

The World 60s

Christopher Connery

In emphasizing the continuities and connections between 1960s struggles around the world, the article attempts to counter those narratives that would stress the national character of the struggles, and to provide, in an account of the worldwide character of liberatory movements, an alternative globalism, one that exists as a resource to contemporary movements in opposition to "globalization." It argues that an engagement with 60s politics of time can provide an alternative to the various narratives of failure or "cunning of history" that have consigned the 60s to a historical anomaly or excess. It also argues that taking seriously the 60s rebellions as forms of world Cultural Revolution allows for the maintenance of a utopian impulse without nostalgia, as an available resource in mobilizing the politics of the imagination. The article includes discussions of Maoism, temporality, the global character of the Vietnam War, the politics of anti-work, and the U.S. counterculture.

The map of the world 60s would have battle sites and action points - Algiers 1957, Bissau 1959, Watts 1965, Mexico City 1968, Saigon 1975 - trajectories, linkages, alliances - Black Panthers with Algeria, Italy, South Africa; Mao to Berlin, Oakland, and Havana; Bandung to Sri Lanka, Egypt, and Senegal. It would map the slogans of metaphoric and ideological co-presences - "Vietnam is in our factories," "Viva Che" - and the rhetoric and syntax of the big character posters combating revisionism and extolling people's war that traveled from China to Calcutta, Boston, and Paris. The politics of the 60s - and here I refer to the long 60s, beginning with the rise of Third Worldism as a political force at Dien Bien Phu (1954) or Bandung (1955), and ending with the mid-seventies conjuncture of the end of the post-War expansion (1973-1974), the September 11 bombings ending the Allende regime (1973), the end of the Vietnam War (1975), the death of Mao (1976)¹ - were always fully worlded, whether we refer to the widest scale of conflict - Third World vs. First World imperialism - or to

the political, intellectual, and material links among those who challenged the capitalist order in word, heart, or deed. The world 60s were the time of the politics of WE-the "we" that claimed victories in Algiers and Saigon, that spoke itself in the widest, most inspiring range of worlded imagining. WE - that point of enunciation - is very much at stake in the present time. The assaults on the social product; on the commons - in its material, spatial, imaginative, and financial forms; the assault on the vast accumulation of social property, on the material bases on which this worlded WE is said: this is the Bush project, the Putin project, the privatization project worldwide.

Anti-capitalist, anti-authoritarian, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist movements were worlded long ago. Those conjunctures marked by the First, Second, and Third Internationals were as worldwide in scope, in linkages, and in inspiration as the 60s was to be. The density of linkage in those earlier periods easily refutes the claim that the 60s new media were the instrumental forces in guaranteeing a new level of revolutionary or oppositional internationalism. The 60s trajectories forged some new paths, and followed many old ones. For the struggles that world capitalism engenders, if truly engaged with the antagonist, will always be worldwide in scope, even if the links forged are not always visible to all participants. Many have argued, for example, and with some reason, that during the Cultural Revolution, China was more isolated from the world than at any time in recent history. But I will argue below that Cultural Revolution Maoism was a fully worlded presence, and not only to those outside of China. Here I must insist on the particularity of the 60s. This was not the coordinated worldedness of the Comintern, which marked some of those earlier moments, nor was it the worldedness called for today by left strategists of the new Internationale, from the World Social Forum to formations further to the left. The worldedness I claim for the 60s is one of links and of co-presence, it is a worlded claim for periodization, as all periodizations centering on capitalism and its crises must be, and a periodization with global stakes: the awakening sense of global possibility, of a different future. The relationality that activated this worldwide "we," that furnished oppositional politics with a chain of connection and co-presence, was equality. Equality has been a goal at the heart of liberatory politics for 200 years. Since the assault on the 60s began, equality has been subject to a series of ideological attacks and reversals,

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1. The long 60s basically follows Jameson's periodization in "Periodizing the 60s" and "A Very Partial Chronology," *The Sixties Without Apology* 178-215. Jameson's article remains, in my view, the strongest conceptualization of the 60s. Further references to this article will be in the text as "Periodizing."

some successful and some not, in a battle which has been joined again, by the Bush administration, with unprecedented ferocity.

A worlded 60s links the movements and struggles of the 60s to the long history of struggle, movement, and oppositional organization that has coexisted with capital's ever more penetrating reach; and also serves as another scene of possibility, another set of conjunctures, a lens through which we can reflect on change and transformation, on the dialectics of success and failure, and on the current situation. And what is the current situation? Globalization, as we all know. This latest, 1990s worldedness, though, began as a victory for the right. The collapse of the socialist regimes meant that there was no outside, no limit to capital's flow; in the famous dictum of Margaret Thatcher, "no alternative." All of our questions, all of our struggles, our total context, became, in this rhetoric, "global." The left is still working out its relationship to this new stage. In contrast to the new forms of hopefulness signaled in works such as Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, some of the left's most important analysts of global phenomena - Wallerstein and Amin, for example - are far more pessimistic. This pessimism is a forceful presence in Eric Hobsbawm's 1994 *Age of Extremes*,² the last word of which is "darkness," a quality that grows as his narrative reaches its terminus. But the darkness has not been total. The collapse of the authoritarian regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe brought some liberatory energy to some sectors of their populations - this relief was in many cases temporary and in nearly all cases a measured one. And the post-1978 market reforms in China, too, represent an experiment, more hybrid in quality than is often realized, whose outcome is not predictable. But in general, the becoming global of the 1990s diminished rather than opened a sense of global possibility.³ In that sense, Fukuyama's *End of History*, which subsequent events proved wrong in many of its assumptions and conclusions, well marked the tenor of that juncture: the sense of an ending was dominant. If the Bush regime's departure from the 1990s neo-liberal consolidation has the odd effect of making one nostalgic for the 90s, it has altered our sense of the future, from Fukuyama's prediction of a world that is unchanging, and uninteresting, to one that is simply changing for the worse. And to be sure,

2. The first U.K. edition is titled without the definite article, a point commented upon by Perry Anderson in his "Confronting Defeat." The U.S. edition was titled *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*.

3. Michael Denning's argument, which I engage later in this essay, is one of several that see post-1989 globalism as a new era of possibility for a real global cultural front. His "age of three worlds" thesis de-emphasizes the global character of 60s movements.

Fukuyama's prediction that human history had seen the end of all beginnings was already a profoundly pessimistic one. On the left, the concept of anti-globalization, characterizing the new social movements that came to prominence in Seattle, Genoa, and elsewhere, had a short life. A wide range of organizations and spokespersons on the left, perhaps recalling the long history of oppositional internationalism, sought, as the 90s advanced, to embrace the global terrain and the global reach of possibility, rather than concede it a *priori* to capital. "Anti-globalization" was over; another globalization, an alternative globalization, a real international, was possible. This embrace of new possibility, a renewed politics of the future, is further ground for linking the new conception of struggle to those of the earlier period.

"Global" was never really an adequate term for post-1989 capitalism. In this age of niche marketing, production-on-demand, and flexible outsourcing, there is something crude and massive about the global *per se*. The real contours of what has passed for the new globality have by now become too clear, suggesting not only an unprecedented acceleration of the unevenness that has always characterized capitalist space, but a new overtness, in the ideological sphere, of global differentiation, where in large sectors of the human population and their living space are classified as irrelevant or surplus. 90s globalization was, from the perspective of dominant capitalist power, the time of negative interpellation: global capital brought large sectors of the population wholly under its dominion, but as negative presences: without hope, future or alternative. In this respect, the now vanished era of modernization theory and the discourse of development, from which the world is in all other respects lucky to be delivered, seems almost utopian, given the now widespread evidence of its failure. The writing out of large sectors of the globe was already evident in the late Cold War years: the tough-guy *realpolitik* of Kissinger's dismissal of the entire African continent marked the end of the era of the African proxy war, though not, certainly, out of any regard for the welfare of the African people, who still live with the legacy of those wars.

The global character of capitalist-socialist conflict was not always to the disadvantage of oppressed peoples and nations. The USSR, Cuba, and the People's Republic of China pointed continually to the U.S. treatment of African Americans and Native Americans as indicative of the real character of U.S. power, and U.S. government concessions to those groups during the long 60s were made with an attentiveness to the global signifying power of civil rights progress or regress. In Latin America, checking the power of Cuba could not be accomplished solely through alliance with military dic-

tatorships, but required some promise, no matter how hollow, of "progress" as well. During the Cold War years, the United States ultimately failed to build anything in Africa quite as impressive socially as the Tanzania-Zambia railway, constructed by Chinese workers with Chinese government support in the early 1970s, but there was still some recognition that the battle for hearts and minds was a real battle, with adversaries and stakes. Post-Cold War, the U.S. became more and more openly indifferent to global hearts. It remains to be seen whether the current talk of the spread of "democracy," whose sole content is the electoral process itself, will buy the dominant power any time.

The post-1989 period has seen an unrelenting process of global triage; for every state, region, social sector or industry taken into the fold of globalization, huge numbers have been given nothing: this has been the case with the U.S. poor and underemployed, largely African American, but also with Third World peasants, many of whose migrant populations fuel the growth of the new "planet of slums," Mike Davis's term for the sprawling growths of impoverished populations in the world's largest cities - Lagos, Jakarta, Dhaka, Mumbai - as well as in former secondary towns such as Douala, Bamako, and Belém.⁴ Within advanced capitalist economies, this logic of separation insinuates itself into the minutiae of daily life's transactions. Compulsory participation in multileveled consumption has fueled recent U.S. economic growth, albeit at the cost of massive middle-class indebtedness. This intensive marketing of the goods of the New Economy is reserved, however, for those able to assume the debt: more massive penetration of the "haves," through stimulated demand and reclassification of necessities, coupled with disregard for the "have-nots." 90s globalization, then, has been Janus-faced: globalization for capital; separation and anti-globalization for humanity. Will this result, though the cunning of history, in a truly globalized oppositional force? Let's hope so. But the dominant discourses of globalization - the boosterism, the advertising images, as well as the regnant academic mythologies of linkage, hybridity, and imbrication - all mask the fact that, outside of the regimes of the market and abstract labor, in terms of a global social project, or even a total frame of reference, humanity's integration is at a remarkably low ebb. Systemic challenges to the dominant arrangement are particularly weak. Thinking the world 60s could help in the imagination of global possibility, of global potentiality, of a global project: the world 60s against the global 90s.

4. See Mike Davis, "Planet of Slums." See also UN-Habitat's *The Challenge of the Slums*, on which Davis bases much of his article.

Periodization

Among contemporary thinkers, Fredric Jameson has made the strongest theoretical and political claims for historical periodization, and it is significant that these claims have been made from the left. Periodization was a concern in his work present in strong form in 1979 and 1981, coming to fruition in 1984, which saw the publication of three articles on postmodernism: notably, "Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," as well as "Periodizing the 60s." The work on periodization reached a sustained theoretical elaboration in his 2002 *A Singular Modernity*.⁵ Jameson's 60s article, like the postmodernism pieces, adapted Mandel's periodization of late capitalism, marking the early seventies as the onset of the period of contraction, or B-phase, in the long Kondratieff wave that began in the 1940s, a wave whose A-phase carried capitalism, in Mandel's analysis, to a qualitatively new stage: lateness, which shared something of Adorno's lateness as well. Adorno's and Mandel's periodization of late capitalism mark a degree of capitalist penetration whose systemic, social, and economic effects are baleful, but their work has also been important to oppositional imagination. Outside of the realm of the aesthetic - art history has long had the most sustained discourse of periodization - periodization's political stakes are clear: periodization allows beginnings and endings, change and possibility. These are useful structurings of the political imagination in times like these (2005), when the spaces of hope seem so eroded.

If hope, or, more modestly, a sense of possibility, is what we want, what can we learn from, what can we do with the stories that 60s periodization allows to be told? Jameson's 60s is unified by the common objective situation of capitalism, and his narrative is disjunctive. The 60s, after all, marked a rare concurrence of capitalist expansion and systemic revolt. The capacity of the 60s to offer to the political scene new subject positions, new modes of signification, new thought, new politics, new circuits of imagination and inspiration, is borne of a kind of superstructural leap: propelled by the momentum of A-phase expansion, the historical dynamic allows or inspires multiple yet articulated sites of emergence and opposition, which surpass, in their energy, the very economic substrate that formed their condition of possibility. History post-80s took a different turn, whose ultimate character is still not clear. What I find important in Jameson's periodization of the

5. See Jameson, "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture;" "The Politics of Theory: Ideological Positions in the Postmodernism Debate;" "Postmodernism and Consumer Society;" "Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism;" and *A Singular Modernity*.

60s, though, is the very disjuncture between the political/cultural and the economic. The end of the 60s seemed to Jameson to prefigure a recombination of these separated strata, with perhaps a reemergence of opposition along more clearly economic lines. Other Marxists, such as Henri Lefebvre and those he has influenced, particularly in the area of uneven development, focus less on the single economic dominant and more on the "lags" in capitalist temporality, those differentials between overdeveloped and underdeveloped elements in the social sphere, which can often be productive of explosions, crises, or other vectors of change. The lag is what must be kept in mind when considering another, better known corollary to Jameson's periodization of the 60s, in the article's second sentence:

The following sketch starts from position that History is necessity, that the 60s had to happen the way it did, and that its opportunities and failures were inextricably intertwined, marked by the objective constraints and openings of a determinate historical situation, of which I thus wish to offer a tentative and provisional model. ("Periodizing" 178)

History as necessity is far from determinism: it is, in an important way, its opposite. What "had to happen" was the fact of the entire combination, the totality of forces, whose interrelations consisted of lag, disjuncture, and unexpected openings. Jameson's argument in the 60s essay shares many features of his postmodernism essays. The classic example of the piece's periodizing reasoning is in the juxtaposed readings of the fate of autonomous art in Wallace Stevens, and of Guevarist revolutionary strategy as elaborated in Régis Debray's theory of the revolutionary *foco*, the small guerilla band in a liberated zone, whose achievements and example could spread far beyond the limitations of its size. As one would expect in an argument for periodization, both the high modernist aesthetic and revolutionary strategy are shown to partake of a homologous cultural, rather than explicitly political, logic. But when we shift from periodization and historiography to the sphere of the political itself, a somewhat different terrain emerges. Jameson has been mistakenly read as a kind of "advocate" for postmodern aesthetic and cultural practice, simply by virtue of naming it. The equivalence of the "endlessly elaborating poem" and the *foco* is a logical one, but it would be impossible to mistake his political energies in the 60s work: "Periodizing the 60s" gives primary place to the eventfulness of 60s rebellion, in the Third World and elsewhere. Although *foco* and Stevens's high modernist autonomism reach similar historical dead ends, the spread of the *foco* is defeated in struggle, by forces in the world; it does not die by the self-

destructive force of its own content. The 60s were, ultimately, a different kind of promise: their beginning signaled the eruption of energies and impulses that would never be exhausted as long as injustice and inequality reigned; their end was not an end to those energies, but the passing of an oppositional dominant, whose energies and whose newly developed forms remain available to future conjunctures: the 60s adds new forms to the *longue durée* of revolution and refusal, coexistent with capitalism itself.

When we are considering the history of revolt and refusal, whether of individuals, classes, subject positions, nations, or other social groups, another set of politics enters the dominant historiographical field, and that is the contest over the very existence of opposition. Histories have been cleansed of their bad subjects for generations, and the 60s is no exception: since the mid-70s, a range of forces worldwide has sought to erase the 60s, in discourse and in deed. U.S. conservative politics have, since the Nixon presidency, been open about the intention to bury the 60s; the post-1978 Chinese state has defined itself against the Cultural Revolution, about which it has largely prohibited discussion. Kristin Ross's *May '68 and Its Afterlives* is a comprehensive analysis of the range of forces in French political and intellectual life that have had at their core the forgetting, trivialization, or containment of the French explosion. In Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America, the buried histories of 60s social and revolutionary movements, and the buried histories of their brutal repressions, have limned the politics of intellectual life for decades. The presence of the 60s, in the authoritarian, neo-liberal, or imperial variants of postmodern hegemonies, is always a politicized presence, a challenged and a challenging presence.

In a revolutionary situation, in the midst of a revolutionary event, there is always a suffusion of possibility, an opening to the shining through of the future, and any politics of the future will be a political figuring of the temporal itself. Alain Badiou has referred to the "faithfulness to the event": May 68, of course, but also the 60s more broadly is the time of eventfulness, an eventfulness that right-wing pseudo-events - September 11, now - exist to obscure. A periodization of the 60s that is to foreground the presence of possibility, to keep the hope of a utopian future alive, and to forestall the narratives that see the 80s, the 90s, and even the present, as the 60s future, as the work the 60s did unawares - such a periodization must have at its core logic not causality, progression, or even succession, but would derive its sense of absolute potentiality from the radical co-presence of its component elements. This co-presence - of Vietnam in Calcutta and Oakland; of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in Havana and Paris - not only worked to break up the global system of separation, but it was a claim for a new

time. This 2005 worlding of the 60s, written at a time when the 60s has entered that intermediate zone, passing from memory to history - and that might, in many ways, be a fortunate thing - is not simply a respatialization of the temporal category, but rather a gesture towards what I would identify as the 60s politics of temporality, a politics visible in multiple locations, multiple political projects, and explicitly posed against a variety of dominant temporal structures. 60s time was, in so many of its registers, a stand against given time, against capitalist time, against abstract time.⁶ This is the temporality of the Third World revolutionary project that sought a bridge to a liberatory nationhood, one not paced to the temporality of development or modernization, but to the revolutionary skipping of classical Marxist stages in Cuba and in the China of the Great Leap Forward. It is the temporality of the anti-revisionist struggles in China and elsewhere, against what seemed an entropic law of bureaucracy-fueled decay of the revolution; and in the overdeveloped world, the confounding or abandoning of the prescribed paces of the staged life: from school, to specialization, to apprenticeship, to worker, and even to boss. Even the revolutions within revolutions were revolts against backsliding, against the reemergence of capitalist time in moments of flagging revolutionary energy. The worlded 60s is also 60s time.

Two, Three, Many Vietnams

The era of Third World revolution fits uneasily into any of the dominant periodizations, and one must guard against all frames that deny the Third World its own history on its own terms. Periodization will always be relational, selective, and political: never absolute. Decolonization and peasant wars have their *longue durée*, and one could argue that my mid-seventies terminus - omitting Nicaragua, El Salvador, the release of Mandela and the end of South African apartheid in the 80s and 90s; and, more recently, the FARC in Colombia, the CPP in the Philippines, and ongoing struggles in Palestine - is in certain respects arbitrary. The mid-70s onset of what Hobsbawm terms "the landslide," is centered on the advanced capitalist regions: East Asia's temporality of boom and bust would have a different dynamic, and might contribute to a different periodization, albeit one with different political stakes.⁷ 1989 - the collapse of the socialist world - looms

6. My idea of abstract time is derived from Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 90 ff.

7. The most important treatment of the crisis remains Brenner, *The Boom and the Bust*. For a critique of Hobsbawm's periodization based on Third-World and East Asian growth timelines, see Anderson, "Confronting Defeat." There are many critiques of the Third

large in the periodizing logic of many recent thinkers: Hardt and Negri, and especially Michael Denning, in his *Culture in the Age of the Three Worlds*, where 1945-1989 forms one coherent period, highlighting what he sees as the very different terrain of resistance following the 1989 "crisis of the three deals - The Keynesian Deal, the Stalinist Deal, and the Third World nationalist Deal." In Denning's vision, Chiapas is the significant nodal point, where the seizure of state power is no longer the primary *telos*, and where Genoa and Seattle prefigure the new combination. Time will tell the extent to which the character of anti-capitalist struggle has changed, and what breaks and continuities will prove to have been most significant for our current condition.

While the Tricontinental Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, held in Havana in January 1966, could be said to represent the world 60s conjuncture,⁸ the strong argument for the world 60s, a Third-World centered 60s, an argument that Che Guevara made in his address to the conference, remains the fact of the American War in Vietnam. The nature of the emergent post-WWII capitalist world order, whose rules, institutions, and regimens were being drafted in Washington, Wall Street, and Cambridge, was, over the course of the 50s and 60s, becoming clear to the world. Vietnam resisted this order, and became the relay, the reference point, for worldwide refusal, in the first, second, and third worlds. Vietnam was the battleground, but also the model, as Che Guevara's *Message to the Tricontinental*, a widely circulated pamphlet whose injunction is the title of this section, makes clear.⁹

But what did "many Vietnams" actually mean? World socialism, as the Cold War domino imaginary would have it? A series of anti-Stalinist, anti-bureaucratic alternatives to capitalism, as Marcuse claimed? The inspirational force of the Vietnamese revolution did not derive primarily from specifically Vietnamese revolutionary practice. More important, ultimately, than the writings of Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, which circulated widely during the 60s in European language editions published by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Hanoi, was the actuality of Vietnam - its very existence,

World concept *tout court*. Probably the best remains Arif Dirlik's *The Postcolonial Aura*. I periodize the 1974-1989 period, giving centrality to East Asian economic growth, in "Pacific Rim Discourse," 30-57.

8. Robert Young sees in the Tricontinental Conference the birth of the postcolonial subject, and dates postcolonial critique - he prefers the word tricontinentalism to postcolonialism - to that 60s moment. *Postcolonialism*, esp. 212 ff.
9. *Message to the Tricontinental* "Create two, three many Vietnams." The text was published in English.

against a globalized U.S. power. Overwhelmingly, in global discourses of solidarity with the Vietnamese war, the national character of the war is affirmed. "The Vietnamese people" and their struggles were the objects of left identification, in the Third World and the first. Socialism - the organization of national social life - was generally understood not as the national component of a global political project, but as the form of self-determination aimed at eliminating exploitation, inequality, and a rationality imposed from the outside, in a world where the force of exploitation and inequality had a name: the United States. In left analysis, the spread of socialism in the Third World was thus always concretized at the local or national levels, but it constituted real and symbolic cumulative rollback against the power that sought global unity on its own terms. In this sense, the nation was not a diminished sphere. Rather, it represented the engagement of struggle on the level of the everyday, where the inroads of capitalist domination were actually felt. Vietnamese communism was overwhelmingly national in its orientation, but the force of its oppositional power, its actualization of the Great Refusal, had a significance that was international, and multiple. If the U.S. could be resisted in that place, it could be resisted elsewhere. Multiplicity - two, three, many - was on the side of the anti-U.S. forces.

Che Guevara had been deeply hostile to the U.S. since his pre-revolutionary days, and his writings were among those instrumental in naming the United States as the primary enemy of liberatory energies. But what kind of enemy did the Vietnam War reveal the U.S. to be? We find in Guevara too the deep admiration for the courage of the Vietnamese people, and the conviction that U.S. imperialism, not totalitarianism of any kind, was the main enemy of liberty and social justice. Guevara's pamphlet was illustrative of the particular character of the worlded Vietnamese war: the way Vietnam was figured simultaneously in its seriality and its specificity. Like many of Guevara's writings, the pamphlet evokes José Martí, using Martí's phrase "Our America" to indicate the coming theater in the anti-U.S. world struggle, and the place within it of the Cuban revolution. The U.S. line on Latin America - "We will not allow another Cuba"¹⁰ - underscores this dominant logic of seriality: just as, from the U.S. standpoint, Cuban exemplarity must not be allowed to spread in Latin America, Guevara's Vietnam is the situation that must be multiplied. The inspirational character of Vietnam, throughout the resistance but particularly after the Tet offensive in 1968, was significant throughout the Third World - for India, for the revolt in the Philippines, for Cuba, for other Latin American revolutionaries, and for Red

10. This and other quotations are from the web version of Guevara's pamphlet.

Guards in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, small bands of whom traveled to Vietnam to join the fight. Not only did the war show that resistance was possible, but it underscored a conviction about 60s struggles worldwide - one repeated in Chinese publications on U.S. imperialism: that the war in Vietnam was further revelation of the weakness of the newest version of the imperial project, that the U.S. was a "paper tiger."

Although the Tet offensive in early 1968 was a huge military defeat for the North Vietnamese and the NLF, it transformed the conflict into one of total war. As Jeremi Suri points out in *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente*, Tet marked the real end of the ideology of "liberal empire," the U.S. ability to portray its presence as oriented toward development, toward the fashioning of South Vietnam as exemplary bulwark against communism. Now it was full-scale technowar, salvation through destruction.¹¹ With the sheer violence of Tet and its bloody aftermath - My Lai, Rolling Thunder - came the worldwide cry to "bring the war home." Bringing the war home - the phrase originated in the Weatherman leadership of the SDS - had multiple registers, and represented a significant internationalization of the Vietnam conflict. It was a project that sought, through a turning of the citizenry against the nation, a dismantlement of the core capitalist states by a massive refusal of participation, a massive dropping out of the "we" that had been the ideologized expression of first world national purpose. It was also a manifesto for pure, existential opposition: by simply existing in defiance, outside the system, left opposition was repeating the facticity of Vietnam, an ungovernability within the terms of the new world order. For some, in Europe and the U.S., it meant the turn to armed struggle, a turn which, applying the logic of Debray's *foco*, found its political efficacy, as Jeremy Varon puts it, "simply in existing," rather than in tactical success or failure (10).

Bringing the war home worked: domestic opposition made further escalation difficult, and hastened the pullout of U.S. forces from Vietnam. It brought European states to the verge of political crisis, threatening the post WWII structure of alliances. The ability to imaginatively inhabit the Vietnam War, to see its local resonances around the world, was a significant unifying element of the world 60s. In Mexico, for example, the generation of 1968 based their struggles not only on the long history of U.S.-Mexican conflict, but on what many saw, in a newly worlded imaginary, as the repetition of the Vietnam War in Mexico itself.¹² The Vietnam War, in the end, did not

11. Suri, *Power and Protest*, 161 ff. For the idea of technowar, and a clear demonstration that the U.S. war in Vietnam was in no way a "limited war," see Gibson, *The Perfect War*.

12. See Volpi, *La Imaginación y el Poder*.

multiply, and the U.S. continued to pursue its hegemonic aims in different ways. But the Vietnamese victory (though hardly acknowledged as such) and the domestic opposition the war engendered had been a defeat for the U.S. consensus. In Jeremi Suri's analysis, the period of East-West détente which came in the seventies marked a global management of political crisis, a settlement pursued by powers more concerned about internal, domestic opposition than about great power rivalry. The forces arrayed against "many Vietnams" were considerable, but the political terrain had shifted. U.S. weaknesses exposed during the Vietnam War have not been bandaged over. This exemplarity of Vietnam remains.

Global Maoism

Each of the twentieth century's revolutions changed our understanding of the nature and historicity of revolution, and altered thinking about the spatial and temporal character of revolutionary possibility. The existence of these revolutions, particularly the successful ones, became part of oppositional thought worldwide, and entered ideologies, struggles, and discourses. Ho Chi Minh, nationalist though he was, framed much of his revolutionary rhetoric and strategy in the terms of "People's War," whose model was China. But Maoism, and the Chinese 1960s, remains an uneasy presence in left discourse worldwide. It is easier to find sympathetic analyses of the Cultural Revolution in China itself, whose post-Mao government is largely based on a repudiation of the Cultural Revolution, than in the west.¹³ Hobsbawm's *Age of Extremes* refers to it as "madness" (260); among leftist intellectuals of almost all stripes, it marks the extreme that should not have been reached. In the dominant version of revolutionary memory in the U.S., the 60s mass movement was badly damaged by Maoist groups such as the Progressive Labor Party or the Revolutionary Communist Party, whose furious sectarianism, and whose grim, joyless, anti-countercultural energies sapped any mass appeal that the revolutionary left could have had.¹⁴ And then there were the geopolitical consequences of China's identification of

13. Although much direct positive evaluation of the Cultural Revolution is not publishable in contemporary China, sympathetic politics can be found in radical and left critics associated with Chinese rural reform. On the new rural movements, see the forthcoming work of Alexander Day, Ph.D candidate in History at UC Santa Cruz.

14. Max Elbaum, in an important history of the U.S. left, writes from a position far to the left of, say, Todd Gitlin, whose *The Sixties* is a negative model of 60s history. In Elbaum's view, the embrace of and presence of Maoism was a primary cause of the waning of revolutionary energy in the U.S.

the USSR as the main imperialist enemy in the world. This split had enormous and largely negative consequences. Just as the long 60s were over, for example, China took the U.S. side against the M.P.L.A. in Angola, contributing to the build-up of Savimbi's forces that condemned that country to nearly three decades of civil war. One could indeed link Maoism to a narrative of failure and defeat, and there are doubtless elements of global Maoism that, in retrospect, proved to have been dead ends. Soviet-oriented communist parties were damaged worldwide by the Maoist current. Did this, in some way, contribute to the great debacle of 1989? Perhaps. Many chroniclers of the 60s have succumbed to the temptation to view Maoism, particularly Cultural Revolution Maoism, as the devil's music, one that sent all who danced with it to hell. But let's be wary of the politics of causality and roads not taken. Global Maoism was an important element of the world 60s, and a reframing of its world presence is important. Under global Maoism, I would include the following: revolutionary movements in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines,¹⁵ Guinea Bissau, West Bengal, Nepal, Cuba, Peru, Uruguay, to name just a few; in the United States not just the PLP, but the Black Panthers, Weather Underground, late SDS; in France, besides the Maoist parties, the *Gauche Proletarienne*, the intellectuals around the journal *Tel Quel* in the early 70s, and radical trade unionists. More important than specific parties or named movements, though, is a set of dispositions and tendencies that informed political life and liberatory dreams across a broad spectrum.

Maoism has been broadly defined as the sinification of Marxism; it is *makesizhuyide zhongguo hua*, "the integration of universal principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution;"¹⁶ or as Li Zehou has described it, a military Marxism, grounded in the specific situation of guerilla or revolutionary war, a set of tactics, strategies, where practice is not application of theory but anterior to theory. The primary texts of this Maoism - "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (1927), "On Practice and On Contradiction" (1937), "On New Democracy" (1941) and "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art" (1941) - are texts written within and from the situation of guerilla war. This experiential

15. The founding of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1969 signaled the orientation of the revolutionary movement away from the USSR and toward China.

16. The quotation is from Shu Riping and is cited in Dirlik's "Modernism and Antimodernism," *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*. The anthology, and Dirlik's essay in particular, are very important reconsiderations of Maoism, including global Maoism. The reference to "military Marxism" is in Liu Kang's essay in the same volume.

character of Maoism was also reflected in the nature of its global spread. Emulation of the Chinese revolution was not primarily through the medium of Maoist theoretical texts. Journalism was just as important - that of Agnes Smedley and Anna Louise Strong, for example, but especially that of Edgar Snow, whose 1937 *Red Star Over China* was translated into many languages, and served as a revolutionary manual for the Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines, and for Che Guevara in Cuba.¹⁷ It is tautological, but not inaccurate, to equate Maoism with the practice of the Chinese revolution: stance, practice, tactic, position, situation, revolution - these are the applicable terms. Arif Dirlik and others have characterized Mao's relationship to the world - Mao's empiricism - as a process of thought and knowledge production formed through the reconstruction of the world with revolutionary goals. This is an appropriate and useful description of Maoism, as long as it is kept in mind that this reconstruction has a national rather than a properly global scope. So in its simplest form, the question "what is Maoism" can receive the answer: the practice of the Chinese revolution. And Global Maoism? I will enumerate some of its qualities and modalities below. But its enabling condition is also the fact of the Chinese Revolution, which I would like to date from 1921 to 1976, marked most saliently by the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 and the Cultural Revolution. On one level it is paradoxical, but it is also true to the *praxis* character of Maoism, that Maoism, in a way similar to the world significance of the Vietnamese war, was globalized as a specific, situated practice. It was globalized without being universalized, a "theory" if we can still call it that, whose effectivity was *praxis*. Maoism becomes equated with global revolutionary *praxis*, as a concrete global event, through a logic that in key respects a kind of universalism in reverse.

The logic of the situation is not a new element in Marxism, nor was *praxis* at all absent in Marxism. Indeed, as Fredric Jameson suggested, the relationship between a revolutionary situation and revolutionary theory was central to twentieth-century Marxism:

In retrospect, it can be suggested that much of left dialectics, from 1917 onwards, was generated by the conceptual dilemmas offered by precisely this conflict between the particular and the universal, between a specific historical fact or datum - the Soviet Union, with its own local and national requirements and the universalism of a left class politics which aims at abolishing even the specificity of

17. For the Philippine case, see Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*, 92-3.

class itself, and lays claim to a general validity across national borders. (*Brecht and Method* 111)

China introduced a new element into this dialectic. Although the Chinese Communist party had long given a positive evaluation to Stalin, worldwide reactions to the phenomena associated with Stalinism had consolidated a critique of the Soviet Union as a place where the revolution had come to a premature end, a place to which younger, Third World revolutions - China, Cuba, Vietnam - were counterposed.

The fundamental content of Maoism is the fact of the revolution itself - revolutionary *praxis* in China. This is constitutive of what are generally taken to be global Maoism's primary "theoretical" components:

1. Practice was the central determinant of revolutionary identity. When Che Guevara writes "the duty of a revolutionary is to make revolution," he is articulating this access to identity through practice. Guevara often wrote that one of the important lessons he learned from the U.S. - backed coup in Guatemala in 1954 - which under the parliamentary socialist Arbenz government had been a center of Latin American Third-World revolutionary internationalism and where he met Castro - was that "political power comes out of the barrel of a gun," that there is no revolution without revolution. The *Quotations of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung*, probably the most widely printed and widely read political text during the world 60s, is a register of the formal *praxis* character of revolutionary ideology. These quotations, drawn largely from pre-WWII writings and arranged topically, were meant in their very material existence - small, single-hand-held books with waterproof covers, and easy-to-read typescript - to facilitate the material insertion of theory into practical activity. Their oracular form was designed to encourage recitation and applicability. The *Quotations* suggested that a theoretical formulation was not to find its truth in textual adumbration, but in direct application.
2. Contradiction and the levels of contradiction formed an analytical means for a strategic understanding of a particular historical conjuncture, often at the level of the nation state, but including those characteristics that are perhaps generalizable to the level of the "underdeveloped world," as developed in the essay "On New Democracy." This concept, widely thought to be the most important component of Maoism, and to be the essence of Mao's original contribution to Marxist thought, is essential to a *praxis*-oriented project. The correct identification of the primary contradictions, at the local level, would prevent party cadres from forcing circumstances into conformity with some abstract model. Practice then,

is the key link, to which I would add, in adducing Maoism's global and to some extent even national effectivity, the following characteristics, which, as will be clear are not all meant to be considered at the same level.

3. Third-ness. By this I refer to the Third World as Mao conceived it - neither developed capitalist nor Soviet-bloc. Politically speaking, third-ness designates a sector of the world population with no material interest in the current state of affairs. I say third-ness instead of third-worldism, a concept I wish to subsume under third-ness, because of the appeal of Maoism - in revolutionary or potentially revolutionary situations in much of Western Europe, India, and even the United States - as an alternative to Soviet-oriented communist parties. Third-worldism reaches its historical moment at Bandung, and Zhou Enlai was the victor in the contest between himself and Jawaharlal Nehru for Third World ideological hegemony. The theory of Soviet Socialist imperialism was never a coherent one - but Maoism's "third-ness" allowed the Soviet Union to stand in for failure, revisionism, or revolutionary death. We could even view this third-ness as a new ontology, the anti-death space of "revolutionary immortality," in Robert Jay Lifton's terms.
4. Anti-revisionism. Maoism isn't the only position associated with opposition to bureaucratic and revisionist tendencies. The Trotskyist vocabulary of de-formation covers similar ground. Cultural Revolution Maoism's vocabulary of anti-revisionism was of particular global salience. During the height of the Cultural Revolution - 66-68 - very little news of China entered the world. But in Europe particularly, the anti-Lin and anti-Confucius movement, which occurred when many European Left intellectuals and communists visited China, provided a widely adopted vocabulary and position. This has its caricaturable dimensions, and anti-revisionist sectarianism is recalled with fondness by few on the left today, but it gave revolutionary currency to the examination of daily-life practices. Who was a revolutionary and who a revisionist? Who was with the people and who was with the pigs? These questions, asked worldwide, were questions that Maoism put on the agenda.
5. The centrality of the peasantry. Mao did not invent peasant rebellions, as a practice or as a concept, and the revolutionary capacity of the peasantry was present across a variety of marxisms before Mao addressed the subject. Neither Frantz Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* nor Indian subaltern studies, though, would have taken the forms they took without Mao's articulation of a peasant-centered revolution. It's worth remembering that

the Subaltern Studies project had its origins in the Naxalbari rebellions in Eastern India in the 1960s. The Naxalite movement was explicitly Maoist, down to Kanu Sanyal's "Report on the Peasant Movement in the Terai," which is directly modeled on Mao's Hunan report of 1927. On another and perhaps more important level, China's revolution remains the one successful peasant-identified revolution in world history. As some of the recent work of Ken Pomeranz suggests, what the emergent field of World History might describe as the primary fact of the history of the 19th and the 20th century is a global war waged against the peasantry, with the People's Republic of China as the significant global exception to the conclusion of that war.

6. The idea of the liberated zone, or the base area. The establishment of a liberated zone, which in some of its more abstract 1960s forms could refer to the mind itself, was associated with the Maoism of the Jingangshan and the Yanan base areas. The base area introduced a spatial dimension into revolutionary theory and *praxis* that was a persistent figure, and of great strategic importance, in India, Cuba, the Philippines, Malaysia, Burma, Vietnam, and elsewhere.
7. The devaluation of intellectuals. This is really a subset of the preceding discussion of praxis and revolutionary identity, and functions at the level of class authority and of style. This was not a universal feature of global Maoism; Brecht's Maoist disparagement of what he called the TUIs- *tellektuell in* - the ideological classes - would certainly have included U.S. polemicists in the Maoist parties such as the Progressive Labor Party or the Revolutionary Communist Party. Global Maoism made it difficult, however, for revolutionary authority to be instantiated in the subject position of the intellectual.
8. Cultural Revolution. In Europe and North America, the sphere of the cultural was where much revolutionary energy and activity was directed, and the Cultural Revolution in China was a central point of reference, even though its actual content was incompletely understood. Mao's work directly shaped 60s Euro-Anglo-American theories of the cultural, and its relation both to class and to revolutionary politics. As important as the intellectual filiation, though, is the fact of the Cultural Revolution, the fact that it had been given a name. One of the purported "failures" of the global 1960s is its confinement to the sphere of the cultural, and it is commonplace to devalue the achievements of the 60s as "merely cultural." This is an intellectual battle that is still being waged.

9. Voluntarism. This, and related concepts, are normally pejorative, and Marxists largely share the belief that over-reliance on the force of will and belief have been destructive to the revolutionary project. Mao's own writings, of course, do not involve the programmatic of voluntarism - he explicitly condemns it - but ultimately we can say that all *praxis* has its origination in the will, and that voluntarism is on one level simply the will to rebel. The Maoist concept of self-reliance - *zili gengsheng*, properly translated as "reconstruction through one's own efforts" - was central to the third-worldist project of de-linking. In Ghana under Ike Achaempong in 1973, it was still possible to mobilize the population for "Operation Feed Yourself," opening up urban and other spaces to food production, often by collectivities. Voluntaristic self-reliance was a refusal of modernization's temporality, a refusal of developmentalism and dependency: it was an immediate and situated opening into the future. Marcuse's Great Refusal, shouted to capital in Europe and North America, is a related gesture of will. Voluntarism will produce excess: it will be antagonistic to reality, and in the logic of success and failure, it will often be deemed a tactical and strategic error. Yet if what is desirable, in this day, is a politics that refuses the logic of success and failure, it might be useful to acknowledge the voluntaristic character of utopianism itself.

The Cultural Revolution spread in China in remarkable ways. In 1981 I visited a small, quite isolated town on the Yangzi River in Sichuan province: few of its residents had ever left it. When I asked some young men whether the Cultural Revolution had taken place there - the Cultural Revolution was largely an urban and town phenomenon, leaving many agricultural villages untouched - I was assured that it had. How, I asked, had it reached the town? "We heard about it on the radio, and did it here, too," was the reply: a massive translation of the vocabulary of revolution and anti-revisionism, crafted in Beijing and Shanghai, into local situations: traveling *praxis*. Global Maoism was the internationalization of the Chinese revolutionary experience, and in this respect had much in common with the Vietnamese revolution's serial character. It was also a powerful language of world making. One could begin from nowhere, from a situation, like Mao's peasants, that was "poor and blank," and reconstruct humanity anew. That sense of beginning was powerfully felt in Detroit, the Sierra Maestre, in Guinea, and in the ghetto of Oakland. Maoism posited a new temporality, a rejection of the measurements of capitalist time and an embrace of the apocalypse: humanity would change into something else; nothing would exist forever. And it was about speed: stages of development would be

skipped in the Great Leap Forward. Out of the swirling vortex of the Cultural Revolution, where old habits, old social relations, and the old world disappeared, the new society would arrive fully formed.

The Work of the World

Hobsbawm and many others found it paradoxical that the 60s rebellions in the overdeveloped world took place during a time of nearly full employment. The postwar expansion was at its height, and the Fordist guarantees could not have seemed more solid: employment, salary, consumption. There were significant fissures, of course. African Americans and other minorities in the U.S. and elsewhere in the overdeveloped world had not shared equally in the Fordist settlement, whose family-based, single-wage-earner logic also relegated most women to subordinate or unpaid positions. Perhaps it was the best, ideologically speaking, that the compulsory labor system could manage. But for those inside and outside its promise, it was unacceptable. Across the overdeveloped world, the futures thus offered to the young were refused. A cold look at the world revealed a built environment, urbanisms, transportation networks, and educational, social, political and economic institutions that were the products of enormous human labor and tremendous productivity, but not the world that many in society had wanted. The explosion of world-making energy in Third World revolution signaled that world making and re-making was possible; construction and reconstruction could be placed on the imaginative agenda. In the advanced capitalist societies, that meant revolt against the logics of separation, alienation, and instrumentalization that the compulsory labor regime, with the cooperation of educational institutions, political parties and trade unions across the political spectrum, had cemented into place. In 2005, it is clear that the work regime has failed: the mass of the human population lies outside it, with no real hope of integration into its logic. To some today, the demand for total employment seems to be the utopian demand, one that exposes capital's inability to deliver a social solution on its own terms. But perhaps a more cogently utopian demand would be for the end of work as we know it. The politics of anti-work were central to the struggles of the world 60s, and constitute an important part of the period's legacy. Viewing a range of struggles through the lens of anti-work is a fruitful conceptual experiment.

By the height of the post WWII expansion, it was clear that human societies could reproduce themselves without the endless toil of their masses. Without being articulated into a coherent political program, but rather realized

at the level of daily life, the possibility of life not organized around compulsory labor deeply shaped life in the socialist world. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the dictum to "put politics in command" radically altered the content of daily life, in schools, factories, and government work units. Political discussion, study, and meetings took up much of what could hardly be called a "work week." Published autobiographical records of Cultural Revolution life, whatever their political position, attest to these hours, and to the equally long hours spent in idleness. Visitors to China during the Maoist period, especially those, like me in 1976, with Stakhanovite expectations, were often amazed at the casual attitude toward work and industriousness: so many discussions, so much tea drinking, so much sitting around in the factories. It took an American factory worker traveling with my group to point out that in his view the absence of hustle, bustle, and constant activity was a better way for factory work to be carried out. Right-wing condemnation of this wasted time, this time lost to the sort of economic growth and development that has characterized post-1978 China, takes today's 70-hour southern Chinese work weeks as the norm, as the basis for China's current productivity. The productive legacy of nonwork in China, and in other socialist countries, is more complicated, and may not be as simple as the growth advocates suggest. Lynn White has convincingly shown that local social networks developed during the Cultural Revolution gave the late 70s and 80s reform and growth much of their momentum. His book demonstrates the productivity of social organization, and the ways the organizational gains from this politicization could serve a variety of productive functions. Linking this politicization to capitalist-style high productivity growth, however, should not suggest that such a development was the only course that Cultural Revolution nonwork could take. For putting "politics in command" was also the actualization of a non-productivist mode of social being; it was, in terms of lived experience, a critique of work as such, despite the later use to which politicized networks were put. The Cultural Revolution's Great Link-up (*da chuanlian*), when hundreds of thousands of Red Guards and other young revolutionaries were given free transportation, food and lodging in cross-country wanderings, was a mass mobilization of non-work, and it is a movement that is viewed with considerable nostalgia by its veterans. The Great Link-up was only one of the experiments that mobilized the country's infrastructure for purposes other than speeded-up productivity. It gave to many of its participants an enduring sense of life's possibilities.

The socialist bloc had never instilled in its citizens the "work ethic" that twentieth century industrial capitalism, with the help of the trade unions, was able to ideologize. Self-exploitative industriousness was a virtue common to socialist state cinema and other mass media, but it was rarely

achieved in lived experience. It was to be expected that the decoupling of compulsory work from the stricter regime of abstract time and its management that obtained under capitalism produced a different relationship to labor. Yet neither was the socialist bloc politically able to ideologize an alternative relationship to labor: nonwork thus had a negative rather than positive character. What obtained there was a system of compulsory labor whose overemphasis on compulsion was matched, or made tolerable perhaps, by an underemphasis on labor. But the nonwork ethic also spread into the citizenry's will to participate in the political or military life of their states, a problem that over the course of the 50s and 60s grew particularly acute. It was thus for many reasons unlikely that an alternate political program could be built on this foundation. Yet in Czechoslovakia, Dubcek's Action Program, published in May 1968 and approved by Brezhnev, initially promised to be a new way forward, a new way to mobilize participation in society by allowing broader social forces to participate in the determination of the social and political agenda. What doomed Dubcek's program was its conflict with the state logic of coercion, on the one side, and the power of Western-oriented dissidents, who demanded Western-style democracy, on the other. Readers in the capitalist world sometimes forget that the initial impulse of Prague Spring was not in the direction of capitalism, but of a renewed socialism. Ultimately, the socialist bloc was unable to build positively and innovatively on its externality to the regime of capitalist-style compulsory labor, an externality that could have provided a base on which radical alternatives to this regime could have been constructed. This failure to reform socialism from within, combined with concerns about a dissatisfied and potentially rebellious urban populace, led the socialist states to détente, with further integration into capitalist cultures of production and consumption.¹⁸ This integration produced structural contradictions that were ultimately untenable, leading to the collapse of 1989.¹⁹

In that the 60s struggles in the overdeveloped world were about the content of life, the work regime was the ultimate horizon of life's content, the total content of society. Anti-work politics found their clearest expres-

18. This idea of détente as a reaction to internal dissidence is the thesis of Jeremi Suri.

19. Robert Kurz, in a series of books and articles, has suggested that the fall of the socialist bloc around 1989 was the first collapse of a compulsory labor society, and that the collapse of the work-society in that region was a prefiguration of its coming collapse in the capitalist West, a collapse that was already evident in oppositional politics in the 1960s. A selection of Kurz's work in English translation, including the *Manifesto Against Labor* by Kurz and the *Krisis* group, of which he was a part until recently, can be found at <http://www.exit-online.org/html/transnattextanz.php>.

sion, theoretically and on the streets, in France, and the Situationists provided its most memorable movements and slogans, many of which, as Greil Marcus has shown, became important in 60s countercultural expression in the U.S. and the U.K.²⁰ But anti-work was a latent content in many other struggles, and it was a message that would ultimately reach the masses in 60s popular culture. In the overdeveloped world, when the Vietnam War was brought home, when the Cultural Revolution was waged in these streets, the content of daily life was among the primary stakes. The broad politics of anti-work, the refusal of abstract time, was a characteristic of what I referred to earlier as 60s time, a relation to the future, to history, and to co-presence. It marked a challenge to a fundamental pillar of capitalist temporal organization, and thus to history itself.²¹

The question of the 60s counterculture in the overdeveloped world has long been a vexing one. The usual impulse on the theoretical left is to downplay its importance, to accentuate the gap between real politics and that sphere of the everyday whose common denomination - lifestyle - is always encumbered with the taint of commodification, reification, and the marketplace of style.²² Yet those historians and commentators who want to minimize or critique the political significance of 60s counterculture, are also eager to emphasize its positive contributions by tracking its impact within capitalism. It should be clear by this point that I want to include under the sign of the 60s the widest range of political, revolutionary, social, and cultural opposition, including the counterculture, and that I believe that narratives of the counterculture which stress commercialization, dumbing down of content, and massification should not obscure the source of much of 60s popular countercultural energy in opposition and refusal, or, to use John Holloway's term, "the scream."²³ The counterculture achieved near hegemonic status in English-language massified popular culture, and brought into the mainstream its roots in the long histories of refusal and resistance:

20. Marcus, *Lipstick Traces*.

21. In *History and Class Consciousness*, Georg Lukács makes a case for the spatialization of capitalist time, and counterposes abstract time to "history." Moishe Postone critiques the idealism inherent in this dichotomy, and makes a strong case for including "history" as a component of capitalist time. Yet I think that that linkage was precisely what was at stake in the 60s rebellions. See Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, especially chapters five and eight.

22. Kristin Ross cites Peter Dews, who makes the claim that the arrival of U.S. and U.K. countercultural modes and styles into France and Italy marks a waning of political energies (13).

23. Holloway 1-11.

Diggers and Ranters, William Blake, Boxcar Bertha, the Wobblies, early twentieth-century anarchism, the folk surrealism of the "Invisible Republic," the Beats. That these mostly marginal currents were brought into a culture industry that reached tens of millions, proclaiming an end to work on Maggie's farm and strawberry fields forever, is a victory, an inroad, not simple co-optation.²⁴ Twentieth-century capitalism proved remarkably capable of incorporating modalities and energies from its outside, and marketing's embrace of certain countercultural modalities is no exception. This could be a sign of capitalism's bloodless vampiric weakness as much as its strength. The 60s in the overdeveloped world put pleasure and ecstatic excess into broad social and cultural play, and Arthur Marwick is right to stress the profoundly transformative character of that moment. The culture industry responded with impressive dynamism, and proved able to satisfy the libidinal explosions that came in its wake. But Marwick and critics like him may be wrongly confident in assuming that capitalism's dynamism, according to some predictable rhythm of explosion and containment, ensures the perpetual manageability of those energies. As consensus cracks, as gruesomely anachronistic experiments like the G.W. Bush presidency expose the fundamental irrationality of the system, as market-ideological promotion of the "ownership society" leaves its subjects with nothing worthwhile to own, it will be more and more important for a different dynamic to emerge, one that can draw on humanity's long history of refusal, of which the world 60s was a shining moment.

*University of California, Santa Cruz
USA*

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Antonis Balasopoulos, Jon Beller, Johanna Isaacson, Mary Scott, and Rob Wilson for their helpful comments on drafts of this essay.

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24. The "invisible republic" is a reference to Greil Marcus's book and the long tradition of American folk surrealism exemplified in the Henry Smith folkways anthology.

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