Chapter 8
Causality and subjectivity: The causal connectives of Modern Greek

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1. Introduction

This paper deals with the main (Modern Greek) MG causal conjunctions: epeiði, γιατί and διότι. There are many connectives in Greek which, besides their other (main) function or meaning, have either causal connotations or secondarily are used as causal connectives. The prototypical, however, purely causal subordinating-connectives in Greek are the ones examined here. What is interesting to note is that these three causal subordinators are almost invariably translated as because in English.¹ The last one, διότι, has in the past been considered the high version of the causal connective γιατί, and since the climate at the time (after the fall of the junta [1974] and when demotiki, the low variety, became the official language of the state) was unfavourable to lexical items originating from katharevousa, the high variety, διότι was not even included in grammar textbooks as a causal connective. However, it is widely used both in spoken but primarily in written Greek. As both γιατί and διότι have identical etymologies, they also serve similar functions as I have shown in previous studies (Kitis 1994, 1996). On occasion, therefore, I may refer to these two connectives in the singular.

In the present study I want to focus on degrees or types of causality designated by these connectives, the interrelation between causality and temporality as exhibited by epeiði, and issues of subjectivity relating to the use of διότι and γιατί. It will be shown that the functions of these connectives correlate closely with their etymologies and their synchronic meanings are informed by their histories. Their distinct distribution, too, seems to be a reflex of their historical evolution. This study is part of a larger project aiming to prove that conceptual domains such as temporality and causality, as evidenced by Greek connectives, rather than being characterized by discreteness, merge in intricate ways in the use of these connectives. As has been noted, distinct uses of English because-clauses are invariably translated by either epeiði or γιατί and διότι. If there is consistency
in modes of translation, this is expected to inform current theories such as Sweetser’s (1990). Before addressing these issues, however, let me summarize some of my previous findings, as they are pivotal in what follows. For reasons of clear exposition I will label \( epeidi \) as \( \textit{because}_1 \), on the one hand, and \( \gamma iati \) and \( \delta ioti \) as \( \textit{because}_2 \), on the other. The examples have been drawn from a large corpus of both conversational and written language. All examples are real data unless otherwise stated.

Causal connectives have been researched widely in Dutch, French and German (see Pit 2003 for references), but not in English (but see Breul 1997; Lagerwerf 1998). \textit{Because}, with certain exceptions, is a glaring omission from research in connectives in the relevance or the neo-Gricean literature, for instance (cf. Blakemore 2002; Carston 2002; Levinson 2000). The reason for the interest in causal connectives in these other languages seems to be the various linguistic forms that exist in them, while in English \textit{because} (except for infrequent \textit{for}) is the typical causal subordinator. In Greek linguistics, apart from my work, there has been scant interest in the causal connectives of MG (Kalokerinos 1999, 2004), but in Ancient Greek (AG) there is a study of causal conjunctions that may inform our accounts (Rijksbaron 1976).

2. The descriptive account

2.1. Distribution of causal connectives

As I have shown elsewhere (Kitis 1994, 1996), only \( epeidi(bc_1) \) can be preposed (cataphoric) in \( \textit{because} \ p, q \) structures. Whereas \( epeidi(bc_1) \) can occur either initially (cataphoric or forward) in \( \textit{because} \ p, q \) or finally (anaphoric or backward) in \( q \textit{because} \ p \) structures, \( \gamma iati \) and \( \delta ioti \) (\( \textit{because}_2 \)) cannot appear initially in them (*\( \textit{because} \ p, q \)), but always follow their main clauses (\( q, \textit{because} \ p \)). In other words, they are always anaphoric. However, these latter causal connectives can occur, and do occur predominantly, both in spoken (after a longer pause) and in written language (after a full-stop sentence-initially, or even paragraph-initially), but always following their main complementing it. This is a most prevalent use of these two connectives. The former subordinator, \( epeidi(bc_1) \), when it appears finally, is always closely connected to its main, and if it appears sentence-initially, outside the \( \textit{because} \ p, q \) structure, the adverbial clause will constitute another speaker’s turn completing, as in a question-answer adja-
cency pair, its main which is a question; that is, it retains the structure, \( q \) because \( p \):

(1a) \( \gamma iati \ \delta en \ \iota \theta e \ o \ \iota \skh \ \iota \ 
Why not came-3SG the Stephen?
‘Why didn’t Stephen come?’

(1b) \( \varepsilon pei\delta i \ (\gamma iati) \ ine \ aro\theta os. \)
Because\(_1,2\) is ill-MS.
‘Because he is ill’.
(fabricated, both causals possible)

The distribution of these connectives can be summarized pictorially in figure 1:

1. because \( p, q \)
   - \( \varepsilon pei\delta i (bc_1) \)
   - \( *\gamma iati / *\delta ioti (bc_2) \)

2. \( q(, ) \) because \( p \)
   - \( \varepsilon pei\delta i (bc_1) \)
   - \( \gamma iati / \delta ioti (bc_2) \)

3. \( q. \) Because \( p \)
   - \( *\varepsilon pei\delta i (bc_1) \)
   - \( \gamma iati / \delta ioti (bc_2) \)

Figure 1. The distribution of \( \varepsilon pei\delta i (bc_1) \) and \( \gamma iati (bc_2) \)

2.2. Initial placement of ‘\( \varepsilon pei\delta i (bc_1) \)’-clauses in spoken Greek

It is interesting to note that truly initial placement of because-clauses, preceding the main clause, is not encountered in Schiffrin’s (1985, 1987) con-
versational data. Ford (1993: 17) also reports that in her conversational corpus, “because-clauses are never placed before the material they modify.” This is not true of written English, as is well known. In written English, or in some genres (Ford, 1993: 86), initial placement of because-clauses is not only possible but multiply practiced. Ford attributes the absence of initial because in conversational genre of talk to the “lesser degree of planning that goes into it” (86), but also to “the possibility of inferring cause from sequence” (89). My explanation, however, differs from Ford’s (1993), as it draws on the connective’s etymological make-up and its evolutionary meaning (see section 10).

In Greek, on the other hand, initial placement of epeiði(bc) -clauses is very frequent and absolutely typical of conversational data, too:

(2)  epeiði(bc 1) I kolitiða sas ine malon pjo
       'Because your colitis is rather more'
       ektetameni ap’ oti sinðos
       'extensive than what is expected'
       kj epeiði(bc 1) to zaharo sas
       'and because your blood-sugar'
       δen mas epetrepe na sas δosoume kortizoni
       'did not allow us to give you steroids,'
       γ’ afto sas kratisame mesa liýo parapano.
       'that’s why we kept you in a bit longer'.
(telephone conversation between patient and doctor)

This frequent initial placement of epeiði(bc 1) in conversational Greek is considered to be a reflex of aspects of its meaning which derive from its etymological make-up and its diachronic use (see sections 8 and 10).
2.3. Morphological/phonological reduction

The connective \( \gamma iati(bc_2) \) appears in reduced form as \( \gamma ia \) in some dialects and in demotic songs (Tzartzanos, V. II: 138):

\[
Strates mou, katharise milies mou, fountofite \ \gamma ia \ \thetaa \ perasi o \ \gammaambros.
\]

‘Paths, clear up, apple trees, send forth leaves, for the bridegroom will pass’.

It can also appear in reduced form as \( \gamma ia \) in fast speech, just as the English \textit{because}, although not so frequently, it can be both phonologically and morphologically reduced if it is epistemic or performative (as \textit{because} is reduced to ‘cause). It is interesting to note that \( \gamma iati(bc_2) \) cannot bear the main stress in a construction, whereas \( epei\deltai(bc_1) \) can. The reason for this potential of \( epei\deltai \) as well as for the reduced form of \( \gamma iati \) will become evident further down.

3. Grounding the discourse

In an earlier paper (Kitis 1996), I argued that \( epei\deltai(bc_1) \)-introduced preposed clauses, just like initial conditional \textit{if}-clauses (Ford and Thompson 1986; Haiman 1978), “serve a general framework- or background-creating function for the discourse that follows them” (Ford 1993: 14).

The following example comes from an interview with NATO’s ex-Secretery General. The interviewer is not quite happy with the answers he got from Solana regarding his conversion from a staunch anti-Nato campaigner to NATO’s Secretary General, and he decides to rub it in by grounding his argument in a completely new perspective. This grounding and perspectiveization is in this case effected by the use of a very long \( epei\deltai(bc_1) \)-introduced clause (containing 59 words). Solana’s response to it is the second longest in the specific interview:

(3) \textit{Because} \textsubscript{1}/\textit{epei\deltai} I come from a country which, like yours, had and has many prejudices as regards NATO [... etc.] for this (reason) (that’s why) I would also very much like you to tell me [... etc.]
The pro-form ‘for this [that’s why]’ substitutes for the topical causal construction. As Haiman (1978: 577) writes “left-dislocation apes the discourse situation in which topics are generally established: initial mention in a full form is followed by subsequent mention in reduced form.”

Thematic left-dislocation or a pro-form encapsulating the reason/cause clause is not a prerequisite for the initial placement of $\text{epeiōi} (bc_1)$-clauses. Such preposed clauses can preface (un)shared information that serves as background knowledge for the interpretation of more topical discourse (Schiffrin 1987: 205), as in the following example, a memo that circulated at our Department:

(4) Because $\text{epeiōi}$ the loss of the OHP that was in Mr. X’s office will be reported as a theft, we request that whoever took it or forgot it lying around should report it at 308A by Wednesday 9/11/04.

Indeed, preposed $\text{epeiōi} (\text{because} 1)$, just like temporal markers, can function, not only as a topic builder, but also as a topic shift builder and a segmentation marker in continuous discourse (Bestgen and Vonk 2000; Virtanen 1992); but this claim has to be substantiated by a corpus analysis.

In sum, the initial findings of these sections can be stated as follows:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Functions of $\text{epeiōi} (bc_1)$ clauses}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
i. & $\text{epeiōi}(bc_1)$, but not $\text{γiati}$ or $\text{δioti}$, can occur in sentence-initial position in $\text{because} p, q$ structures in all genres, including casual conversation.\footnote{5} \\
ii. & Sentence-initial $\text{epeiōi}(bc_1)$ is discourse dependent in that its completion (or part of it) is to be sought in the following discourse. \\
iii. & Preposed $\text{because} p$ clauses in $\text{because} p, q$ structures have thematization potential. In this function, the presented proposition is assumed to be given or undisputed. \\
iv. & On account of the above, and in particular (ii), we can claim that $\text{epeiōi}(bc_1)$ introduces dependent clauses. \\
v. & On account of the facts summarized in figure 1, it becomes clear that, while $\text{γiati}/\text{δioti}(bc_2)$ can be only anaphoric and it therefore has a backward or retrospective function, $\text{epeiōi}(bc_1)$ can be both anaphoric, and hence can have a backward or retrospective function, but it can also be cataphoric, and hence it can have a forward or prospective function. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
It is often stated in the literature that subordinate adverbial clauses are grouped in language with the “logically” presuppositional clauses (Givon 1982). This claim, though not explicitly stated, must concern only propositional uses of connectives. However, as Givon (1982) stresses, *because*-clauses are “logically presuppositional” but they can also pragmatically rather than logically background information which functions as a topic. Although he does not restrict the topic-function potential of *because*-clauses to initial placement, that is, to forward causal *because*, this point is implicit in his examples. He (1982: 102) concludes: “Logical presupposition, involving ‘truth-values’, is thus a more limited phenomenon, often corresponding to – but never identical with – extreme cases of pragmatic backgrounded-ness”.

It is worth stressing, then, that *epeiði*(bc 1) preposed adverbial clauses do not necessarily (re-)introduce presupposed information, but rather information that needs to be taken on trust, as having been established in previous discourse, as given or as indisputable. Owing to this connective’s (*because 1*) potential for (back-)grounding the following discourse, I dubbed *epeiði*(bc 1) ‘polyphonic’ or ‘heteroglossic’ (Bakhtin 1981); its adverbial clauses can be likened to ‘quotations from previous discourse’ (Akatsuka 1986; Van der Auwera 1986).

4. The factual causality of ‘*epeiði*(bc 1)’

In this section, I will demonstrate that only *epeiði* (*because 1*) introduces factual propositions. To this end I will consider Haiman’s (1978) claim that *because*-clauses are asserted rather than presupposed (573). Although he is not explicit about it, what Haiman has in mind are *q because p* constructions rather than *because p, q* ones. In other words, he examines backward or retrospective *because*. Since in MG we have the option between at least two causal subordinating conjunctions, it is interesting to see how English *because* would be each time translated in Greek depending on whether it introduces presupposed or new information. Let it be noted that both connectives are acceptable (except in 5a) if the presuppositional issue is not heeded.

Haiman considers the timeworn sentence:

(5)  *Do you beat your wife because you love her?*,
which is three-way ambiguous: it can question, depending on where the focus stress occurs, either (i) the causal relation between the two clauses, or (ii) either of the two clauses:

(5a) Do you beat your wife because you love her?
(5b) Do you beat your wife because you love her?
(5c)Do you beat your wife because you love her?
(stress indicated)

In (5a) the question is whether the causal relation holds between the two clauses which represent material or information that is regarded as given. In (5b), on the other hand, the speaker questions the validity of the content of the causal subordinate clause as being adequate grounds for the given action of beating (Given that you beat your wife, do you beat her because you love her?); whereas in (5c) the speaker questions the validity of the content of the main clause as being the effect of the causal proposition. (Given that you love your wife, do you beat her because you love her?). Of course, Haiman’s concern is with topical constructions, but topical constructions need to represent given information. In MG now the situation is quite different, because given causal material is best structured in epeiδi(bc 1)-clauses rather than in γiati(bc 2)-clauses, as can be readily shown in translating Haiman’s sentences:

(6a) xtipas ti γineka sou epeiδi(bc 1)/γiati(bc 2) tin αγapas?
   Beat-2SG the wife your because(bc 1)/bc 2 her love-2SG?

(6b) xtipas ti γineka sou *epeiδi /γiati tin αγapas?
   Beat-2SG the wife your because*(bc 1)/(bc 2) her love-2SG?

(6c) xtipas ti γineka sou epeiδi /γiati tin αγapas?
   Beat-2SG the wife your because(bc 1)/(bc 2) her love-2SG?
   (stress indicated)

In (6a), which is the equivalent of (5a), the acceptable causal conjunction is epeiδi(bc 1), but not γiati(bc 2), which, moreover quite expectedly, cannot carry the main stress. The reason for this situation seems to be that the causal construction must carry presupposed information since what is questioned is, not the contents of the two propositions presented in the two clauses, but rather the causal connection between them. As has been
claimed, *epeidi*(bc 1), but not *yiati*(bc 2), can signal presupposed assumptions. Moreover, since the focus of the question is the causal relation between the two propositions, *epeidi*(bc 1) is the only choice as it is the exponent of ‘pure’ or ‘direct’ causality and can be, unlike *yiati*(bc 2), topicalized or become the focus of cleft-constructions (Kitis 1994). On the contrary, in (6b), which translates (5b), *yiati*(bc 2) sounds better, while *epeidi*(bc 1) seems to be outright unacceptable (unless [6b] is a rhetorical question or a quotational one echoing someone else’s claim); the reason for its unacceptability is the questioning of the causal clause’s proposition. Similarly, in (6c), which translates (5c), *epeidi*(bc 1) is the natural choice, while *yiati*(bc 2) does not seem to presuppose the truth of the causal clause’s proposition. Rather, the speaker’s choice of *yiati*(bc 2) will probably indicate his/her doubts about the truth of the state of affairs presented in the causal clause (a sign of subjectification of causality, see below).  

The claim made regarding the choice of causal connectives in translating Haiman’s examples is corroborated if we try to paraphrase them making explicit each time the presupposed material:

(6bi) δεδομένου οτι ξιτιπά τι γινεικα σου, τι ξιτιπά *epeidi*(bc 1)/*yiati*(bc 2) τιν αγαπάς?
   ‘Given that you beat your wife, do you beat her because(bc 2) you love her?’

The unacceptability of *epeidi*(bc 1) becomes obvious in an alternative question in which the two alternants are contradictories:

(6bii) Given that you beat your wife, do you beat her because(γiati bc 2) you love her or because(γiai bc 2) you hate her?

Let it be noted that *epeidi*(bc 1) in (6b) is unacceptable inasmuch as the question is about whether your loving her or not constitutes the grounds for beating her, which (the beating) is the topic (given), and not just about the causal relation; (6c) will be paraphrased as follows:

(6ci) δεδομένου οτι αγαπάς τι γινεικα σου, τι ξιτιπά *epeidi*(bc 1)/?*yiati*(bc 2) τιν αγαπάς?
‘Given that you love your wife, do you beat her because(bc1) you love her?’

In (6ci) epeiði(bc1) is acceptable if the question is about whether you beat her or not on the grounds that you love her, whereas γiati(bc2) is questionable in this case.

It appears that whenever the proposition of the causal clause is presented as an undisputed presupposed fact, epeiði(bc1), rather than γiati(bc2), seems to be the preferred causal connective. We can conclude that only epeiði(bc1), but not γiati(bc2), can bear both the presuppositional (factual) and the focused causal relation.

5. Syntactic and semantic constraints on causal connectives

In previous studies (Kitis 1994, 1996), I identified both syntactic and semantic constraints characterizing the use of (because 1)-clauses: epeiði(because 1)-introduced clauses have potential for topicalization and can be left-dislocated (see section 3), can be embedded, and are included within the scope of the negative operator of the main clause. These constraints do not affect γiati/δioti(bc2)-introduced clauses. The latter can be neither topicalized or left-dislocated, nor can they be included within the scope of the negative operator of the main clause; γiati/δioti(bc2)-introduced clauses also resist embedding.

Moreover, these constraints seem to affect, or rather reflect, the type of relation that holds between the conjoined clauses. As we have seen, the two causal connectives (because1, because2) are not freely interchangeable, even in structure (ii) (fig. 1), that is, when they occur in postposed clauses. In many cases, quite apart from presuppositional aspects of the introduced clause, the substitution of epeiði(bc1) for γiati(bc2) is unacceptable:

(7) anapsan,fotja γiati/*epeiði vlepo kapno
    Lit-3PL fire, because2/*bc1 see-1SG smoke.
    ‘They lit fire, (be)’cause I see smoke’. (fabricated)
While *epeiði*(because 1) cannot occur in (7), in some other cases its substitution for *γiati*(because 2) or *δioti*(because 2) incurs a dramatic change in the function of the adverbial clause it introduces:

(8) an δen tis etroγes, θa peθenes.
If not them ate-2SG would died-2SG.
‘If you did not eat them, you would die.’

δen ihe simasia an i patatoflouðes itan vromikes,
Not did matter if the potato peel was dirty,
‘It did not matter if the potato peel was dirty,’

*γiati* δen tis eplenan.
because2 not them washed-3PL.
‘because they did not wash them’.

It is interesting to note that in (8) the *because*-clause – as each time it follows a comma or a significant pause – occurs as an intonationally separate unit. And as such this adverbial clause can admit *γiati* or *δioti* (because 2) but not *epeiði* (bc 1). If the latter causal subordinator replaces *γiati*(bc 2), then it has to be intonationally incorporated within the main clause, and the meaning of the structure q *because* p is completely changed: The causal adverbial *epeiði*(bc 1)-clause is included within the scope of the negative operator. So, what is negated is the causal connection obtaining between the main and the subordinate clause, as can be shown in the following notation:

(a) *epeiði* ~ ((p → q) because 1 ~ r)

As I have demonstrated here and elsewhere (Kitis 1996), the proposition of the adverbial *epeiði*(bc 1)-clause is considered factual. In the actual example, (8), however, what is negated is the proposition of the main clause only, while that of the *γiati* (because 2)-clause is excluded from the negative scope as its function is simply to explain why the peel was dirty. It focuses on the lexical item ‘dirty’:

(b) *γiati* ~ (p → q) because 2 ~ r
γιατί (because₂), therefore, seems to introduce in a separate intonational unit a clause that functions as an explanation, justification or metalinguistic comment.

In all cases of the use of epeιδι (because₁) the causal connection is pronounced or strong. In other words, the function of the construction q epeιδι (because₁) p is to actually assert the causal connection between p and q. This is at least partly the reason why an epeιδι (because₁)-introduced clause can be included within the scope of the negative operator. This also explains why thus introduced clauses can be embedded in reporting verbs. What is embedded or reported is the causal relation between the two propositions of the clauses (Kitis 1996). So the question that seems to emerge regards the kind of causal connection that is signified by the two types of causal connective. Or else, if a causal connection is asserted by epeιδι (because₁), what is the function of γιατί/διοτί (because₂)? Kitis (1994: 313) writes in this connection:

The causal connection in all cases [of γιατί (because₂)] has to be inferred because it is indirect. By ‘indirect’ I mean that the explanation arrived at on the basis of what is stated is not subsumed under a regularity or a generalization. On the face of it, therefore, sentences do not exhibit the same degree of explanatory coherence as they would if the accession of the explanation did not require any extra inferential effort.

And Kitis (1996) underlines that only epeιδι (because₁), but not γιατί (because₂), can signify factuality (see Keller 1995), presuppositionality (see Chafe 1984) and causal relations. The claim that the former connective (because₁) only signifies a causal relation between the two clauses is also proven by its potential to be embedded and be included within the scope of the negative operator. That epeιδι-clauses only connote factuality and presuppositionality is shown by their intolerance of epistemic modalizers suspending the factual character of the epeιδι (because₁)-introduced clause, such as modal verbs and adverbs, while they can be modified by adverbs strengthening the causal relation (Kitis 1994):

(9) Ti δέρνε γιατί/επειδί malon δέν τιν αγάπα
her-ACC beat-3SG bc₂/bc₁ rather not her-ACC love-3SG
‘He beats her, because₂ he rather doesn’t love her’.
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(10) Tis δini δora sinehos
her-ACC give-3SG presents constantly

γιατί*/επειδή prepi(epist.) na tin aγαπα
bc2*/bc1 must[epist]-3SG to her-ACC love

‘He gives her presents all the time because2 he must(epist.) love her’. (fabricated, επειδή(bc1) in 10 will render ‘must’ deontic)

As the propositional content of γιατί(bc2)-clauses is not considered factual or presuppositional, but is rather asserted, these clauses have acquired a more or less autonomous status; as a result γιατί(bc2) clauses can at times be regarded as (near-)paratactic rather than subordinate.

In conclusion, γιατί/διότι(bc2) clauses resist embedding, intonational incorporation with the main and inclusion within the main clause’s negative scope. Moreover, as γιατί/διότι(bc2) is not the prototypical exponent of a causal relation between the two clauses, it cannot be topialized. In short, γιατί/διότι(bc2) clauses cannot be considered presupposed or factual and, as they are independently asserted and their causal connection to the main is weak, they are not dependent on the nucleus (main) sentence. It follows then that while επειδή(bc1)-clauses must be truth-evaluable within the complex sentence, γιατί/διότι(bc2) clauses need not affect the truth-conditions of the conjunction.

6. Sweetser’s solution

In this section I will turn to Sweetser’s (1990) account as an obvious source for a solution to our problem. She claims that we can explain the function of causal connectives in terms of the three domains she identifies, at which language supposedly functions, of content-world, epistemicity and speech-acts. The examples she cites in relation to causal connectives will be best translated as follows:

(11a) John came back because he loved her.
(11b) John loved her, because he came back.
(11c) What are you doing tonight, because there’s a good movie on.
(11a) o γιανις γιρισε επειδή(bc1) tin ayapouse

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Let it be noted that (11a) will accept \(\gamma iati(bc_2)\), too. However, the content-world reading is clearly rendered only with \(epei\delta i(bc_1)\); \(\gamma iati(bc_2)\) signals a rather subjective (the speaker’s) interpretation of the situation (see below).

At first sight it appears that \(epei\delta i(bc_1)\) functions as a content-world connective whereas \(\gamma iati(bc_2)\) has an epistemic and speech-act use. Indeed, Sweetser (1990: 82) writes: “My final argument for the existence of these domains is that there are languages whose vocabularies distinguish more clearly among the domains than is the case in English.”

However attractive Sweetser’s solution may appear to be, it loses its explanatory rigor as soon as we apply her trichotomization to real data (Kitis 1996). The reason for the collapse of the theory is that there can hardly be any neat trichotomization of domains, as postulated by Sweetser, especially between the content and the epistemic domains. As was shown in Kitis (1994, 1996) in many cases, \(\gamma iati(bc_2)\) functions as an attenuated causal connective introducing a reason explanation or a justification or even a comment that is very loosely connected with the main clause or with some lexical item, or it can even have a meta-linguistic or metadiscursive commentary function. For example, \(\gamma iati(bc_2)\)-clauses are nowadays overwhelmingly used in advertisements and in most cases there is no clear connection between the \(\gamma iati(bc_2)\)-clause and the preceding main one. It usually functions as a comment justifying why we should buy a product as admonished in the main clause or even in a preceding NP:

\[
\begin{align*}
(12) & \quad \text{Beauty shop, } \gamma iati & i & \text{ aniksi } \theta ei & \text{ ananeosi} \\
& \quad \text{Beauty shop, because}_2 \text{ the spring wants change.}
\end{align*}
\]

‘Beauty shop, because \(\text{spring calls for change}’.

The connection between a directive speech act, which is presumably performed in the elliptical NP-main clause, and the adverbial clause hardly warrants a speech-act interpretation of the function of this connective, as its proposition does not refer to “the relevance or irrelevance of a state of affairs as causing or impeding the speaker’s action” (Sweetser 1990: 81). Consider the gloss: ? We are inviting you to come round to the Beauty shop because spring calls for change.
If we concede that the main clause performs the speech act of inviting (directive), then one of the (rather peripheral) felicity conditions for this speech act might be the stating of a reason for speaker’s performing the act (Searle 1975). However, whereas in speech act theory this reason is incorporated in the speech act performed, either directly (“Why don’t you be quiet?”), or by embedding the speech act clause (“You ought to be more polite to your mother”), or by making it dependent as an object-clause on the main expressing the reason (“It might help if you shut up”), in our case we would have to stretch the notion of ‘reason’ beyond any generally acceptable, patterned connection between the two clauses.

This ‘peculiarity’ is by no means characteristic of Greek advertising only:

(13) Everybody recognizes status. 
Because not everybody has it. (American Bank advertisement)

(13) admits γιατί(bc 2), but not επειδή(bc 1), in its Greek translation. If we read this as a content-world because, which seems the only option available in this case, then our world will become a very strange place to live in. Moreover, as we read this advertisement, indeed we feel an authorial authoritative voice (persona). Is it then an epistemic or speech-act because?

We seem to be on a wild-goose chase.

Another ‘peculiar’ function of the same connective, which does not seem amenable to a Sweetserian interpretation, is the following:

(14) Θα σας ηνα δο μίπος εχο καμία φοτοτιπία εγώ, 
Will  search-1SG to see whether have-1SG any copy I ‘I’ll have a look just in case I have a copy’,

γιατί to iha persi. 
because it-clitic had-1SG last year

‘because_2(γιατι[bc 2]/επειδή[bc 1]) I had it last year’.

(a colleague and I looking for a document; she suggests that she should have a look in her office, ‘unmarked’ [falling] intonation is assumed, for rising intonation, see Kitis 1994)

(14) cannot be a content-world connective (if it were its paraphrase would run as follows: Because I had it last year, I may have it this year too; but not: ?Because I had it last year, I’ll have a look inside), neither can it be an epistemic one. The because-clause cannot be the premise for the main as
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conclusion. (Gloss: ?Since/Because I had it last year I can conclude that I’ll have a look inside! “The because-clause is fully sufficient as a cause for the act of concluding” Sweetser, 1990: 80). The only viable interpretation might be the speech-act one; but then the adverbial clause does not justify the speech act performed (stating), but rather its propositional content, and therefore it can be better explained as providing a reason explanation (a non-nomic cause, Itkonen, 1983) for it (for the action which is described as imminent).

If (14) can be somehow made to fit Sweetser’s thesis, consider (15):

(15) i̲hame, δilaδi, ti hiroteti θea
    ‘We had, that is, the worst view,
       Had-1PL, namely, the worst view,
       ‘We had, that is, the worst view,’

γiati i kaliteri θea eylepe stin ayia sofia.
    because2 the better view looked-3SG to the St. Sofia
    ‘because the best view was over St. Sofia (church).’

(15) epeiði(bc1) is totally unacceptable in this context precisely because there is no causal connection that is being asserted between the two clauses;12 γiati(bc2) does little more in (15) than actually conjoin the two clauses in an argumentative or elaborative manner. The γiati(bc2)-clause elaborates on the main one.

Whatever tests we may apply to (15), we will not detect any causal or evidential, or reason relation between the two clauses in whatever domain we look for its interpretation:

(15) a. *The reason for having the worst view was that the best view was over St. Sofia.

(15) b. *Because the best view was over St. Sofia, we had the worst view.

(15) c. *Since the best view was over St. Sofia, we had the worst view.

(15) d. *I am in a position to say/assert/know/conclude that we had the worst view, because the best view was over St. Sofia Church.

Such examples that do not fit Sweetser’s thesis, even at the propositional level considered here, are legion in my corpus.

Initially, her thesis seems to make sense in the case of the Greek causal connectives: epeiði(bc1) is the causal connective used for the content-world
domain and $\gamma_{iati}(bc_2)$ is the connective used for the other two domains, epistemicity and speech acts. However, Sweetser’s thesis collapses under the strain of real data occurrences of the Greek causal connectives. Although we might initially claim that the identification of the domains is a way of getting off the ground, the problem with the meaning and function of $\gamma_{iati/\dot{i}ioti}(bc_2)$ looms large. Moreover, $epeio\ddot{i}(bc_1)$ can be used as a speech act connective in initial placement even when an explicit performative verb is absent (Kalokerinos 1999; Kitis 1994, 1996). Quite clearly, we have to look in a different direction for an adequate explanatory account. Before turning to other sources that might provide an explanatory account though, it would be useful to state the findings of the above sections:

7. The findings

To conclude this rather descriptive section we may summarize the main findings in the following table:

Table 2. Functions of MG causal connectives

i. $epeio\ddot{i}(bc_1)$, on the one hand, and $\gamma_{iati/\dot{i}ioti}(bc_2)$, on the other, are not freely interchangeable, even in post-posed position.

ii. $\gamma_{iati/\dot{i}ioti}(bc_2)$ only can occur sentence/paragraph initially, but always following the main clause.

iii. $\gamma_{iati/\dot{i}ioti}(bc_2)$ only can be considered near-paratactic connectives.

iv. $epeio\ddot{i}(bc_1)$ only is factual.

v. $epeio\ddot{i}(bc_1)$-clauses only can be cleft-constructed.

vi. $epeio\ddot{i}(bc_1)$-clauses are always subordinate to the main clause.

vii. $epeio\ddot{i}(bc_1)$-clauses only can be included within the scope of the negative operator, can be embedded and intonationally integrated within the main.

viii. $epeio\ddot{i}(bc_1)$ in $q$ because $p$ structures always asserts a causal relation between the two clauses.

ix. $epeio\ddot{i}(bc_1)$ predominantly can assert causal relations that are considered direct (also see section 9).

x. $epeio\ddot{i}(bc_1)$ only can be the focus by bearing the main stress.

xi. $epeio\ddot{i}(bc_1)$ signals a cause or a reason irrespective of its placement (initial/final).

γιατί/διότι (bc 2) can signal a cause or a reason, but it predominantly appears to signal a rather attenuated form of an indirect causal relation or sometimes it appears to have an argumentative or elaborative function (also see section 9).

8. The explanatory account

8.1. The grammaticalization of ‘epeidi (bc 1)’

While these findings are interesting, we have not explained why we have two distinct types of causal subordinating connective each being characterized by distinct formal and functional characteristics. How can we explain features such as the assertiveness, but non-factuality, of γιατί/διότι (bc 2), or the factuality and initial placement of epeidi (bc 1) even in conversational data?

Tracing back the history of epeidi (bc 1), we see that this connective was primarily a temporal conjunction and a causal one already in Homer. But originally it probably was a deictic expression having a demonstrative-local meaning (Schwyzer 1939: 659):

\[
\text{επ-ει} (= \text{dar-auf}) \rightarrow \text{επεί} \rightarrow \text{επεί δή} \rightarrow \text{επειδή}^{13}
\]

\[
\text{ep-ei} (= \text{dar-auf}) \rightarrow \text{epei} \rightarrow \text{epei δί} \rightarrow \text{epeidi}
\]

There seems to have been a unidirectional course in the evolution of the meaning of epeidi from the more concrete domains of locality and temporality to causality:

\[\text{demonstrative-local} \rightarrow \text{temporal} \rightarrow \text{causal}\]

Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer (1991: 50) write that “spatial concepts are more basic than other concepts and therefore provide an obvious template for the latter.” As has been amply demonstrated in the literature, meanings that were initially conveyed as conversational implicatures were later established as conventional ones and later entrenched as semantic meanings. It can be surmised that AG epei, which was a temporal connective, also acquired meanings of causality, initially by conversational implicature, that were later mutated to stable conventional implicatures and semantic meaning. Rijksbaron (1976), who claims that epeidi-clauses of
AG have to be interpreted along the same lines as epei-clauses (95), reports causal implications of temporal epei and epeidi (‘seeing that’, ‘now that’) in Herodotus, although he claims that this observation does not necessitate assignment of causal meanings to the conjunction (76, 93) (cf. Powel 1949 for a different view). Besides, the most frequently used causal connective of AG was γαρ/γar (Rijksbaron 1976: 185).

This evolution of epeiδi’s meaning, then, may explain a great deal of its characteristics, namely its initial placement, its discourse-grounding function, its factuality, its signifying a causal relation between the two clauses, its potential for presuppositionality and the speaker’s uncommitted status regarding the introduced clause. The epeiδi-introduced clause bears an iconic relation to its main – that can also be called a consequent – in because p, q structures (Kitis 1996). Indeed, we can speak of antecedent-consequent clauses strictly only in the case of epeiδi(bc 1). In the case of γιατί/διοτί(bc 2) the relation can be so ‘loose’ that these terms do not seem to be warranted. So broad is the relation between the two clauses that διοτί(bc 2) initiated paragraphs seem to be more than frequent in the genre of argumentative writing (see notes 4, 20). Resonating Langacker (1991: 425), one could say that epeiδι(bc 1), but not γιατί/διοτί(bc 2), marks a stative relation that designates the spatio-temporal and causal posteriority of its trajector (a process) following its landmark.

The speaker’s uncommitted stance regarding the epeiδι(bc 1) adverbial proposition is due to its iconic reflection of a temporal order:

```
  event A  →  event B
```

Causality invokes the concept of time. As soon as we say why something happened, we invoke the flow of time (Deutsch 1997). The propositions of epeiδι(bc 1)-clauses, whether depicting events or plans or states of affairs, are regarded as constants in our speech, impervious to any further deliberations. Even when the epeiδι(bc 1)-clause refers to the future (example 4), its proposition is considered to be already in existence at its allotted moment, and as such it can act as the cause of some effect. So epeiδι(bc 1)’s factivity and perfectivity has little to do with surface grammatical epiphenomena, such as our tense system, but more with a
conceptual brand of factivity and perfectivity that presents events, plans, or even future arrangements and states as a conceptual fait accompli. In this sense, therefore, epeiði(bc 1) has a rather deterministic character.\textsuperscript{16}

*epeiði(bc 1)*, then, is a causal subordinating connective that, although well entrenched in the domain of causality, borders also on the domain of temporality.\textsuperscript{17} Yet, due to the characteristics we identified we tend to regard it as the prototypical subordinating causal connective of MG. It appears, then, that prototypical causality needs to share a fair amount of the pie with temporality.

It seems that we are now in a position to complete table 1 (section 3), which concerns primarily *epeiði(bc 1)*, as follows:

*Supplement to Table 1. Further functions of epeiði(bc 1) clauses*

- **vi.** epeiði(bc 1) *p, q* structures exhibit the relation of cause. This relation is conceptual or logical (logical precedence of cause over effect) but it is coded semantically, too, in the conjunction.
- **vii.** Since the *epeiði p* (*because 1 p*) proposition in *because p, q* structures is considered to be an antecedent to the consequent sentence or discourse, it can be claimed that the linguistic structure of such *because p, q* constructions (and consequently of *epeiði p, q* constructions) is iconic of its conceptual structure.

8. 2. The subjectivity of ‘γiati’ and ‘δioti’ (because 2)

Although γiati/δioti(bc 2)-introduced clauses are not factual but rather asserted, one might feel that there is a tinge of non-assertibility about their proposition. This non-assertibility comes through in their asserted status as the speaker’s subjective commitment to the proposition expressed. Whereas the proposition of *epeiði(bc 1)*-clauses is looked upon at a distance as reflecting an objective state of affairs, the proposition that γiati/δioti(bc 2) introduces is filtered through the speaker’s subjective interface. Therefore, while *epeiði(bc 1)*-clauses are regarded as objective and undisputed (often due to the temporal anteriority of real events in real time or of logical/conceptual anteriority) and can be taken on trust, γiati/δioti(bc 2)-introduced propositions may be considered subjective since they have not been grounded in the deictic spatial, temporal dimension via their conjunction.
Tracing back the history of γιατί/διότι (bc 2), we must first note that γιατί is the low variety version of διότι. So, these two conjunctives are the two faces of the same coin, as we have already seen. It is interesting to note that the interrogative particle why in MG has the same form as the causal γιατί.\(^\text{18}\) Again, this form is the version that originated from the AG preposition διά/δια (‘for/by’) and the interrogative pronoun τί/τι (‘what?’). AG διότι, therefore, answered to interrogative διά τί? διά τούτο ὅτι/δια τί? διά touto ὅτι (‘for that-DEM that-CONJ’). Thus, reanalysis of this conjunction provides evidence for Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer’s claim that there is a shift in functions, from hearer-oriented interpersonal function to textual function: interrogative structures are reanalyzed as subordinate structures involving the grammaticalization of question markers to markers of clause-subordination.

\[\text{διά τί?} \rightarrow \text{διά τούτο ὅτι} \rightarrow \text{διά τούτο ὅτι (deshalb weil')} \rightarrow \text{διότι} \rightarrow \gammaίατί ὅτι(=\text{CONJ})\]

We must also note that ὅτι/οτι in AG is not only a conjunction serving as a non-factive complementizer to assertive verbs, but primarily to mental and psychological verbs (Monro 2000: 242). In other words, the origin of ὅτι/οτι leads us onto paths of subjectivity. As a causal conjunction, ὅτι/οτι appears to function in AG in exactly the same fashion as does γιατί/διότι (bc 2) in MG.\(^\text{19}\)

All this can explain why γιατί/διότι (bc 2) may function as a subjectivity marker introducing arguments (which of course are asserted but subjective). This subjectivity element inherent in διότι (bc 2)’s evolutionary history and etymological make-up can account for its use as a speech-act connective or an epistemic one, since in both cases there is no explicitation of the inferential premises drawn upon by the speaker, but rather the interpreter needs to retrieve implicit inferential configurations for its interpretation. This causal connective is the one to modulate causes, internalize and mutate them to reasons, and introduce illocutionary forces. Its argumentative assertiveness is also explained on the grounds of its subjectivity. What is filtered through the speaker’s cognitive interface comes out as an argument or is looked upon as having the force of one. Its argumentative force also explains its tendency to become a paratactic connective:
Since the γιατί/διοτί( bc 2)-clause’s primary function is to assert the speaker’s belief or to state his/her argument, the causal relation is accorded secondary importance. Moreover, the causal connection can be modalized in a number of ways, since the proposition does not iconically reflect the out-there order of the real world or necessarily a nomic proposition. Since γιατί/διοτί( bc 2)-clauses are not ‘objectively’ or necessarily causal, the conjunction enters a process of desemanticization, shedding part of its meaning narrowly described as causal. And as the causal relation is not focused, the conjunction cannot be focused upon (no-clefting potential). Indeed, γιατί/διοτί( bc 2) may best be described as a broadly functioning argumentative discourse marker rather than a causal connective.  

Moreover, γιατί/διοτί( bc 2), just like another temporal/causal connective of MG, αφού/afou (since) (cf. Kitis 2000b), exhibits a high degree of position variability, as shown in the examples below:

(16) δοσε mou ta γράμματα, fevγο γιατι
    ‘Give me the letters, because2’
    ‘Give me the letters, because2 I’m leaving’.

(17) A: to αφίσε πιάνα to plino [to sakaki]? 
    it-clitic left-2SG to it-clitic wash-1SG [the jacket]? 
    θα to pas ston rafti?
    Will it-clitic take-2SG to the tailor? 
    ‘Did you leave it [the jacket] for me to wash? Will you take it to the tailor?’
B: mpori
    ‘Maybe’
A: ine γιατι skismeno kses [kseris].
    Is-3SG because2 torn know-2SG 
    ‘Because it is torn, you know’.

(18) S’ ayapao afou.
    You-ACC love-1SG since
    ‘But/Because I love you’. 
γιατί, just like αφου (since), can occur medially (17), or can be ‘appended’ at the end of a clause (main, 16) transforming it into an explanation, justification or argument, thus communicatively incorporating the clause in which they occur into the preceding discourse. This behavior of these two connectives, which is identified initially at the conceptual or propositional level of their function, can thus be interpreted as evidence for a process of grammaticalization and desemanticization, whereby they emerge as discourse particles. Reanalysis of these connectives will show a shift in both semantic and syntactic categories affecting the status of both the proposition and the sentence in which they occur. Thus marked (by appending or interposing γιατί and αφου) utterances seem to have an echoic status, in that they do not further the discourse in respect of its informational increment.

All this leads us to regard επειδή as the prototypical causal connective, on the one hand, and, on the other, to view διοτί, but primarily γιατί, not only as an expressive marker, but also as a device (particle) for organizing conversation, since it functions as a semantically rather empty co-ordinating connective (Kitis 1994). So Traugott’s (1989) schema, is not only applicable in the case of γιατί, but it would also have to reflect γιατί’s organizational potential as a discourse marker and as a conversation-organizing device:

\[ \text{Propositional} \rightarrow \text{textual} \rightarrow \text{expressive} \rightarrow \text{interactional (or conversation organizational)} \]

(Traugott’s schema extended)

While επειδή seems to merge the temporal with the causal domains, γιατί/διοτί, on the other hand, is a clear case where the supposedly ‘out-there’ content-world is caught in the net of the subjective world that filters everything that comes its way, internalizing external stimuli as causes and reason explanations, or simply co-ordinating them as barely relevant. Indeed, γιατί can be said to be a purely ‘relevance connective’ (Blakemore 1987; Moeschler 1993), with procedural function, orientating the hearer to access the clause it introduces as relevant to what has preceded it, or as relevant to the main directionality of the discourse (Koutoupi-Kitis 1982). The acute question that emerges is whether in our linguistic world, which both reflects and is reflected by the extra-linguistic world, we can have clear-cut cases and neat categorization such as causality and temporality, epistemicity and factuality, subjectivity and objectivity.
If Keller (1995) is right in his claim that we must distinguish only between epistemic and factual causal connectives, then we can assume that we are left with the onus of having to account for these two latter types of connectives. Surely, Sweetser’s model, neat and tidy as it may be, is not adequate for explaining their function, as I have shown. What needs to be taken on board is their evolutionary course, their etymological make-up and a careful examination of the versatility of their functions which will be extracted from a big corpus. What is most essential, though, is to blot out a neat demarcating line between a content-world domain and an epistemic one, because, as we have seen with respect to MG causal connectives, the postulation of these domains cannot afford us an adequately explanatory account of real data occurrences of these connectives.

As I have shown here by way of considering the main MG causal connectives, cognitive domains such as the factual or objective and the internal-subjective rub shoulders producing disconcerting friction as do domains, such as temporality and causality, which cannot be ripped apart.

In the following section I will discuss the issue of objectivity-subjectivity that is brought to bear on the use of the connectives under discussion. The notions of subjectivity, speaker involvement and perspective have often been identified as underlying factors regulating the use and function of causal connectives (Pander Maat and Degand 2001; Pit 2003; Verhagen 2000, amongst others). However, my notion of subjectivity is quite distinct as it relates to types of knowledge and reasoning. In what follows I will elaborate on this issue and will propose a principled (non-discrete) distinction between the two domains of subjectivity and objectivity.

9. Subjectivity vs. objectivity

I would now like to draw our attention to a well known and well appreciated fact of more recent linguistic research, that audible and “visible language is only the tip of the iceberg of invisible meaning construction” as Fauconnier (1997: 1) put it so succinctly. The main bulk of the iceberg that stays underground, or rather underwater, to carry the metaphor further, is the more or less well organized system of structured background knowledge in memory on the basis of which both language and reasoning function.

This background knowledge, as I claimed elsewhere (Kitis 1982, 1987a, b, 1995, 1999, 2000a), can be represented in frame and script structures stored in memory (Minsky 1975; Nelson 1996; Schank and Abelson 1977).
In my view, the generic informational content (the flesh) of these structures can be stated primarily, if not exclusively, in the form of the ‘primordial’ conditional. It should be recalled that conditionals are assumed to be incorporated in the formal structure of universal statements, too (‘For every \( x \), if \( x \) is \( S \), \( x \) is \( P \)). Both law and non-law statements may be expressed in this general form. But law statements warrant inferences of the form ‘if \( a \), which is \( S \), then \( a \) is \( P \).’ The latter inference is an instantiation, or a token, with specific values of the former general law-like statement, or the type, which is expressed in variable form.

Now, because-clauses can be considered to be the reverse of if \( p \)…then \( q \) (\( p \rightarrow q \)) conditional statements that are structured in thematic chunks in our encyclopaedic memory. Moreover, they might on occasion be regarded as instantiations of more or less general (law-like) statements, that is, statements regarding specific cases: (i) The water boiled because it reached 100° C, (If water reaches 100° C, water boils [generic]).

It does not seem unfathomable to assume a principled, but fuzzy, division between two types of reasoning, one firmly based on general background knowledge-and-belief systems as stored in memory (example [i]), and another based on more individualized subjective quasi-knowledge and beliefs. If background knowledge-and-belief systems are generally accepted, they form the backdrop of language use and language comprehension, as such systems support inferencing processes. This type of knowledge can be called, rather schematically, ‘objective knowledge’.

What the term ‘objective knowledge’ needs to bring to the fore is the intersubjective character of this type of knowledge and beliefs that is the subject matter of semantic and broad encyclopaedic memory. In the French (post)structuralist tradition intersubjectivity would be construed as a kind of intertextuality (Barthes 1970; Kristeva 1969), but not all knowledge and beliefs need to be the product of other texts (Lyons 1979). In Koutoupis-Kitis (1982) I postulated two types of background knowledge and beliefs: Standing Background Knowledge and Beliefs (SBK Bs), corresponding mostly to rather intersubjective, objectivized knowledge, and Current Mutual Contextual Assumptions (CM CAs), which include local knowledge and rather subjective beliefs (cf. Kitis 2000a; see also Allen 1995 and Nelson 1996 for similar distinctions). This type of more individualized quasi-knowledge and beliefs can be called ‘subjective knowledge’.

Further, we can represent these two domains of knowledge and beliefs as two bipolar extremes on an epistemic continuum. At one extreme there will be placed what might be called the objective or intersubjective domain and at its antipode the subjective domain. Indeed, Searle (1995, 1997, 2002,
Eliza Kitis (2004) distinguishes between objective and subjective epistemic claims. These two extremes are the end points of a conceptual epistemic continuum connecting the knowledge-substrata of our propositions and, more generally, of reasoning. Figure 2 is a schematic representation of the proposed cline. The top level of the cline reflects the world level, both objective and subjective; the bottom level represents the epistemic continuum between the two types of knowledge that interact (dotted lines) with their counterparts at the world level (domains), both feeding them and being fed by them:

\[ \text{cline} \]

\[ \text{Figure 2. The epistemic subjectivity-objectivity cline} \]

The ‘objective’ polar extreme of the proposed cline would ‘attract’ objective knowledge, nomic regularities and common knowledge, all expressed in the form of law-like conditional statements (Kitis 1995, 1999, 2000a). In short, at this extreme there would cluster common knowledge as objective configurations of subjective knowledge, and, consequently, statements of direct causality, interpretable as nomic or non-nomic regularities, norms and internalized rationality principles. Objective knowledge then can be captured in if...then conditional clauses. Interpretation of linguistic contributions supported by objective knowledge would also require a more direct type of reasoning. In short, it would not ordinarily involve inferential leaps that would require active inferencing procedures on the part of the interpreter. At this end of objective knowledge, one would expect both such if...then general statements, but also their instantiations concerning specific cases. Because-clauses expressing what I called direct causality (Kitis
1994) are expected to be converted into such general conditional statements: because \( p \), \( q \) or \( q \) because \( p \) statements would be directly paraphraseable as if \( p \), then \( q \)\(^{26}\) ones, where both \( p \) and \( q \) would retain their propositional form and content, or would be their generalized entailments.\(^{27}\) Consequently, these structures can be instantiated both in epeidi(bc 1) and \( \gamma i a t i / \delta i o t i (b c 2) \) clauses (the latter only in postposed position).

At the other extreme, labeled subjectivity, one would expect a clustering of non-general knowledge (subjective quasi-knowledge, or beliefs, not supported by common knowledge); also, uncertain knowledge and individualized configurations of reasoning patterns which have not acquired a general status and are not, therefore, regarded as objective or factual, or at times, even acceptable. This type of non-‘objective’ (in the sense of non-intersubjective, non-generalized and non-recurring)\(^{28}\) quasi-knowledge and beliefs cannot be represented in generic \( p \rightarrow q \) statements. Intentional causality (Searle 1983) tends to be supported by this latter type of knowledge structures. Capturing this type of knowledge as conceptually underpinning the use of causal statements often entails reasoning that requires maximal inferential leaps on the part of the interpreter; such inferential leaps are not readily predicted or anticipated on account of systematically stored-in-memory knowledge types. In other words, this proposal subsumes epistemic and speech act uses of connectives under an inferential procedure that involves inferential leaps, which, however, once explicitated will reveal conceptual links at the semantic propositional level. On this view then epistemic and speech act uses of connectives can be regarded as short-circuited conceptual ones. It is this type of short-circuited or ‘gapped’ reasoning then that would not admit epeidi(bc 1) but license \( \gamma i a t i / \delta i o t i (b c 2) \) (cf. examples 8, 12, 14, 15). Quite apart from speech act and epistemic uses of causal connectives, this proposal will also encompass many other cases similar to the ones identified here that do not fall within the one or the other category. Therefore, this account seems to be more adequate and elegant since it subsumes under its purview all cases of causal connection.

The suggested cline between the two domains of objectivity and subjectivity (adopting rather general fuzzy terms) may recall Sweetser’s (1990) postulation of the domains of content-world and epistemicity. However, quite apart from the absence of discreteness in the postulated continuum, Sweetser’s domain of epistemicity is the product of mapping operations from the sociophysical world, whereas the proposed subjectivity-objectivity dimension relates to the content of our linguistic contributions, its knowledge-substrata residing in memory, and the brand of reasoning used.
Returning to the case of the Greek causal connectives, I would like to propose, in a rather programmatic fashion, that \( \text{epei} \delta \) is the causal connective functioning primarily at the objectivity end, whereas both \( \gamma \text{iati} \) and \( \delta \text{ioti} \) can handle cases that would cluster around the subjectivity pole, although they could also occur at or near the objectivity end, especially in fuzzy cases of causality, factuality and presuppositionality. Indeed, I suggest that this latter connective (\( \gamma \text{iati/} \delta \text{ioti} \)) should be seen as a lexical development indexing a domain of subjective individualized quasi-knowledge. It can be further proposed that, not only its morphology, but also its syntactic behaviour (final placement or post-item placement [following the item it qualifies] examples 16, 17) is a development of the conceptual subjective domain from which it derives its function. Subjective, individualized, non-general quasi-causation is rendered as explanation rather than as objective causation. The latter (objective causation) need not be filtered through the subjective interface as it has been amassed and entrenched in ‘public’ memory. It need not be expanded into an inferential chain that is assumed but not directly stated in our linguistic contributions. Objective causation can be linguistically rendered as directly linked clauses of conditional statements. Moreover, the former (subjective explanation or justification) ordinarily follows its explicandum, as it relies on subjective internalized quasi-causation precepts, not readily translated in conditional statements.

It appears, therefore, that all the characteristics of the two connectives discussed here fall out of the bipolar continuum between subjectivity-objectivity proposed here. More specifically, \( \text{epei} \delta \) can be preposed in an iconic fashion, just as causes in the objective domain (representing the ‘out-there’ world) are conceived and perceived as preceding their effects, while \( \gamma \text{iati/} \delta \text{ioti} \) always follow their main clause, mirroring our subjectively interpreted causation or reason explanation which ordinarily follows the exlanandum; \( \text{epei} \delta \)'s potential for grounding the discourse, for factuality and presuppositionality falls out of its firm capacity to frame propositions in a ‘speaker-detached’, so to speak, fashion and present them as objective and factual states or events, unrelated to the subjectivity of the speaker.

In sum, what lies behind the notion of a content or propositional causal connective (primarily \( \text{epei} \delta \)) is our ability to subsume the relation between the two clauses within a nomic or non-nomic patterned, or less patterned, regularity. Such a regularity can in principle be symbolized, as has been noted, in the form of a conditional statement, \( p \rightarrow q \), stored in
memory; \textit{epeiði(\textit{bc} 1)}, therefore, indexes causally ‘compact’, coherent propositions; \textit{epeiði(\textit{bc} 1)} guarantees, so to speak, causal and explanatory coherence. Explanatory coherence entails that there are no huge inferential leaps to be made that will not be readily warranted by broad encyclopaedic knowledge stored in or mutated into memory. This statement also explains the occurrence of \textit{epeiði(\textit{bc} 1)} in both speech-act and epistemic cases when the speech act or the epistemic verb is explicitly articulated. If the speech act verb or the epistemic predicate is encoded, then there is no need for reasoning by the interpreter that would require inferential leaps. Moreover, enablement uses of \textit{because}, which require longer inferential chains, as in \textit{He will come and spend Christmas with us because I'm paying for his flight}, where a free ticket enables him, but does not cause him, to spend Christmas with us, are rendered with \textit{γιατίδιοτι(\textit{bc} 2)}, but not with \textit{epeiði(\textit{bc} 1)}. The reason for this seems to be the gapped causal inferential chain that is necessarily generated by the propositions encoded in the two linked clauses and their entailments.\(^{29}\)

Now, if we take on board Keller’s suggestion regarding speech-act uses of connectives, then we can identify the main problem in the data we examined at the intersection of what Sweetser calls content-world and epistemic domains. In this section, I suggested that a division of labour between an objective and a subjective world as a basis for an initial account of the function of causal connectives might be a better solution than Sweetser’s domains. The transition from norms to nomic \(p \rightarrow q\) regularities, to non-nomic regularities, to more individualistic, interiorized and internalized inferencing patterns interpreted as explanation or justification does not warrant its theoretical translation into the Sweetserian postulated discrete domains of objective and epistemic worlds. Moreover, we have seen that the postulation of a subjectivity-objectivity cline does not only account for, but also seems to be necessitated by, the distinct functions of causal connectives in Greek.

In the next section, I will compare English \textit{because} with each one of the two Greek connectives. The findings are expected to explain some of the facts that have been pointed out.

10. Comparison of ‘because’ with \textit{διοτι (\textit{bc} 2)} and \textit{epeiði (\textit{bc} 1)}

Whereas \textit{because} in English has not been reported to occur in initial position in \textit{because p, q} structures in conversational data, \textit{epeiði(\textit{bc} 1)}, as I have
already noted, occurs very frequently in this position in the genre of conversation. On the contrary, just like because, γιατί/διότι (bc 2) does not occupy initial position in a cataphoric relation to the main clause either in spoken or written language. That is, it does not occur in because p, q structures.\footnote{I would like to propose now that this similarity in distribution between διότι (bc 2) and the English causal connective because (in the genre of conversation) reflects a similarity in function, which in its turn is explained by the similar etymological make-up of the two connectives.

Because originates from the preposition, by, and the substantive, cause; originally it was used as a phrase, by cause, followed by the cause or purpose expressed by a substantive governed by of or a subordinate clause introduced by that or why (OED). According to the same source, such subordinate clauses fell into two classes: (a) they expressed cause or reason, and (b) they expressed purpose. When the subordinate clause signified cause or reason, that was often omitted, whereas in (b) cases that prevailed in modern usage.

διότι (bc 2) (γιατί being its low variety variant, but both used interchangeably without significant stylistic variation in MG) originates, just like because, from the conjunction of the preposition διά (=by) and the neuter of the demonstrative pronoun in the accusative, τοῦτο, which takes the place of a substantive, followed by the conjunction οτί, the equivalent of that, nowadays called the complementizer:

\[ \text{διά + τοῦτο + οτί > διά + οτί > διότι} \]

Whereas in the case of διότι, the substantive τοῦτο gets omitted, in the case of because it is that that is left out in cause or reason clauses:

\[ \text{by+cause + that > by+cause > because} \]

επείδη (bc 1), on the other hand, originates form the compounding of the preposition ἐπί/ἐπί, (meaning ‘[up]on’), and the doric εἰς, a locative adverb meaning ‘where’ (this point, however, is not confirmed or discussed in the literature); δι/δή is an emphatic particle which was occasionally appended for emphasis and later lost its emphatic function and became a constant part of the conjunction:

\[ \text{ἐπί + εἰ > εpei, εpei δί > επείδη} \]
Whereas ἐπείδη grounds its reason or cause as a temporal anteriority in its spatial anchoring, this grounding is non-existent in both διότι and because; rather these conjunctions have been the product of a substantive (English: cause, Greek: touto) introducing a cause or purpose clause (English: that/of, Greek: οτι) by way of a preposition (English: by, Greek: δια). And thus introduced the propositions of these clauses were probably placed closer to the sphere of teleology than that of factivity, due to their teleological character then, such because or γιατί/διότι structures would ordinarily be postponed, since they signified final cause, purpose or design (teleology<teleologia<telos[=end, purpose, final cause]). Moreover, it is worth recalling that language is egocentric and one departs in one’s speech from the occurring or surrounding event or state of affairs to further explore its possible causes, motivation, explanations or justifications (see Kitis 1996). In other words, in our speech we tend to move from the here and now of effects to causes, from the explanandum to the explanans. Talmy (2000) also points to the priority of the resulting over the causing event.

I believe that I have provided, not only an explication of γιατί/διότι’s final occurrence, but also a better explanation for the absence of initial placement of because in the genre of conversation than Ford’s (1993) argument regarding “the lesser degree of planning that goes into it” (86).

11. Conclusion

In this study I have claimed that there are two types of causal connectives in Modern Greek, both of which are viewed as purely causal in mass linguistic consciousness, but each one of them reflecting distinct conceptual and discoursal relations. On the one hand, ἐπείδη is the prototypical causal connective registering cause and effect or event and explanation relations. The function and meaning of this connective, as I have demonstrated here and elsewhere, borders on the domain of temporality; traces of evolutionary aspects of its meaning as a temporal connective are still very much evident in its use and function in MG. This comes as no surprise if one considers that the prototypical causal relation involves two events both spatially and temporally ordered: event A, which is the cause of event B, is temporally prior to event B (Mackie 1975). Therefore, the concept of time is inherent in the concept of causal relations. Moreover, the concept of space is also inherent in both domains of temporality and causality, since events either temporally ordered or causally related are also spatially anchored.
epeiði(bc 1) is a truly subordinating connective functioning at sentence-internal level, as the adverbial clause it introduces is closely connected with its main. Preposed, in *because* *p, q* structures, it introduces a clause whose proposition is considered assumed, undisputed and factual. In short, it is taken on trust, or as Givon (1982) would put it, it is information that is “shielded from challenge”. In this position, epeiði(bc 1)-clauses seem to have an iconic relation to their conceptual anteriority. This function of epeiði(bc 1) can be traced back to its originally temporal meaning in AG. When final in *q because p* structures, epeiði(bc 1) asserts a cause or a reason holding between the two clauses. The relation of the adverbial clause to the main is always causal and its proposition is always considered factual. However, as the causal relation between the two clauses is asserted, epeiði(bc 1) can bear the main stress, can be topicalized, can be intonationally incorporated and embedded within the main clause, is included within the negative scope of the main and, in short, epeiði(bc 1)-clauses have all the characteristics of subordinate clauses. In all these respects, epeiði(bc 1) seems to be the equivalent of *omdat* (Dutch), *parce que* (French) and *weil* (German).

For these reasons, I consider epeiði(bc 1) the prototypical subordinating causal connective. The notion of prototypicality of causality as evinced in connectives, however, carries the implication that the causal connective displays its prototypical function at the conceptual level. Indeed, epeiði(bc 1) can be regarded as the prototypical causal connective functioning at the propositional level. Likewise, Pit (2003: 155) considers *omdat, parce que* and *weil* to be the genuine subordinating causal connectives. Moreover, it is assumed that since it is primarily this type of causal connective that carries causal conceptual meaning and gives rise to causal conceptual representations that are brought to consciousness, epeiði(bc 1) is also truth conditional, if “the primary bearers of truth conditions are not utterances but conceptual representations” (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 23).

γιατί/διότι(bc 2), on the other hand, is the causal connective that functions at both sentence-internal level (and then it behaves very much like epeiði(bc 1)), but primarily at the broader textual and discourse level. Whereas epeiði(bc 1) could be characterized as a purely semantic or content conjunction, since it is the prototypical exponent of causality, γιατί/διότι(bc 2) plays a primarily cohesive role in discourse, indexing relevance relations between adjacent, but also remote, clauses, and
accessing subjectively tinged causal relations (cf. examples 12, 15). Rather than bearing conceptual meaning, its role is procedural (Blakemore 1987). In other words, it can be claimed that only γιατί/διότι(bc2) can have procedural meaning, can be more semantically opaque and its meaning cannot often be brought to consciousness “as conceptually represented” (Wilson and Sperber 1993). This broad, but desemanticized, meaning of γιατί(bc2) may occasionally allow it to be phonologically reduced in fast speech. Associated with this broad function is also γιατί’s frequent occurrence in conversational data as compared to other connectives (also concerning written language see note 20).

Moreover, γιατί(bc2), just like αφού(since), (but not διότι(bc2), which occurs more frequently in written language), behaves like a free mover: it can be interposed or appended to a clause as an interjection or an expressive marker, and in this function it is used, not only as a relevance marker, but also as a presuppositional marker accessing supposedly known information or rather converting the propositional content of the clause to which it is appended or in which it is interposed (examples 16, 17) to shared information. Therefore, γιατί(bc2)’s behaviour provides evidence for the proposed unidirectional grammaticalization process from propositional meanings to expressive ones (Traugott 1989). However, as γιατί(bc2) is also used as a semantically rather empty marker in organizing conversational moves (cf. example 17, Kitis 1994), we can extend Traugott’s schema to include the interactional level at which currently this connective can also function.

In sum, while επειδή(bc1) can be said to be the causal connective at the ideational level, γιατί/διοτί(bc2) are the connectives that function at both the ideational level, but also at the textual and interactional levels of language, and as a result they are both used in a (near-)paratactic way.33 Its strong subjectivity element originates from its evolution: it answered to διά τί? (either explicit or implicit) questions, such questions often involving a purpose perspective looking into the sphere of teleology (Kalokerinos 1999) rather than factivity and perfectivity as in the case of επειδή(bc1), which never answered to διὰ τί? (= for what[reason]) questions in AG.

Having said all this, I certainly do not want to claim that these connectives are not interchangeable in a majority of cases. Nuances and meaning differentials are very subtle in many cases and especially at the propositional or ideational level at which interchangeability seems to be more feasible. These nuances of meaning relate to issues of factuality, generality
patterns and issues of objectivity and subjectivity as determined by background knowledge and inferential processes deployed for its accession; *epeiði*(bc 1), then, can be regarded as a formal or material trace for accessing compactly linked causal statements drawn on premises stored in shared common memory (objectivity marker), whereas *γiati/δioti*(bc 2) can be seen as a formal trace for loosely or idiosyncratically linked statements or for accessing an inferential procedure that would supply the premises supporting the connection (subjectivity marker). While as far as *epeiði*(bc 1) is concerned we can quite confidently conclude that its use marks compact causality drawn on conditional statements stored in memory, *γiati/δioti*(bc 2), on the other hand, can assume both *epeiði*(bc 1)’s function but additionally it can also act at the subjectivity end as a discourse marker performing a multiplicity of functions, not just at the conceptual or propositional level of language, but mostly at the discourse level of language use. In all these functions *γiati/δioti*(bc 2) does not derive its premises supporting its use from widely shared or objective background knowledge, as is the case with *epeiði*(bc 1). However, just as the objective and the subjective domains cannot be teased apart but rather are intertwined in intricate ways, so too the functions of the Greek connectives overlap to a degree that up till now has not allowed or necessitated their careful examination.

Notes

1. The phonetic transcription of *epeiði* would be ‘epiði’, but I choose an orthographical one that reflects the Greek orthography for reasons that will become obvious. Only this causal connective can at times, and only when it is in initial position (forward or cataphoric), be translated as *as* or *since* (Stavropoulos 1988).

2. As becomes clear from the statement of purpose, in this study I will focus on causal connectives at a sentential level rather than at the level of discourse. Therefore, the data that will be examined will be restricted to one speaker’s turn and mostly to the equivalent of what is conventionally regarded as a sentence (or an utterance). However, the meanings and functions of these connectives at the propositional level are regarded as preemptsing their functions at the broader level of discourse, in my view. But this perspective has to stay outside the scope of this paper and will only be hinted at at some points.

3. We may distinguish two types of causal structure in this respect: (i) *because* *p*, *q* in which *because* functions cataphorically and is therefore a forward causal connective, and (ii) *q because p* in which *because* acts anaphorically and is
therefore a backward causal connective. The main clause has been variously called head, main or nucleus whereas the subordinate because-introduced clause is the causal clause that can be also called the antecedent with the main as its postcedent.

4. Also see Bakakou-Orphanou and Koutsoulelou-Michou (1999) on paragraph-initial γιατί and διότι introducing either subordinate or ‘independent’ causal clauses in retrospective evaluative paragraphs for rhetorical effects.

5. Tzartzanos (1989: 141) notes a rare occurrence of initial γιατί(bc2) instead of epeίδi(bc1) in demotic songs.

6. By propositional uses I mean cases in which the two sentences are straightforwardly joined in terms of the propositions expressed, what I call direct causality, not assuming subjective correlates.

7. It is interesting to note that Degand (1997) calls the Dutch want (evidently the equivalent of γιατί/διότι(bc2), also see Sanders et al. 1993 in this connection) polyphonic, probably because, just like the Greek γιατί/διότι(bc2), it introduces a more subjective, argumentative or rhetorical perspective. However, I call epeίδi(bc1) polyphonic because it introduces a factual perspective which need not be the speaker’s. To use a Lacanian term, it introduces the other’s perspective, even if it is considered a generally accepted one. The point is that this perspective need not be hooked on the speaker. In the same vein, Verhagen (2000) claims that want is a perspective marker anchored in the speaker’s mental space, whereas omdat (evidently the equivalent of epeίδi) is not, as it functions within the perspective set up by the main clause. Indeed, epeίδi acts within the one perspective introduced by the main but this need not be the speaker’s.

8. What has been claimed with relation to γιατί(bc2) carries over mutatis mutandis to διότι.

9. All examples from Searle (1975).

10. On occasion epeίδi(bc1) might occur in such cases, but then it is an occurrence by analogy to γιατί(bc2) and is considered a rather marked provocative use.

11. If we allow this example to be categorized as a content-world connective, then the distinction Sweetser wants to preserve between ‘the out-there outside’ world and the speaker’s internal world is completely lost. If, on the other hand, trying to win the argument, Sweetser would say that on a content-world interpretation the gloss goes like this: Because I had it last year, this motivates my looking for it in my office, then, I am afraid, the motivation in this case goes through my knowledge/conjecture that I might have it. So might it be an epistemic connective? The circularity of the argument is obvious. (See Kitis, ms, for criticism of Sweetser’s postulation of three domains).

12. It is funny, however, that, although (15) is a typical use of γιατί(bc2), if you rip this sentence from its context and ask around for untutored intuitions, people (a
fair percentage at least) will tell you that (15) is not ‘correct’ because they can’t see the connection between the two clauses. The question they ask is: “what’s the connection?” This means that γιατί(βες) is registered in our linguistic consciousness as a causal connective.

13. It is interesting to note that in Greek, and in other languages I believe, locative adverbs can have causal meanings, too: \textit{pān̄o pou} (over that/there) (MG); δι is an emphatic, assertive focus particle, and as such it adds to the factuality of temporal/causal AG \textit{epei} (\textit{epei+δι>epeiδι}) (Denniston 1934). Breathing is omitted in renditions of AG.

14. ‘uncommitted’ here is meant to be understood as ‘uninvolved’. In other words, the truth of the adverbial proposition is regarded as generally undisputed and, therefore, as not an object of negotiation. Rijksbaron (1976) reports that the \textit{epeidi}-clauses in AG (Herodotus) refer “to a well-known fact which makes in Dutch a rendering with \textit{immers} better than one with \textit{want}!” (189), while he also notes that sometimes in \textit{epei}-clauses “an appeal is made to knowledge that …is supposed by Herodotus to be present among his public” (182).

15. Kant (\textit{Critique of Pure Reason}) established the connection between the idea of ‘succession’ in time and the idea of ‘causality’, a connection that seems to have been venerated in some form even in the theory of relativity.

16. It would perhaps be intriguing to explore the connection between the function of \textit{epeiδι(βες)} as a causal lexical exponent in futurity and the future conceived as a determined ‘factivity’ (cf. Quantum mechanics, but also Husserl and Sartre).

17. That is why sometimes sentence initial \textit{epeio} is best translated as \textit{as} and occasionally as \textit{since} in English. However, the meaning is not quite the same. For example, neither occurs in the immediate scope of negation (*\textit{not as/since} or in alternative constructions such as \textit{As/since I am a linguist but *not as/since I know a lot about this subject...}, but \textit{epeio} does. See section 10. Dancygier and Sweetser (2000: 126) write that “\textit{since and because} …express positive epistemic stance; the clauses in their scope are seen as representing ‘factual’ or presupposed information.”

18. This interrogative particle can sometimes be used as an interrogative-causal particle in reduced phonological form primarily in rhetorical questions: γα \textit{de} \textit{les tipote}? ‘Why don’t you say anything’, \textit{sklavi mou γα \textit{de xereste}?} ‘My slaves, why don’t you rejoice?’ (Triantafillidis 1941: 400).

19. According to Schwyzer \textit{dioti} originates from δια + \textit{o ti}. In AG \textit{o ti or oti} (as it is frequently written) is the neuter of \textit{ostis}, the relative pronoun, which however is used as an adverb just like \textit{dioti} in indirect questions (=for what) (L&S). So, whether the second compound of \textit{dioti} originates from this relative pronoun or from \textit{oti}, the complementizer (L&S is not specific about it), is a moot point. What is interesting in both cases is that both \textit{o ti} and \textit{oti} have causal meanings. For a detailed account of \textit{oti} see Monro (2000: 241-245).
20. Sidiropoulou’s (1994) findings provide evidence for this claim: She notes that this connective is supplied 24.4% (as opposed to single figures of other connectives’ occurrences) in explicating relations in translating news reporting material from English into Greek.

21. However, this point has to be taken on trust, since its demonstration would need a thorough examination of conversational data within a conversation-analytic framework that would lead us astray in this study. What is important is that γιατί is currently used as a discourse particle with reduced semantic content (having all the functions identified in Schleppegrell 1991), whereas επειδή retains its full share of causal meaning at the propositional level, but is also used at the level of speech acts - when preposed or when the speech act is encoded (Kalokerinos 1999; Kitis 1994, 1996)- and explicit epistemicity.

22. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, I can note that γιατί(bc 2) is frequently used as a kind of interjection in expressive language as in (i)

   (i) As tin efí sou γιατί / As to diavolo sou γιατί  (*Leave me alone*)

23. He claims that the difference between epistemic weil and so-called illocutionary weil is based on the difference between assertive and non-assertive speech-acts (24).

24. Notice that counterfactuals, too, are supported by such law-like assumed or presupposed statements stored in encyclopaedic memory (Chisholm 1975, and more recently Fauconnier 1997, who writes that counterfactuals “are not just fanciful flights of the imagination” [14]).

25. The two types of knowledge and beliefs in Kitis (1982) are not identical to the two types identified here but rather crosscut each other. It must be stressed that the issue of what constitutes knowledge is a complex one as is the issue of subjectivity and objectivity, both much discussed in philosophy (cf. Davidson 2001). Here we adopt a rather naïve folk notion of what constitutes knowledge and belief as semantic and episodic memory encountered in cognitive science literature, roughly corresponding to propositional knowledge that is independently evaluable (hence objective) in terms of its correspondence to states of affairs. But as Davidson (2001: 214) stresses, “there are... no ‘barriers’, logical or epistemic” between the varieties of knowledge he distinguishes – that is, between first-person knowledge (of one’s own mind), second person knowledge (of other minds) and world knowledge.

26. See Dancygier and Sweetser (1997) on the intricacies of then in conditional constructions.

27. This is a rather sweeping generalization and exceptions will have to be admitted; initial επειδή occurrences in what would traditionally be called speech act cases must be one exception. The view taken here, however, is to regard
such epeidí occurrences as providing a covert temporal anchor (or even a topic) rather than just a causal one. This is not the place to go into the inextricability of causality and temporality, which is at issue here.

28. In his attempt to define causality, Russell points out that events involved in cause-effect relationships are recurring universals: “An ‘event’ in the statement of the law [of causality] is obviously intended to be something that is likely to recur, since otherwise the law becomes trivial. It follows that an ‘event’ is not a particular, but some universal of which there may be many instances” (Russell 1963: 136). Generally, the prevalent view in philosophy has been that a relation between two events (or states of affairs) can be said to be causal if it amounts to a regularity or a causal law.

29. Verstraete (1998) proposes paraphrasing the speech act verb or introducing a projecting speech act clause that explicates the internal use (Halliday and Hasan 1976) of because-clauses. Such explicitation will bring the because-clause from the level of the grounding and convert it to an Adjunct embedded in the instantiated type of the main clause. Kitis (1994) had claimed that epeiði had the features [+external], [+ideational], [-discursive], [+adjunct], [+subordinate] and [+direct causation], whereas γiati/δioti was mainly characterized as [+internal], [+interpersonal], [+discursive], [+disjunct], [-subordinate] and [-direct causality], although both γiati and δioti can function in the place of epeiði, especially in fuzzy cases of presuppositionality, etc.

However, even though Verstraete’s solution can take care of both speech act and epistemic causal connectives, the problem still looms large with cases of real data as identified here that do not fall into these two categories; these cases hinge on uncertain knowledge or subjectivized inferential chains that are neither made linguistically explicit nor supported by compact conditional statements stored in memory, but rather have to be supplied by the interpreter as the missing inferential premises of the required reasoning. As claimed, such premises are not readily drawn from our stored knowledge types. Cf. Verstraete’s examples (i) of external and (ii) of internal conjunction (198):

(i) Bill resigned because his employer wouldn’t pay his overtime.
(ii) Bill resigned, because his wife told me so.

On my account (i) is readily interpretable on the invocation of a direct conditional entailed by (i), stored in objective common encyclopaedic memory: If one’s work is not paid one is likely to stop working/resign, etc. The case is quite different with (ii), which is not readily supported by such a compact conditional stored as common knowledge in memory: *If one is told by someone’s wife that someone resigned then someone resigned. To supply the inferential process supporting (ii), the interpreter must supply premises that cannot be stored in common encyclopaedic memory, but are rather drawn on
subjective knowledge/beliefs pertaining to specific cases and the roles of the participants enacted in the speech event. (Gloss would run like this: What s/he tells me in the main clause bears no direct connection to the ‘because’-clause.
(No coherence retrieved). But I know that ‘If someone tells you something then you are in a position to report it to someone else’. Therefore I have to assume that Bill’s wife told the speaker what is reported in the main clause and the ‘because’- clause supplies this information as guarantee for the truth of the proposition of the main clause).

(ii) can be rendered only by γιατί/διότι(bc 2).

If (ii) is a clear case of internal conjunction, however, there are many cases that do not fall clearly within the one or the other category (cf. example 17) but are rather fuzzy cases on the cline we identified:

(iii) Shall I turn off the heater? Because2/*bc1 I’m airing the room and I have the window open.

(iii) cannot be a clear speech act case as the because-clause does not just give a reason for asking, but also a reason for turning the heater off. The inferential procedure is not straightforward again, but rather involves further premises that have to be drawn upon to support the causal clause. (Gloss would run like this: If one airs a room and the window is open the heat of the room is lost. If the heating system is on under those circumstances then the heat is wasted. If heat is wasted so is money, etc. Therefore one should turn the heating off to cut down on the waste, etc.; epeιδι(bc2) is precluded in (iii) even if the main clause is declarative (I shall turn off the heater), but is an option if one spells out the reason a bit further, that is, if one supplies some inferential steps.

30. One might note some exceptions in forward (initial) position in poetic use; in poetry γιατί appears to be much more frequent (as a backward [final position] connective) than epeιδι, probably due to its subjective character as explained here (Kitis 1994).
31. Kalokerinos (1999) claims that γιατί, just like για na, introducing purpose clauses, can function in the sphere of teleology, non-factivity and epistemic causality.
32. It must be stressed, though, that the meaning of this connective is not temporal in MG.
33. It must be noted that only the low variety-originated γιατί has been observed to function at the interactional level, but these functions have not been really demonstrated in this study. However, both the textual and interactional functions, which have only been pointed up, follow from γιατί/διότι’s semantic characteristics examined here.
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