BOOK OF ABSTRACTS
Table of Contents

Panos Athanasopoulos. *Spatio-temporal metaphors and time estimation* 5

Ad Foolen. *The hand (and its parts) as a source (and target) in figurative thought and language* 7

Klaus-Uwe Panther, Linda L. Thornburg. *What do you think you’re doing? Exploiting Wh-questions for expressive purposes* 10

Günter Radden. *Situational metonyms* 12

Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez. *Understanding figurative language in terms of cognitive operations on cognitive models* 14

Gerard Steen. *Why figurative thought and language are not enough: On the crucial role of metaphor in communication* 16

Ioannis Veloudis. *Metaphor-Metonomy in grammar and beyond* 17

Angeliki Athanasiadou. *If-clauses and their figurative basis* 19

Ifigeneia Athanasiadou, Panos Athanasopoulos. *Plural mass nouns and the construal of individuation: cross-linguistic evidence from verbal and nonverbal behaviour in linguistic and non-linguistic contexts* 20

Alexandra Bagasheva. *The role of metonymy and metaphor in Bulgarian compounds* 22

Annalisa Baicchi. *How to do things with metonymy: illocutionary scenarios and constructional procedures* 23

Mario Brdar, Rita Brdar-Szabó. *How metonymy and grammar interact: Effects and constraints in a cross-linguistic perspective* 26

Asterios Chardalias. *Personification Conceptualizations of the Heart in Modern Greek Song Lyrics: From the Being of Heart to the Heart of Being* 27

Alexandra Christakidou. *The emotion of LOVE in George Seferis’ poetry: A Cognitive Linguistic analysis of one of his poems* 28

Herbert L. Colston. *Complexities of Pragmatic Effects in Blended Figures: The Case of Metaphptonymy* 29

Charles Denroche. *Figurative Text Phenomena and Text Metaphtonymy* 31

Christoph Haase. *Verbs of perception as metaphorical devices in the natural sciences: A corpus study of specialized and popular text types* 32

Anne Jugnet & Emilie L’hôte. *Surprises and wonders: on the metonymic readings of some “psych nouns”* 33

Ioanna Karatsori. *Figurative Language: The Case of Evaluative Adjectives* 35
Figurative Thought and Language

Zbyszek Kopec. From language to thought: how do we arrive at conceptual metaphor? 36

Danyang Kou, Orsolya Farkas, Source Domains in Conceptualizations of the State in Chinese and Hungarian Political Discourse 37

François Labatut. “[T]he Bill is all about extending marriage. That is what we believe is the gold standard and the thing to which people aspire.” Culture Secretary Maria Miller, 2013 38

Martha Lampropoulou. Metonymic and metaphoric mappings in morphology: a case study 40

Louis Wei-lun Lu. A constructional approach to conceptual metaphor: A case study on COMPLETION IS UP in Mandarin 41

Linda Manney. Up From Slavery, by Booker T. Washington: Conceptual Integration in Discourse and Narrative Structure 43

Anna Piata, Time conceptualization in everyday and poetic discourse: from metaphor and beyond 44

Katarina Rasulic, Shakespeare on the shelf, Blue Helmets on the move: Human-related metonymic conceptualization in English and Serbian 46

Anna Rewiś-Łętkowska. Metaphtonymic interplay in the embodied language of fear 47


Giota Syrpa. Size in English; big and large 49

Maria Theodoropoulou. Emotion and the metaphor within metonymy: the case of idiomatic expressions of fear 51

Paraskevi Thomou. Metonymy within metaphor: evidence from the Modern Greek language 52

Efthymia Tsaroucha. Englishisation in Greek Ads; The Rise of a “Novel” Metaphor 53

Eleni Tziafa, Olympia Tsaknaki, Greek Crisis Visualized in Political Cartoons 54

Ene Vainik. Multiplicity of motivation behind the dynamic descriptions of emotions in Estonian 57

Evgenia Vassilaki. Cognitive motivation in the linguistic realization of requests in Modern Greek: the case of present tense interrogatives 59

Vogiatzis Anastasios, Christakidou Alexandra, Tsarouha Efthymia, Athanasiadou Angeliki. Metaphor, Emotions, and Political Speech 61
Time provides essential structure to human experience. Taking as a starting point the physical foundation of abstract thought, we empirically investigate the impact of spatio-temporal metaphors on our ability to estimate time. People tend to talk about time using spatial concepts of distance and quantity. This tendency exhibits considerable crosslinguistic variation. In English, distance metaphors are typically used to convey temporal duration (i.e., long time). In Greek and Spanish, duration is commonly expressed through quantity metaphors (i.e. poli ora/mucho tiempo, 'much time'). Previous research (Casasanto, 2005, 2008) shows that when estimating duration, English speakers, as opposed to Greek and Spanish speakers, perceived lines that grew a long distance on the computer screen as having a longer duration than lines that only grew a short distance (the duration of the lines was in fact identical). However, when watching animated filling containers, Greek and Spanish speakers, unlike English speakers, were influenced by the quantity with which the containers were filled, perceiving full containers to have longer duration than half full ones (again, growth duration was identical). This phenomenon is labelled language-specific spatial interference. We extended this paradigm to Swedish, a language with distance-based spatio-temporal metaphors (lång tid, 'long time'), and examined under what conditions such interference occurs. Consistent with our predictions, the results showed that Swedish speakers were more influenced by distance than quantity when estimating duration. In addition, we found that language-specific spatial interference was strongest when stimuli were preceded by verbal prompts. Finally, we investigated the effects of this phenomenon in bilingual speakers with L1 Spanish and L2 Swedish. Here, the results suggested that the degree to which language-specific interference occurs depends on factors such as age of L2 acquisition and language proficiency. These findings reveal the inextricable link between conceptual metaphor in language and fundamental thinking processes like time estimation, and contribute to the emerging broader picture of the powerful role of linguistic experience in shaping the way conceptual representations are activated (Athanasopoulos & Bylund, 2013; Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 2012).
References
Body parts and inner organs provide a rich source for idiomatic expressions (somatisms). From an embodiment perspective, this is to be expected. Our cognition is grounded in the body, in bodily experience, movements and actions. However, not all body parts and inner organs are equally strong sources. The strength will depend on the universal role they play in self experience (the heart is permanently beating) and its role in different cultures (for example liver divination in cultures with animistic worldviews, cf. Siahaan 2008).

A study on a body part as a source for conceptualization presupposes that that body part is conceptually distinguished as a separate body part at all. Not all languages distinguish ‘hand’ as a separate body part, cf. Enfield et al. (2006), which is surprising. One would expect that generally the hand is experientially strongly salient, considering its universal importance in the active life of human beings, cf. Révész (1958) and already Cushing 1892:308, who stressed the central role of the hand in human life: “[T]he hand of man has been so intimately associated with the mind of man that it has moulded intangible thoughts no less than the tangible products of his brain. So intimate, indeed, was this association during the very early manual period of man’s mental growth that it may be affirmed to be, like so many hereditary traits, still dormantly existent in the hands of all of us to a greater or lesser degree.” In so far languages distinguish the hand as a separate body part, it is to be expected that it will be a strong source for figurative language, for the same reason that one expects separate conceptualization.

That the hand has cultural specific roles too, has been pointed out in more recent descriptive and contrastive studies, cf. Ahn & Kwon (2007), Sadikaj (2009), Staffeldt (2011) and Vogiatzis (2012). In the first part of my presentation, I will sort out universal and cultural specific figurative language related to the hand. The hand plays cultural-specific roles in work, greeting, praying, eating, fighting, writing, etc., and this will lead to cultural variation in the figurative use of the hand.

In the second part of my talk, I will discuss some more general aspects of the hand and fingers in relation to cognition and communication. Firstly, the hand plays a central role in nonverbal communication, i.e. in gesture (cf. Mittelberg 2013). This natural way of communication is an extra stimulus to develop figurative expressions in spoken language in which the hand plays a role.
Consider, for example, French *maintenant* ‘now’, which literally means: ‘hand holding’. If we want to understand this conceptualization of the present time, we have to take gesture into consideration.

Secondly, the role of the hand and fingers in counting will be considered. Hand counting is widespread in cultures. The hand is the only organ that provides a number of parts (the fingers) which are experientially salient (compared to toes or teeth) and not restricted to the low number of two. When the cultural need for counting arises in a culture (not a universal need, see Everett 2012, p. 259-263, on the absence of number words in Pirahã), the fingers seem to be the natural ‘affordance’ to support the cognitive challenge of counting and to develop it further. This leads to figurative projections in two directions: names for numbers are used to name fingers and names for fingers are used to refer to numbers. The projections between objects, fingers and cognitive quantities can be expanded into further projections when the fingers are depicted as written figures (I, II, III, IV and V, with V for the full hand, and IV for the full hand minus one finger). The projection of finger and hand forms on surfaces which can preserve the forms for a longer time (wood, stone, etc.) has played an important role in the development of writing, cf. Röhr 1994:82): “The ability to account for the storage of numerical information has always played an integral part in the evolution of different systems of writing.”

The fact that the human hand was a main theme in cave painting (see picture abstract Veloudis), can be interpreted as a sign of the central role it has played in early human experience. Even in modern office life, the hand plays a central role, which is, however different from earlier roles. Typing, touching the screen and manipulating the mouse are part and parcel of our working hours. Will this lead to new figurative expressions with hand and fingers? The mobile phone is called ‘Handy’ in German, a fitting metonymic name for this omnipresent tool.

**References**


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In keeping with one of the main aims of this conference, i.e. “to explore how the cognitive processes of metaphor, metonymy, and metaphtonymy have an impact on the relationship between language and emotions”, we present an analysis of some expressive speech act constructions to argue that inferences are an essential component of an adequate theory of meaning construction, and thus must be part of the theoretical apparatus of cognitive linguistics. This idea has been advocated for the last fifteen years by various cognitive linguists such as Antonio Barcelona, Mario Brdar and Rita Brdar-Szabó, Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza, and the present authors, to name just a few, but it has never really caught on in “mainstream” cognitive linguistics. We bolster this inferential conceptual-pragmatic model with further evidence from a family of constructions instantiated by examples such as the following (taken from the COCA):

(1) **What do you think you’re doing with that plastic bottle?**
(2) **Who do you think you are, some public intellectual?**
(3) **Mi scusi, Signorina! Where do you think you are going, young lady?**

These utterances have a recognizable literal or source meaning, but this meaning is often almost completely backgrounded in favor of a highly expressive emotional and evaluative target sense, now nearly completely conventionalized. The key question is: how is the expressive target sense conceptually and pragmatically related to its still extant source sense? We argue that it is inferentially motivated via a series of metonymic shifts (see Panther 2013 for our conception of motivation).

In our analysis we rely on the notion of speech act scenario (as developed by Panther and Thornburg 1997, 1999; Thornburg and Panther 1998; see also for further elaborations of the model Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi 2006, Baicchi 2012), in particular the expressive scenario of DISAPPROVAL. We show also that the semantics and pragmatics of the mental process verb *think* plays a key role in the elaboration of the emotional and evaluative target meaning.

**References**


Situational metonymies

Studies of metonymy have mainly been concerned with referential metonymies, typologies of metonymic relations, and the role of the hearer in accessing the metonymic target. Much less attention has been devoted to non-referential metonymies, in particular situational metonymies, to the issue of indeterminacy in metonymy, to the speaker’s role in construing a conceptualization metonymically, and to the meaning emerging from the conceptual integration of the metonymic source and target.

The presentation will touch upon these four neglected aspects surrounding metonymy but focus on situational metonymies (as opposed to referential metonymies) and the emergence of meanings as a result of the integration of source and target. Situational metonymies draw upon a much larger network of conceptual relations than referential metonymies. In principle, any conceptual unit(s) of a situation as well as the situation as a whole may partake in a metonymic shift, and the shift may affect lexical as well as grammatical material such as tense, aspect and modality. Typical situational metonymies involve preconditions or subevents that stand for a whole event, as in the characterization of a forward in soccer as a player who “knows where the goal is”, meaning a player who has been quite successful in scoring goals.

While referential metonymies form a fairly small, well-defined set of types and tend to be noticeable, situational metonymies form an open set of types and tend to be indeterminate and may even go unnoticed. For example, the name of a country is often used metonymically in reference to the people or the government of that country, but it may also metonymically stand for a situation. Thus, in Greece was not supposed to happen, the country name Greece stands for an indeterminate range of situations including budget deficits, austerity measures, increasing unemployment, lack of perspectives, people’s protests, etc. But also the metonymic source conveys more than just denoting a country: In a given context, the country Greece invokes a range of associations such as Greece being one of the seventeen Euro countries, Greece as the cradle of democracy, etc. If a linguistic description aims at representing the full meaning conveyed by metonymy, both the speaker’s construal and the hearer’s interpretation of metonymy have to be taken into account as well as their concomitant indeterminacies and associations.

Like other figurative modes of language, a metonymic expression may be fully entrenched and beyond people’s awareness. These expressions are
conceptually well-motivated but less interesting from a communicative point of view since they do not compete with literal expressions. A speaker who deliberately chooses to construe a conceptualization in a non-literal way normally does so with some purpose in mind; and it is the hearer’s task to infer the speaker’s intended meaning from contextual and linguistic clues as well as frames and encyclopaedic knowledge. The aim of the presentation is to draw attention to metonymy in its online use within a communicative situation.
For over three decades since the publication of Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980) *Metaphors We Live By*, cognitive semanticists have paid special attention, first, to metaphor, and, then, to metonymy as pervasive cognitive phenomena in language and thought. In recent times the Lakoffian approach to metaphor, which was initially based on linguistic evidence, has taken an important turn into the world of the brain sciences, where metaphorical inferences are not simply explained in terms of mapping source domain structure and logic to a target domain. The Neural Theory of Metaphor provides an explanatory mechanism using neural computational modeling, according to which inferences occur when the activation of meaningful nodes in a neural circuit (the antecedent situation) leads to the activation of more meaningful nodes (the consequence) and when the inhibition of consequence nodes gives rise to the inhibition of antecedent nodes. In this theory metonymy makes use of linking circuits between nodes (cf. Lakoff, 2008).

It may be observed that the Neural Theory of Metaphor builds on previous work that was itself based on linguistic evidence. This preliminary work, following Lakoff’s (1990) *cognitive commitment*, was compatible with the state of the art in the cognitive sciences. In this context, I will argue that the path of searching for linguistic evidence for possible cognitive activity should not be abandoned. In this respect, I will also argue that other areas of figurative thought besides metaphor and metonymy are indeed productive. Thus, it is possible to find evidence of specific cognitive activity by looking for fixed correlations between the meaning implications of figures of speech in actual language use and the types of cognitive models underlying such use. This is the case, for instance, of some hyperbolic statements. Hyperbole is generally explained as an exaggeration. This is only part of its (predictable) communicative effect. People exaggerate to draw attention to their attitude about a given situation. For example, the usual interpretation of *This suitcase weighs a ton* is that the suitcase weighs too much and that this situation somehow affects the speaker negatively. The question is how this set of meaning implications (and other possible ones) is obtained. If we think of this sentence in terms of cognitive modeling, a plausible answer is that we make use of a virtually impossible situation (verging on counterfactuality) to think and reason about a real one where the excessive weight of a suitcase bothers the speaker; i.e. we map conceptual structure and its logic, like in metaphor. But postulating a mapping is not enough. The “virtually impossible”
situation is obtained by assigning a greater strength to the ‘weight’ magnitude. This process is one of “strengthening” a postulate based on a scalar concept. Strengthening is a cognitive operation that has a specific cognitive model type within its scope of application.

The presentation will examine other cases of figurative speech and thought and disentangle their cognitive configuration in terms of cognitive operations on cognitive models (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza, 2011). It will set up a typology of cognitive models and put forward several kinds of cognitive operation working on them, often in combination. Additionally, this exploration will allow me to frame metaphor within a paradigmatic system of such models and operations, which is necessary to fully account for its nature and scope.

References


The cognitive-linguistic revolution that changed metaphor from a figure of speech to a figure of thought has been extremely influential and productive in metaphor studies (e.g. Gibbs, 2008). It has led to the discovery of conceptual metaphors, the distinction between complex and primary metaphors, the role of image schemas and metonymy and the potential grounding of all this in embodied cognition. It has also led to the discovery of discourse metaphors and their relation to scenarios, frames and other forms of conceptual structures in discourse. In all, then, the cognitive-linguistic revolution has been a story of success.

However, the story is not complete. I have argued (Steen, 2008, 2011) that it needs to be developed by adding a third dimension of metaphor, the importance of which has not been recognized until recently. This is the dimension of communication. What counts as a metaphor in communication is a different story than what counts as a metaphor in thought or language. The relation between these three dimensions of metaphor is not yet completely understood. In this paper, I will present the reason why we need the third dimension of metaphor in communication and how it raises new questions about metaphor in thought and language.

In his brilliant *The tell-tale brain* (2011) V.S. Ramachandran discusses, among others, the following three instances of what he calls the ‘peak shift effect’ – a universal law that “relates to how [our] brain responds to exaggerated stimuli”: (i) A rat taught to prefer a rectangle to a square in a hypothetical experiment, reacts in a quite unexpected way when shown with a fresh, quite abnormal, longer and skinnier, rectangle: amazingly, it prefers this new one to the familiar rectangle, although it is only the latter that, after a few dozens of trials, has been associated with food: ‘[normal] rectangle = cheese’. The rat, Ramachandran comments (p. 207), “isn’t being silly at all. It has learned a rule –rectangularity– rather than a particular prototype rectangle, so from its point of view, the more rectangular the better”. (ii) In his pioneering experiments on seagulls, Nikolaas Tinbergen found that the gull chick, which begs for food by pecking vigorously on the red spot on the end of the mother’s beak, displayed the same begging behaviour when shown a fake beak or a rectangular strip with a red dot on the end. “But the best was yet to come” Ramachandran comments (p. 210): “To his amazement, Tinbergen found that, if he had a very long thick stick with three red stripes on the end, the chick goes berserk, pecking at it much more intensely than at a real beak. It actually prefers this strange pattern, which bears almost no resemblance to the original!” That is to say, more stripes meant ‘more mum’ (and more food). (iii) In the same way, you can create a caricature of Nixon that is “even more Nixon-like than the original Nixon”, provided that “you take all those features of Nixon that make his face special and different from the average face, such as his big nose and shaggy eyebrows, and you amplify them”. This amplification, if right done, will allow you to capture the “very essence” of Nixon, Ramachandran concludes.

To these non-verbalised cases of exaggeration I will add a verbalised one: (iv) By uttering

ΛΕΠΙ (δεν πιάσαμε)!  
‘LEPI (δεν ‘pjasame)!  
‘(we caught not even a) SCALE!’

the Greek speaker strongly denies that he/she had any luck in fishing. My reason for doing this is that this (diachronic and possibly cross-linguistic) way of exaggerating negation has much in common with the above three (non-verbalised) instances of Ramachandran’s ‘peak shift effect’. Their common denominator is the *qualitative* upgrade of a WHOLE (: rectangle, mum, Nixon, the
proposition ‘we caught no fish’) by means of the *quantitative* upgrade of a PARTICULAR, distinctive, characteristic (: rectangularity, red spot, nose-eyebrows, scale).

One might readily recognize the mix of metaphor (*GOOD IS UP*) with metonymy (*PART FOR WHOLE*) here: ‘*UP-PART for GOOD-WHOLE*’. The emotional aura that can be detected in all four cases should not pass unnoticed, though: this metaphor-metonymy mix apparently goes hand in hand with feeling-sensation. “Wow! What a rectangle!” is, according to Ramachandran (p. 207), what the rat thinks, when shown the “distorted”, skinnier, version of a rectangle. And this emotional response remains unchanged as we move up to our “distorted”, lacking even the proper negative particle, version of negation *LEPI! ‘SCALE!’*: “Wow! What a negation!” is what the hearer thinks when the speaker reacts in this “peculiar” way.

To restrict myself to the verbalised case of the peak shift, what is it that makes *LEPI! ‘SCALE!’* fancier than a typical denial such as *We caught no fish?* Why do we take this amplified one-word response as “more negative” than a whole negative sentence? Why do we “like” it more as a negative response, although it apparently has nothing to do with negation? On what grounds do we feel that it expresses almost the “very essence” of a denial? In my opinion, questions like these ask for a reconsideration of the metaphor-metonymy relationship. And I will try to open the relevant discussion in a rather unexpected way: taking into account the handprints (‘negative hands’) found in caves that were inhabited tens of thousands years ago.
If-clauses and their figurative basis

The impact of figurativity on grammar has not only been recognized but there have appeared studies that provide evidence to support it. Compared with metaphor, metonymy and its impact on grammar has been rather “neglected”. Langacker’s paper on Metonymic Grammar has brought it to the foreground confirming the metonymic basis of grammar through the issue of indeterminacy (2009: 46).

I start from the assumption that the cognitive processes of metaphor and metonymy have an impact on grammatical organization and development. In this paper, an attempt will be made to examine the ways figurative meanings interact with grammar. Reference is made to the grammar of English if-clauses. My data are borrowed from corpus data selected and discussed in Athanasiadou and Dirven 1996, and Dirven and Athanasiadou 2005 papers. According to our typology, hypothetical conditionals are further subdivided into subtypes, some of which are:

Predictive:  If there is no water in your radiator, the engine will overheat immediately.

Prerequisite: Sure you can borrow the car, providing/if you get it back to me before 10 o’clock.

Suppositional: if/suppose/supposing you went bald, what would you do? (Dirven and Athanasiadou 2005: 101-107)

It will be argued that there is a metonymic basis allowing shifts within the complex domain of hypothetical conditionals; each time the focus is assigned on different facets of the domain (prediction, condition, supposition, assumption).

Another very frequent type of conditional met in corpora is what we call course of events conditionals. In this type there is a natural, almost real co-occurrence of the two events: You should call a doctor to diagnose and treat your child if there is a rash, certainly if there is a fever or the child feels sick. (Athanasiadou and Dirven 1996: 627). This is a case of high-level metonymy grounded in high-level metaphor (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007). The metonymy that licenses the hypotheticality for naturally occurring events (‘you should call a doctor whenever there is a rash, fever...’) is HYPOTHETICALITY FOR REALITY. Reality is here presented as if it is hypothetical. This is a case of metaphor and, particularly, a case of deliberate metaphor (Steen 2013) employed for a
communicative function, that of an instruction. Reality is presented as hypothetical in order to soften the imperative character of an instruction.

The aim of the presentation is to examine in which way figurative language interacts with grammatical relations in the two types of if-clauses. Can the idiosyncrasy of grammatical relations allow us to claim that figurative shifts function differently and serve different purposes? How do metaphor and metonymy work at the level of grammatical constructions? How do they contribute to the communicative effect of if-clauses?

References
distinction between count and mass nouns. It has been argued that even though the count/mass noun distinction is observed in both Greek and English, mass nouns in Greek, contrary to English, can flexibly be pluralised (Tsoulas 2006; Athanasopoulos 2008; Athanasiadou 2009; Alexiadou 2011). In the present study, the effects of grammatical structure on non-linguistic cognition are examined. English and Greek monolingual speakers completed a verbal as well as a nonverbal task. In the verbal task, plural marking on familiar count and mass nouns from the domain of food was assessed across linguistic (informative and neutral) and non-linguistic contexts. Greek, when compared to English, speakers, pluralised mass nouns more in linguistic as well as non-linguistic contexts, with this differentiation being even stronger within a non-linguistic context. In the nonverbal task, categorisations by shape or material were examined for novel objects and substances across linguistic (informative and neutral) and non-linguistic contexts. Greekspeakers displayed a similar cognitive performance to English speakers, by extending objects by shape and substances by material in informative as well as non-linguistic contexts, respecting hence universal ontological principles. Results from multiple regression analyses revealed that pluralization of mass nouns in the verbal task was a significant predictor of shape preferences for substances in the non-verbalk task and this relationship was stronger in Greek than in English speakers. These results reveal that: a) Informative syntactic contexts enhance ontological categorical distinctions in both Greek and English speakers; and b) Greekspeakers apply plural marking to a greater extent than English speakers even in mass noun contexts, and this has consequences for the non-linguistic construal of individuation. Such effects have not been found before and have implications for theories on the interaction between language and thought (Whorf 1956; Lucy 1997).

References
The role of metonymy and metaphor in Bulgarian compounds

Key words: synthetic compound nouns, compound verbs, metaphor, metonymy, Bulgarian

The proposed presentation focuses on the role of conceptual metonymy and metaphor in two particular classes of derived words in Bulgarian: synthetic substantive compounds and compound verbs. The restriction is motivated by the methodological consideration that these two types of compounds share specificities in terms of internal semantics and mechanisms for computing the meaning of the whole to allow for a uniform analytical approach. They share the metonymy-based manipulation of a frame by the foregrounding of a value-specified central or non-central frame constituent (e.g. книгоиздател [knigoizdatel, ‘book-publisher’, book publisher]; кръводарявам [kravodaryavam ‘blood-donate’, donate blood, etc.).

The frame semantic analyses of 700 nouns and 76 verbs reveal that the mechanism of derivation is based on the systematic manipulation of construal in intra-frame configurations along the lines of value-specification and shifting of figure-ground relations. Goldberg’s definition is used here as the basis for studying the evoked intra-frame modifications,

(1) a. A word sense’s semantic frame (what the word ‘means’ or ‘evokes’) = profile + background frame
   b. A word sense’s profile: what the word designates, asserts
   c. A word sense’s background frame: what the word takes for granted, presupposes (Goldberg 2010: 40).

Words are lexical concepts or “units of semantic structure, bundles of different types of highly schematic content” (Evans 2009: 11) that operate by referencing richer conceptual frames, which are non-accidental networks of contiguities (Koch 2005). Both classes of compounds function by manipulating these contiguities on the principle of conceptual metonymy and adjusting focal granularity in their internal morphotactic constitution. “[M]etonymy implies a contiguity-based
figure/ground effect between elements of a conceptual frame or between the frame as a whole and one of its elements (or vice versa)” (Koch 2005: 154).

Utilizing these methodological and analytical operationalizations we hypothesize that both classes of compounds in Bulgarian represent verbal subclassification as analytically defined by McGregor (2002).

In the second part of the presentation we focus on the external construal or lexico-semantic constitution of the whole. The lexico-semantic construal of compounds captures the relations between the novel morphotactic complex and the concept in engenders. Here both metonymy and metaphor operate with equal force and are frequently combined in metaphtonymic processes (Goossens 2003), (e.g. въртиопашка [vartiopashka, ‘twist-tail’, turncoat]; главозамайвам се [glavozamayvam se, ‘head-dizzy oneself’, get a swell head], etc.).

References

Annalisa Baicchi
Dept. of Humanities Section of Theoretical and Applied Linguistics
University of Pavia
annalisa.baicchi@gmail.com

How to do things with metonymy:
illocutionary scenarios and constructional procedures

Keywords: metonymy, speech acts, constructions, illocutionary scenarios
Illocutionary meaning has been addressed from a wide array of perspectives and philosophers of language and linguists have put forward two main assumptions on the interpretation of the illocutionary force: the ‘Codification Hypothesis’ gives prize of pride to grammatical aspects, whereas the ‘Inferential Hypothesis’ ascribes it to mental mechanisms. As insightful as they are, neither of the two strands have been able to offer a full-fledged analysis of the interplay between the linguistic structures that speakers utilize to convey their communicative intentions and the mental paths that guide speakers in the verbalization process and hearers in their interpretive tasks. It was the great merit of scholars in Cognitive Linguistics to identify and propose new models able to overcome the weaknesses of traditional theories. Thornburg and Panther (1997) and Gibbs (1999) identify in conceptual metonymy the cognitive tool that affords access to the illocutionary force of indirect speech acts. We owe Panther and Thornburg (1999) the cognitivist turn in traditional Speech Act Theory: these scholars define metonymy as a natural inferential schema that regulates the felicitous performance of speech acts and, in order to deal with the metonymic grounding of illocutionary meaning, they postulate the existence of complex structures that are accessed metonymically, which they call illocutionary scenarios, consisting of three main components - a BEFORE, a CORE, and an AFTER - that specify traditional felicity conditions in a cognitive-model theory format. The scenario-based theory of indirect speech acts foregrounds two pivotal points, i.e. metonymic instantiation and storage in our long-term memory in the form of scenarios, which represent a relevant asset over traditional grammatical and relevance-theoretic models and prompt innovative approaches to the study of illocutionary activity. Banking on Panther and Thornburg’s model and on its application and development carried out by Pérez 2001, Baicchi and Ruiz de Mendoza 2010 and Baicchi 2012, this paper is meant to address the phenomenon of interpersonal meaning and to introduce an alternative theoretical framework, the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model (Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi 2007), which is circumscribed within Cognitive Linguistics and the cognitively-oriented strand of Construction Grammar. With the focus placed upon a number of traditional interpersonal speech acts, this paper will contribute to identifying common features and distinct peculiarities across instances of, e.g., offering, promising, requesting, suggesting, threatening, warning. Furthermore, with reference to the Goldbergian cognitive approach to Construction Grammar, constructional procedures common to the above mentioned speech acts will be identified and their metonymic grounding will be discussed. It will be shown how the same constructional procedure can instantiate different illocutionary meanings and how the metonymic reasoning motivates the different illocutionary forces. The examination of the interplay between linguistic structures and cognitive processes involved in the construal of
Illocutionary meaning will then lead to conceive of speech acts as high-level situational cognitive models that encompass the scenario in which the illocution is uttered, the common elements of the low-level structures and the constructional procedures for the instantiation of illocutionary meaning. Illocutionary constructions are hereby defined as “entrenched, productive and replicable form-function pairings characterized as constructional procedures capable of jointly activating relevant parts of illocutionary scenarios in connection to relevant elements from the context of situation” (Baicchi 2012).

References
Cognitive and other literature on grammaticalization freely makes use of metaphor in accounting for a wide range of phenomena. The impact of metonymy on grammar, on the other hand, is still a virtually unchartered area. Recent years have seen a marked rise in the interest in the interaction between grammar and metonymy, convincingly showing that metonymic processes are crucially involved in shaping central areas of grammar (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal Campo 2002, Brdar 2007, and the chapters in Panther, Thornburg and Barcelona 2009).

The impact of metonymy on grammar is most conspicuous against the background of functional effects that metonymic mappings produce in the grammatical system. In other words, metonymies make it possible to express certain grammatical distinctions without any explicit marking on the lexical items functioning as the metonymic vehicle, but the grammatical, i.e. morphosyntactic, effects of this may be observable in a wider context, e.g. in the presence or absence of the indefinite article and/or plural marker:

1. We raise our own pork, beef and lamb but haven't tried chicken yet.
2. It’s not often our ears will prick up at the sound of a new beer being launched.
3. Crack open an Achel and I will make my decision then on the Saaz or more Styrian goldings.

This simplified way of looking at things might imply that the relationship between metonymy and grammar is one-way traffic, grammar being infinitely plastic and therefore easily formed by metonymic processes. By applying a cross-linguistic perspective in studying grammatical effects of metonymy in several small-scale case studies (grinding/portioning, collective nouns, MANNER FOR ACTION metonymy) in Germanic, Romance, Slavic and Uralic languages, we aim to demonstrate in this presentation that things are more complex than that and that their interaction practically always involves some two-way traffic. It turns out that whether a certain type of metonymy is available in a given area in a given language is often dependent on the ecological conditions, or the structural givens present in the grammatical system (including its word-formation system). In other words, grammatical factors such as the presence or the absence of a given element in the system may play a role in constraining the application of various types of
metonymy in that language. Since more than one element may be involved, it is of course possible that the application of a metonymy may be constrained by simultaneous absence or presence of all the elements in question, or by simultaneous presence of one or some elements and the absence of the other(s), e.g. by the lack of definite and indefinite articles and of a rich derivational system with dozens of suffixes, as e.g. in Croatian. In sum, we are led to conclude that, depending on its particular character, one language’s grammatical “effect” of metonymy may turn out to be another language’s constraint on the application of metonymy.

References:

Asterios Chardalias
School of English, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
chardalias@enl.auth.gr

**Personification Conceptualizations of the Heart in Modern Greek Song Lyrics:**
**From the Being of Heart to the Heart of Being**

Keywords: heart, embodiment, personification, cultural model, cognitive poetics

This paper, using Cognitive Poetics (Tsur, 1983) as a working framework, critically reviews a corpus of thirty (30) Modern Greek songs containing the lexeme ΚΑΡΔΙΑ (HEART) in their lyrics in an attempt to locate, taxonomize and qualitatively describe the multisourced cognitive input involved in construing it as a person, one of the many construals for the heart documented in the language. To that aim, it studies how the notion of Embodiment (Johnson, 1987; Gibbs, 2006; Kövecses, 2010) and the primary cognitive operation of personification (Hamilton, 2002; Dorst, 2011) interact to reinterpret and reconfigure a simplex HEART FOR PERSON part-for-whole metonymy as a complex and highly productive THE HEART IS A PERSON ontological metaphor. It then attempts to sketch the interplay of the concept “heart” with the person-relevant domains of Animacy, Sentience and
Intelligence, providing authentic language material from the corpus as supporting evidence; more specifically the correlations with reference assignment and self-awareness, capacity to collect and process empirical data from physical stimuli, life-sustainment prerequisites, intended autonomous motion, manifestation of emotions as well as other cognitive skills usually thought as constituting the mind come under scrutiny. It concludes that present analysis offers some vestiges of psychological reality to the concepts of Intrapersonal Intelligence (Gardner, 1983) and Emotional Intelligence (Payne, 1985) and may ultimately yield a compact Cultural Model (Sharifian, 2011) for the heart in Modern Greek which is markedly idiosyncratic in its hybrid cardiocentricity.

Alexandra Christakidou
School of English, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
alexchristakidou1@gmail.com

The emotion of LOVE in George Seferis’ poetry:
A Cognitive Linguistic analysis of one of his poems

Keywords: Emotion; Contrast; Blending; Metaphor; Metonymy

This presentation aims at the analysis of a love poem that was written by George Seferis on August 28th, 1945 (Seferis 1973: 18-19; Seferis 1974: 10). In the poem under discussion there are examples of figurative language, such as metaphors (Kövecses 1986) and metonymies (Radden and Kövecses 1999), as well as more complex processes like conceptual blending (Fauconnier and Turner 2006/1998) and synaesthesia (Ramachandran and Hubbard: 2001). Emphasis will be placed on aspects of contrast between opposite concepts (Danesi 2009) and negation; they both create a kind of conflict and, as a result, they offer vividness to the poem.

One of the main metaphors of the poem is of the type LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Τούτη ἡ ἀγάπη ποὺ πηγαίνει / toúti I aγápi pou piγéni/ this love that goes/ ‘this love advances’). This love is not static but it changes over and over, it spreads, it gathers, though it has no body and cannot be seen. However, it can be tasted, and for the creation of a feeling of taste, the poet uses words that refer to fruit; it has sound since there is the sound of the biting of an apple and the bursting of a fig, as well as the sound and the sense of love’s throb and beat. This final characteristic belongs to the metonymies the poet uses for love. As it is known, THE EFFECT OF THE EMOTION STANDS FOR THE EMOTION. In this particular case, the effect of love that is highlighted is that of the intense beat (of the heart/veins). Referring to blending, there is conceptual blending and synaesthesia
mainly between tastes, sounds, and colours. Finally, as far as contrast is concerned, it can be observed throughout the poem. For instance, there is contrast between notions like spreading and gathering, lack of colour and colour of fruit, the airiness of Aphrodite and her human need of thirst that grounds her next to humans.

References

Herbert L. Colston
Department of Linguistics, University of Alberta
colston@ualberta.ca
Complexities of Pragmatic Effects in Blended Figures: The Case of Metaphtonymy

Keywords: metaphor, metonymy, metaphtonymy, pragmatic effect, blended figures

One approach to distinguishing metaphor and metonymy is through analysis of pragmatic effects performed by the figures, and how those effects are
accomplished. For example, both metaphor and metonymy can achieve derision (e.g., belittling a target domain/topic/referent), but they may use different mechanisms. Several metaphor comprehension theories suggest that borrowed, shared, emergent, simulated or blended semantic characteristics of source and target domains are fore-fronted during metaphor comprehension, such that any derisive qualities involved (e.g., naiveté or overly simplistic morality as in, “He is such a boy scout.”) are realized as a characteristic of the referent (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). Metonymy, or more specifically synecdoche, however, (e.g., “Go ask red hair if she knows where the bathroom is.”) achieves derision more as a structural diminutive function of the figure when applied to certain referent domains (e.g., people versus objects) (Colston, forthcoming; Colston & Brooks, 2008).

But whether the metaphoric mechanism(s) are always, fully or solely responsible for metaphoric pragmatic effects (i.e., derision) remains unclear. The same holds for metonymic effects. To the extent that metaphor and metonymy become blended, so might their pragmatic effects, and cases indeed exist where the figures get very close.

The proposed presentation will discuss blends of metaphor and metonymy, including pragmatic effects they may perform. Complexities in discerning these effects and the concomitant impact for distinguishing metaphor and metonymy, will also be treated.

To preview, consider the metonymy:

“Crewcut told us to leave.”
[a person whose hair style is a crewcut told us to leave]

For metonymies that can be metaphorical, attribute(s) selected from a whole, used to refer to that whole, can be borderline metaphoric. They indeed might be synonymous terms a speaker would choose for source domains to achieve derision in metaphorical utterances. They at least can conjure much of the same information a metaphor would produce, such that the two figures could act similarly. Use of the above metonymy for instance, could trigger similar pragmatic effects as using, “crewcut”, in a metaphor:

“That man is a crewcut.”

including semantic associates and schematic substrates involving the military, conformity, blind-rule-following-without-thinking, lack of aesthetics/creativity, strictness, enforcement, conservativeness, etc.
For metaphors that can be metonymic, consider the decidedly derogatory term overheard by the author:

“Prince Charles is a wingnut.”
[said about Great Britain’s Prince of Wales]

This example is metaphorical in that characteristics of the source domain (wingnut) might arguably apply to the target (e.g., Prince Charles having a metaphorically cold, metallic, technical, odd, etc., personality). But the term is also somewhat metonymic in its conjuring of actual physical resemblances between the source domain and target (e.g., Prince Charles’s protruding ears). Thus, referring to someone metaphorically with terms that additionally relate to the person metonymically, might accomplish similar effects as using those terms metonymically.

Other issues to-be briefly discussed are pragmatic effects of double (multiple) entendre—given how metaphor/metonymy blends might take on such a categorization, as well as a potential figurative hierarchy whereby pragmatic effects of some figures might on predictable occasions trump those of others.

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Charles Denroche
ECLS & MAL, University of Westminster, UK
denrocc@westminster.ac.uk

Figurative Text Phenomena and Text Metaphonymy

In this paper, I present four figurative text phenomena, figurative schemes which play a role in organizing language at the level of the whole text, either by patterning lexis or changing register. These phenomena have all been identified individually by other scholars but no one to date has brought them together into a single framework in the way I do here. Many scholars have engaged in metaphor-
Figurative Thought and Language

led discourse analysis and metaphor identification across genres – such as Cameron & Stelma, Goatly, the Pragglejaz Group and Steen – but their focus has been on local ‘emergent’ meaning in spoken interaction rather than the impact of metaphor on longer stretches of language; and few have recognized the equally important role of metonymy in organizing longer stretches of language. The framework I present brings together authors from different fields and different eras, from Jakobson, Lodge and Lakoff & Johnson to Al-Sharafi, Koller and Semino. I also reinterpret Halliday & Hasan’s (1976) work on ‘cohesion’ in terms of figurative thought and extend Goossens’ (1990) concept of ‘metaphtonymy’ to the level of the whole text, which I call ‘Text Metaphtonymy’.

References

Christoph Haase
Bielefeld University, Germany and Purkinye University, Usti, Czech Republic
christoph.haase@uni-bielefeld.de

Verbs of perception as metaphorical devices in the natural sciences:
A corpus study of specialized and popular text types

Keywords: Cognitive linguistics, Corpora, English for Academic Purposes (EAP), Conceptual Metaphor

To form a basis for more effective use of metaphor in scientific writing I examine the distribution and function of verbs of perception as metaphorical devices in two parallel registers of natural sciences texts. Verbs of perception are pervasive and abundant in science texts due to their direct conceptualization of otherwise ungraspable or highly abstract phenomena. The distribution of different verbs of perception in different research domains can be empirically attested; however, this raises the question of a specified use of these expressions, especially when the specialized and the popular register are compared.

The parallel structure of the corpus was achieved as follows: First a set of specialist texts from the physical and biological sciences was retrieved from pre-print servers including arXiv and PNAS (see Haase, 2009). In a second step, a parallel set of texts was identified which consists of popularized summaries and journalistic recreations of the first set found in multi-disciplinary, non-specialist,
Figurative Thought and Language

general-interest science journals including the New Scientist. By comparing the use of verbs of perception using a cognitive-linguistic framework, the defining characteristics of these text types are isolated and the conceptualisations behind the metaphorical usage are classified. I offer suggestions as to how these characteristics and conceptualisations form a kind of signature of the science domains and text types. One general result is that verbs of visual perception are more widely used than other verbs of perception, raising the question of what additional clarity of expression or scientific insights might result from use of a wider spectrum of modes of perception (cf. Haase, 2010). The differences in metaphors found among the scientific domains as well as between specialist texts and the matched non-specialist general-interest writings are discussed, exploring possible reasons for the differences and pointing out advantages and limitations.

References:

Anne Jugnet & Emilie L’hôte
Université Paris 7, UFR Etudes Anglophones, Sorbonne Paris Cité, CLILLAC-ARP, EA 3967
anne.jugnet@paris7.jussieu.fr

Surprises and wonders: on the metonymic readings of some “psych nouns”

Keywords: Cognitive semantics, corpus linguistics, emotions, metonymy

It has often been argued that a subset of state nouns related to psychological predicates, or “psych nouns”, can refer either to a state or to the cause/stimulus of this state (Barque, Fábregas, et Marín 2012). Nouns such as love, obsession, hate, or surprise are thus analyzed as polysemic items, and it is often assumed that a metonymic relation holds between the two readings. This analysis is a priori appealing, as the opposition between stimulus and state corresponds to an ontologically clear distinction, which is reflected by some linguistic properties (e.g. the nouns tend to be mass nouns when they denote a state while they tend to be used as count nouns when they denote a stimulus).

Yet our hypothesis is that the linguistic data does not consistently reflect a clear opposition between a state sense and a stimulus sense. In this paper, we
propose an analysis of the occurrences of a subset of psych nouns (disappointment, preoccupation, preference, surprise, and wonder) in the Corpus of Contemporary American English. We show that it is often not easy to determine if a specific occurrence has a state or a stimulus sense. More specifically, some psych nouns (disappointment, preoccupation, preference), though sometimes ambiguous, most often denote states (corresponding to ‘prototypical’ state nouns), while others (surprise, wonder) are in very many cases ambiguous.

We argue that cognitive semantics allows us to account for the attested ambiguity of surprise and wonder, as we provide a new interpretation of their semantic networks. Following the cognitive definition of metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon with a linguistic expression (Seto 2003; Blank 2003; Radden et Kövecses 1999), we propose to locate ambiguous occurrences at the centre of a gradient of meaning instead of considering the issue in an either/or perspective. Based on a series of corpus-based evidence about the characteristics of conceptual metonymy (Radden et Kövecses 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibanez 2000; Hilpert 2006), we claim that the traditional interpretation of the stimulus sense of the noun being a metonymical extension of its stative sense must actually be reversed.

References
The present study concerns composite structures consisting of evaluative adjectives and nouns found in Greek discourse, and attempts to give insight into the metaphoricity and metonymicity through the use of adjectives. In fact, it is due to such cognitive processes as metaphor and metonymy which are under operation that a composite structure of this type transforms into a very dynamic expression that accomplishes in a really remarkable manner to transmit its message clearly and effortlessly. Consider, for instance, the Greek phrase \(φαρμακερός πόλεμος\) (lit. venomous war). This composite structure activates in the mind of the hearer/reader both ‘war’ and ‘venomous’; \(πόλεμος\) (‘war’) is a metaphor used to denote some kind of a disorderly situation, without the arming involved in a real war though, whereas \(φαρμακερός\) (‘venomous’) constitutes a metaphor with a metonymic basis due to the fact that it arouses certain unfavorable emotions. Espousing Fauconnier and Turner (2002), “blending” occurs between these two resulting in the immediate creation of expectations about this ‘war’ that is taking place; it becomes clear that it is not only a war that concerns medicine, but it is also connected with some kind of bitter experience and probably bears a lot of negative, or even detrimental, consequences for the people involved too. This leads us to another interesting point; “adjectives do not always assign a property to their head noun but may assign a property to a metonymically related entity” (Radden and Dirven, 2007: 148), namely the role of the adjective \(φαρμακερός\) in the above structure is not only to characterize what type of a war this one is, but also to make reference to the people affected by this situation. Was this not the purpose of the speaker/author, then, he/she would have selected a different adjective to modify the noun ‘war’ (e.g. \(φαρμακευτικός πόλεμος\), lit. pharmaceutical war), or would have even chosen another type of construction (e.g. \(πόλεμος του φαρμάκου\), lit. the war of the medicine). All this highlights the contribution of the figuratively used adjective \(φαρμακερός\) that is
indicative of the fact that grammatical constructions are not “formal system[s] or level[s] of representation” operating in an autonomous way (Langacker, 2007: 444).

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Zbyszek Kopec
Institute of Modern Philologies, Jan Długosz University of Częstochowa
zbyszekopec@toya.net.pl
From language to thought: how do we arrive at conceptual metaphor?

The paper sheds some more light on the relationship between linguistic and conceptual metaphor. It shows how to move from the linguistic into the conceptual level. Conceptual metaphor theory claims that our understanding of abstract concepts is ‘fundamentally metaphorical in nature’. We understand abstract concepts through conceptual metaphors as systematic mappings from usually more concrete domains to more abstract domains.

So far it seems odd that cognitive linguists have not worked out any specific method for the identification of conceptual metaphors that underlie metaphorical linguistic expressions. It remains unclear how they both collected their linguistic metaphors and formulated their conceptual metaphors. In most of the cases, their research favours a deductive approach to metaphor identification, which means that the researcher assumes the existence of conceptual metaphors. In his five-step method, Steen proposes an inductive approach to conceptual metaphor identification, which means that the researcher starts with linguistic metaphors without assuming the most obvious mappings. His procedure bridges a methodological gap between linguistic and conceptual metaphor and makes the process of identifying conceptual metaphors more explicit.

In this paper, I put both a bottom-up and top-down approach to test by analysing Kovecses’s examples of metaphorical linguistic expressions and their underlying conceptual metaphor SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE PLANTS. For
instance, both the inductive and deductive analysis prove that the SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS ARE PLANTS metaphor does not directly underlie the linguistic metaphor in ‘employers reaped enormous benefits from cheap foreign labour’. The results I have obtained from the two different analytical routes show alternative possibilities in formulating cross-domain mappings, such as different levels of abstraction at which mappings are constructed, different labelling of source and target domains, and sometimes even different concepts.

Danyang Kou, Orsolya Farkas
ELTE in Hungary
cocolevin@sina.com

Source Domains in Conceptualizations of the State in Chinese and Hungarian Political Discourse

Key words: source domains, state metaphor, political discourse, Chinese, Hungarian

In the view of cognitive linguistics, abstract concepts are often understood through more concrete domains of experience, and the resulting conceptual metaphors deeply influence the way people think of and reason about them. Over the past few decades, several interesting studies have been published about this feature in the realm of politics, where the power of speech is greatly felt. One of the most basic concepts of this realm is that of the state, sometimes equated with the country people live in. This paper discusses similarities and differences in the conceptualization of the state in Chinese political discourse on one hand, and Hungarian political discourse on the other, as they are reflected in the source domains used as vehicles of understanding. The discussion is based on corpus research findings, but the analysis relies both on individual intuition of the authors, members of these two cultures (yielding quality analysis), and on frequency counts in the texts of the corpora (quantity analysis). Since there is no authoritative readily-made corpus of political discourse in either language, two relatively comparable corpora are created by collecting annual work-summary speeches made by the premier of China and prime ministers of Hungary in the past decade to conduct the present research. The functions of culture in shaping metaphors and choosing a specific source domain are also taken into consideration in this contrastive study of the two languages. The research results show that conceptual metaphor is indeed an important tool for both Chinese and Hungarian people to understand the concept of state, and state metaphors are
widely used in political discourse. The research also demonstrates that where similarity is found between state metaphors of the two cultures under examination, it is mainly rooted in embodiment or everyday life experiences connected to our bodies. The potential universality of the bodily experience explains the appearance of a large number of personification metaphors as well as the shared common source domain of building for the target of state in both languages. However, differences in the two nation's historical and present political structure yield differences both in the choice and frequency of source domains used in the conceptualization of the state, and in the mappings of resulting conceptual metaphors. The research is done within the theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics, and the previous research done by George Lakoff, Zoltan Kövecses, Andreas Musolff, Ning Yu, Elena Semino, and Charteris-Black provide us great inspiration and crucial guidance, so most of the discussions and analysis in the paper are based on what they have found, but at the same serve as either another set of proof or a supplementary for their theories.

François Labatut
Université de Nice
labatut.francois@gmail.com

“[T]he Bill is all about extending marriage. That is what we believe is the gold standard and the thing to which people aspire.”
Culture Secretary Maria Miller, 2013

Keywords: Metaphor, Discourse Analysis, Rhetoric, Pragmatics, Corpus Linguistics

This article presents a qualitative and computer-assisted corpus-based approach to the rhetorical and ideological characteristics of metaphors expressed during the Same-Sex Marriage Bill Public Committee debates (250,000 word corpus) in Great Britain in 2003. By emphasizing metaphorical shifting and clusters, we argue that metaphor plays a central role in cognitively and socially structuring ideologies and discourse itself. Metaphor is no longer seen as a rather fixed cognitive and abstract structure prior to language but as a dynamic, contextual and flexible linguistic vehicle stemming from discourse (see Cameron and Maslen 2010 for more details). We propose a multi-dimensional analysis of metaphor: in addition to providing a detailed description of the metaphors at stake in the debate, we show their communicative role through the metaphorical process of legitimation and solidarity (Honohan 2008; Schneider 2008). The pragmatic dimension of metaphor is also given priority in order to account for the persuasive and emotive
functions of metaphoric instantiation (Charteris-Black 2004; 2013). Drawing upon the slippery slope fallacy theory (Schauer 1985; Dag 2008), we show how metaphor allows for reifying, materializing and modelling the political world through dysphemistic reasoning. Moreover, we propose a content analysis that focuses on the strategic functions of pragmatic markers such as speech acts and modalised utterances and the way those are encoded in context. Finally, the rhetorical and ideological characteristics of metaphors as producers of cultural stereotypes (Stubbs 2001) are considered through the study of their impact on the evaluative orientation of words and on semantic prosody (Hunston and Francis 2000).

References
Key words: conceptual metonymy, conceptual metaphor, morphology, suffixes, mappings

The purpose of this study is to identify conceptual metonymic and metaphoric relationships between noun and verb-forming suffixes and the emerging nominals or deverbals. From a Cognitive Linguistics perspective, “the meaning of the composite structure is determined by the meanings of its substructures, in which the suffix plays a decisive role” (Hamawand 2011). More specifically, examining the productivity of words, it can be argued that “a suffix forms a network of senses subsumed under a schema, a pattern which represents an outline of a suffix” (ibid.). Based on the previous statement and, taking into consideration recent approaches on conceptual metonymy and metaphor (Lakoff 1987; Radden and Kövecses 1999; Langacker 2009; and Panther and Thornburg 1999), this study attempts to give insight on how the resulting formations are interpreted by speakers or what schemata motivate speakers to use the particular formations. In order to do so, the study also comprises an experimental part, examining noun forming suffixes (i.e.-hood, -dom) and verb forming suffixes (i.e. ize) on nominal roots. In particular, a number of university students, native speakers of German were asked to complete a questionnaire and make judgments on non-existent words, which were the product of coinage based on existent morphological and semantic patterns. The findings of the study may be useful in that they highlight the cognitive morphological mappings and can be used to draw conclusions over speakers’ conceptualization abilities. Overall, the aim of the study is to show what are the tendencies concerning the usage of specific suffixes: whether speakers relate a particular suffix with a scenario, if there is a preference towards a literal or figurative meaning and if so, if the nature of these meanings is metaphorical or metonymic, or both.

References
Louis Wei-lun Lu
Masaryk University
weilunlu@gmail.com

A constructional approach to conceptual metaphor:
A case study on COMPLETION IS UP in Mandarin

Keywords: Construction Grammar, Polysemy, Metaphor, Space, Conceptual Archetype

The present study shows how a constructional approach (Croft 2001; Goldberg 1995; Langacker 2008) is useful in the investigation of motivation of conceptual metaphor, with COMPLETION IS UP in Mandarin as illustration.

Although COMPLETION IS UP has been claimed to account for the ‘completive’ sense of up in English verb-particle constructions (Hampe 2000, 2002; Kövecses 2001), literature has not reached a definitive answer regarding the motivation of the metaphor. In view of this dangling issue, the present study investigates the positive pole of the vertical dimension in Chinese, linguistically elaborated as shang. The spatial particle has been reported to exhibit a completive sense (Lu, Submitted; Lu and Su 2012), the extension to which is thus obviously metaphorically motivated by COMPLETION IS UP.

Using authentic corpus data, we classify the various usages of shang into semantic clusters, each with its own constructional characteristics. We argue that the extension from the prototypical sense ‘vertically higher and in contact with’ to ‘completive’ can be explained by the principle of semantic attenuation (Langacker 1999, 2008). Following the observation, we claim that the ‘completive’ sense of shang is a result of a gradual profile shift that gives the
conceptual scene an increasing endpoint focus, with the conceptual residue of CONTACT remaining in the semantic cluster of ‘completive.’

The above findings have important implications. First, a constructional approach to polysemy, i.e. observing form-meaning pairings related to a metaphorically motivated semantic extension, can reveal the details of how conceptual metaphor arises through a gradual reduction of conceptual substrates. In addition, a constructional approach to conceptual metaphor provides a compelling alternative to a purely conceptual and experiential explanation with solid linguistic evidence.

References
In this paper, I examine cross-domain mappings which appear in the autobiographical text *Up From Slavery*, by Booker T. Washington (1901/1995). Booker T. Washington, born a slave in the 19th century, was a prominent educator and spokesperson for African-Americans after slavery was abolished in the USA. In my study, I examine the communicative function of conceptual blends in Washington’s life story; in particular, I rely on blending theory (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) to explain conceptual integration in both the discourse and narrative structure of the text, and the three-dimensional model of metaphor (Steen 2008) to characterize blends at both discourse and narrative levels as instances of perspective-changing conceptual integrations.

First, I examine metaphors which foreground the accommodationist stance of the narrating subject. In Text 1 below, School is constructed as Paradise; in Text 2, Slavery is constructed as School.

**Text 1 School as Paradise**

“*I had no schooling* whatever while I was a slave, though I remember on several occasions I went as far as the *schoolhouse door* with one of my young mistresses to carry her books. . . .

. . . *I had the feeling that to get into a school house* and study in this way *would be about the same as getting into paradise.*” (Up From Slavery, p.4)

**Text 2 Enslavement of Blacks as School**

“. . . *the ten million Negroes inhabiting this country,* who themselves or whose ancestors *went through the school of American slavery,* are in a stronger and more hopeful condition, materially, intellectually, morally, and religiously, than is true of an equal number of black people in any other portion of the globe” (Up From Slavery, p.9).

Through these metaphors, the narrator exalts the role of education among newly freed black citizens, while simultaneously appeasing white philanthropists by constructing the enslavement of black people as a form of education, and through implicature, as a kind of paradise.

A more revisionist perspective is developed on the narrative level through conceptual blends which position a black male as a heroic subject. In the second part of the paper, I analyze narratives in *Up From Slavery* as blended structures
which merge variants of the life story paradigm (Smith and Watson 2010) and the success story (Weiss 1969/1988). The emergent structure foregrounds an African-American male as a successful hero in the classic success story frame, thus creating a new reality in the narrator’s era in which a black man succeeds in the white man’s world. Through conceptual integration, a narrating subject skillfully manipulates discourse and narrative forms as a communicative strategy to project his own view of events in his day.

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Anna Piata
University of Athens
apiata@enl.uoa.gr

Time conceptualization in everyday and poetic discourse: from metaphor and beyond

Keywords: time, metaphor, poetic discourse, conceptual integration

Research on time conceptualization has long been devoted to the spatialization (“Christmas is approaching”) and the commodification (“Thank you for your valuable time”) of time and the conceptual metaphors underlying their emergence (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff & Johnson 1999, Lakoff 1993). At the same time, poetic metaphors of time have also been discussed in the light of conceptual metaphors and in terms of their imagistic structure (Lakoff & Turner 1989). However, no unified account of time has been addressed in the relevant literature looking at conventional and creative metaphors of time alike.

The present study aims to shed some light on time conceptualization as manifested in everyday and poetic linguistic expressions of time and thus trace
the continuities and the discontinuities between them. The analysis is based on corpus data drawn from the Hellenic National Corpus (HNC) and a small, specialized corpus of Modern Greek poetry that enable investigating conventional and non-conventional expressions of time respectively. As expected, the findings of the research point to a continuum of varying degrees of conventionality. However, unlike the widely held assumption in cognitive linguistics that time is entirely understood in metaphorical terms, the empirical evidence under examination suggests that non-metaphorical patterns are also used to conceptualize time in the context of poetry, thus constituting the most creative cases of the continuum. In theoretical terms, the proposed analysis uses the analytical tools of Conceptual Integration, or Blending, Theory (Fauconnier & Turner 2002, 2008), which can adequately explain emergent meaning that arises in both metaphorical and non-metaphorical expressions of time.

On the whole, the present study points to an interdisciplinary line of research that integrates insights from cognitive linguistics, cognitive poetics, and corpus research. In doing so, it aims to deepen our understanding of time conceptualization, at the same time sharpening our theoretical tools for explaining conceptual mappings and meaning construction.

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Figurative Thought and Language

Katarina Rasulic
Affiliation: University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philology, English Department
ekv@eunet.rs; k.rasulic@fil.bg.ac.rs

Shakespeare on the shelf, Blue Helmets on the move:
Human-related metonymic conceptualization in English and Serbian

Keywords: human-related, metonymy, English, Serbian

The salience of humans as reference points/vehicles in metonymic conceptualization has long been noted in cognitive linguistics (e.g. Langacker 1993, Kövecses and Radden 1998), while numerous metonymic transfers that recruit concepts from the human domain either as vehicles (e.g. PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT) or as targets (e.g. PIECE OF CLOTHING FOR PERSON) have generally been considered with respect to different types of metonymy-producing conceptual relationships, with respect to different pragmatic functions and at different levels of generalization (cf. Kövecses and Radden 1998, Panther and Thornburg 2003, Warren 2006, Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006).

This paper focuses on human-related metonymies and addresses the issue of how human beings are conceptualized “through the metonymic looking glass”: what are the metonymic vehicles that afford mental access to PEOPLE as the desired targets, what target concepts are accessed via PEOPLE as metonymic vehicles, what does the metonymic portrayal of human beings reveal about the way people conceive of themselves, and to what extent is such human-related metonymic conceptualization culture/language sensitive? It presents a descriptive and contrastive analysis of human-related metonymies based on the linguistic data from English and Serbian (cca 900 examples of human-related metonymies in the two languages, collected from the pertinent linguistic literature, representative electronic corpora, and selected sources of authentic language usage). The findings are discussed with respect to the underlying conceptual patterns as well as the lexical and grammatical aspects of their realizations in the two languages (including culture/language-specific lexicalization, entrenchment / on-line recruitment of human-related metonyms and anaphoric reference). In view of the remarkably rich range, variety and flexibility manifest in the human-related metonymies in the two languages, it is argued that anthropocentricty is one of the prominent features of metonymic conceptualization, that clear preferences towards the recruitment of particular human-related concepts (individual and collective) as metonymic vehicles and targets tend to outweigh culture/language-specific differences, and that human-related metonymies provide a particularly useful insight into the nature of metonymic conceptualization as a powerful
mechanism of meaning extension, online meaning construction and meaning imposition.

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Anna Rewiś-Łętkowska  
Krosno State College, Poland  
a.letkowska@gmail.com  

**Metaphtonymic interplay in the embodied language of fear**

Keywords: fear, emotion, embodiment, metaphor, metonymy, metaphtonymy

This paper deals with the analysis of interactions between metaphors and metonymies within the conceptual model of fear as manifest in English and Polish language data. It elaborates on the long-established link between emotions and physiological symptoms (e.g. Lakoff and Kovecses 1987). Generalizations made on the basis of the analysis show the organization of the concept of fear according to a very limited number of metaphoric and metonymic themes, which interact with each other, giving rise to metaphtonymic concepts, as defined by Goossens 1990 or Ruiz de Mendoza 2000. I postulate that the ‘physiologically motivated’ expressions referring to fear can be categorized according to two metaphtonymic concepts: DROP IN BODY TEMPERATURE STANDS FOR FEAR - FEAR IS COLD and SYMPTOMS OF AN ILLNESS STAND FOR FEAR - FEAR IS AN ILLNESS. My claim at this point is that both the COLD metaphtonymy and the ILLNESS metaphtonymy represent Goossens’ metaphor from metonomy category, where the whole expression is first a metonymy, but then it becomes metaphorically mapped onto another domain.
“An Eye for Resemblances”: Metonymy, Metaphor, and the Cognitive Bases of Similarity

Keywords: metonymy, metaphor, Aristotle, I.A. Richards, conceptual domains

When Aristotle attempted to explicate metaphor in his Poetics, he defined its logic in terms of categorical relationships and asserted that only people with an “eye for resemblances” are capable of producing apt metaphors. Perhaps because Aristotle’s categories themselves were so influential, for more than 2000 years his categorical, similarity-based view of metaphor as sophisticated rhetorical artifice went mostly unchallenged.

In 1931, in an attempt to disprove the Aristotelian view, Richards argued that not only was metaphor ubiquitous in everyday language but that no special ability was required to utilize it. Then in 1987, Lakoff asserted that mental concepts are not logically derived but are accumulated ad hoc through embodied experience. While Lakoff’s concepts better reflect the idiosyncrasies of language than Aristotle’s logical categories, details concerning how conceptual domains cohere and interact to account for metonymy and metaphor have yet to be convincingly explained. This presentation will examine the neural connectivity that must be posited for conceptual domain-based theories to be regarded as viable.

Metonymy may be understood as a linguistic corollary to the neural links that bond disparate mental images together into concepts. Cutler and Clifton (1999: 140) and Giora (2002: 40-41) have offered evidence that disambiguation of meaning in the mental processing of synonyms is accomplished through “spreading activation,” the fundamental process that allows neurons to “fire together” and “wire together.” Because spreading activation is such a well-documented type of neural activity, it is only natural to propose it as the basis for both the instantiation and interpretation of metonymy.

The greater challenge is to explain how cross-domain associations are initiated in theories that view metaphor as a relationship between disparate conceptual domains. English, Greek, and Japanese examples will be used to demonstrate that metaphorical connectivity results as momentary false-positive identifications of pre-primed concepts register in the brain’s recognition systems. While initial discovery of a non-language-based metaphor may require both extensive domain knowledge and the presence of some common element to trigger the correlation, once the novel metaphor has been verbalized, anyone
with language ability and experience with the two domains will be equipped to access the metaphorical understanding.

Consequently, the main insights of both Aristotle and Richards were correct. While it generally takes no special skill to use and interpret metaphors in language, discovering novel metaphors in the absence verbal cues requires a conceptual system with domain elaboration sufficient to trigger the noticing of resemblance.

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Giota Syrpa
School of English, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
syrpag@yahoo.com
Size in English; big and large

Our spatial experience largely determines our reasoning and understanding of the world around us; dimensional adjectives capture the way we perceive space. Among the English dimensional adjectives describing overall physical size, I will focus on the adjectives big and large. In English, the conceptualization of the positive polarity of the semantic dimension of SIZE is expressed in these two alternate ways. Treating these adjectives in terms of synonymy or near synonymy does not suffice to account for their different collocational preferences. Although big and large describe physical size, they both deviate in varying degrees from the overall size of physical objects interpretation; they may be near synonyms when they describe physical size –particularly of inanimate objects- but their meanings diverge when it comes to the description of other kinds of nouns. For instance, the meaning of big seems to extend to metaphoric senses of intensity or importance, whereas large - which seems to collocate with quantity or amount
nouns thus being the preferred adjective to describe an excessive amount or quantity of something (Muehleisen 1997) - encourages extensions that have to do with the scale or amount of a property; describing somebody as ‘large’ in order to attribute the quality of being generous has much to do with this sense of the adjective.

Interestingly enough, the adjectives under study seem to touch upon physical size in different ways and, thus, they further reveal aspects of the concept of SIZE. This is due to different figurative extensions of their meanings. Language speakers rely on physical size (a) to refer to the overall size of physical objects with both big and large; (b) to refer metonymically, mainly with large, to the number of people involved in a situation or to the amount / quantity of something (Taylor 1989 & Radden 2002 have argued for the metonymic basis of the MORE IS UP metaphor due to the natural association between quantity and vertical extent. I will further claim that there is a natural association between quantity / amount and overall size, too, encouraging the metonymic readings of large or big. In addition, Johnson’s Conflation Theory forming the basis of experiential metaphors will be taken into account); (c) to refer metaphorically, mainly with big, to the intensity of actions, the importance of situations and people (IMPORTANT IS BIG, Radden 2002) or even their age.

In this presentation an attempt will be made (a) to offer an account of the collocational preferences of the dimensional adjectives big and large based on corpora findings and (b) to discuss the impact of figurative language either on metonymic and/or metaphoric grounds.

References
Emotion and the metaphor within metonymy: the case of idiomatic expressions of fear

The paper focuses on the idiomatic expressions denoting fear in Greek, i.e. expressions that are instantiations of the general metonymic mapping THE PHYSIOLOGICAL (OR BEHAVIORAL) REACTION STANDS FOR EMOTION (Kövecses 1990, 2000). It aims at examining the pattern of metaphor within metonymy (Goossens 1990; see also Barcelona 2000; Dirven & Pörings 2002). This interplay occurs frequently in the language of emotions — at least in Greek. What is interesting about this pattern is that metaphor and metonymy take on different roles: metonymy perspectivizes a body part while metaphor highlights the intensity of the emotion. This “division of labour” between the two cognitive processes, in addition to the fact that the metaphorical mappings in the pattern of the metaphor within metonymy appear to be from one concrete conceptual domain to another concrete one, raise questions concerning the functionality of metaphor in the language of emotions (Dirven 2002; Foolen 2012; Theodoropoulou 2004, 2012).

References
Metaphor is a cognitive process through which we understand one concept in terms of another. A metaphorical mapping involves a source domain and a target domain (Lakoff 1993, Kövecses 2010). Metonymy is a cognitive process whereby one concept is used to mentally activate another concept with which it is closely related in experience (Panther & Thornburg 2007; Barcelona 2010: 134). Metonymy involves contiguity between the two domains.

Although metaphor and metonymy are distinct cognitive processes, it appears to be the case that the two are not mutually exclusive. They may be found in combination in actual language expressions (Goossens 1995: 159). If metaphor and metonymy are distinct processes or in interaction has raised a lot of discussion (Barnden 2010). It is also argued that the borderline between metaphor and metonymy is blurred (Panther & Thornburg 2007: 239).

Data from the Modern Greek language indicate that metonymy functions within metaphor as a realization of metaphtonymy (Goossens 1995).

(1) Πιερτόδισ prospathies yia na perioristi i katastrofi tou perivalondos
Fever(adj) efforts (noun) so that restricted the destroy(noun) of environment

Fevered efforts so that the destroy of environment is restricted

In the example, efforts are on fever, whereas persons are on fever (metaphor). On the other hand, efforts (action) are seen as the agent (metonymy).

In this presentation we are going to analyze examples of metaphtonymy and raise questions on its realization in actual language data. In those examples contiguity is found in the ACTION IS ACTOR (AGENT) metonymy and others, all involving a human being. Our Modern Greek language data fit in the target-in-source type of metonymy (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera-Masegosa 2011).

References


Efthymia Tsaroucha
School of English, Aristolte University of Thessaloniki
efiaeris@yahoo.gr

Englishisation in Greek Ads; The Rise of a “Novel” Metaphor

Keywords: novel metaphors, semantic extension, ads, youth culture

This paper attempts to discuss the impact of English on Greek ads, mainly TV commercials. It is argued that the continuous influx of English phrases prompts for the rise of novel metaphors that encompass social characteristics of Greek youth culture. The cultural and social context of Greek TV commercials encourages metaphors that permeate certain domains of experience (Kövecses 2008) for the above-named subgroup.

Specifically, many Greek TV commercials whose main trading product is “smart-phones” use the English verb “to hit” in order to promote the advertised product to their target audience, which in most cases is young people. The extensive use of this verb derives from social media and the way youth culture makes use of the web. For instance, when young people use social media they employ phrases like “I hit it” meaning that they have listened to a particular song, watched a video etc. As a result, the verb “to hit” was afterwards introduced to TV commercials appealing to the particular subgroup.

The semantics of the verb “to hit” shifts from the meanings “to touch something with force”, “have a bad effect”, “have a problem and/or difficulty” into the meanings “to start to affect”, “to reach a state” and “to achieve something” (Macmillan Dictionary). Hence, the usage of the verb “to hit” in Greek
TV commercials dealing with the selling of “smart-phones” presupposes that the ones who “hit” the trading product manage to reach a particular goal, that is they buy the advertised product.

Moreover, the figurative interpretation of the verb “to hit” by means of the cognitive process of metaphor seems to encourage the afore-mentioned semantic extension (Radden & Dirven 2007). Particularly, the licensed metaphoric reading is ADVERTISED PRODUCTS ARE HITTING GOALS. This will be treated as a case of orientational metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) since consumers seem to orient themselves towards a particular spatial location (the physical space of buying the advertised product). Hence, the reaching of a destination means the reaching of a goal as well. It seems that the advertised product is positioned in a verticality axis, wherein the reaching of the UP part indicates the state of hitting (purchasing) this product. Lastly, it is argued that the emergence of such metaphors is descriptive of a certain kind of public space. Within this public space consumers (youth culture) are represented as a set of dispositions. Such dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes and incline consumers to act and react on certain ways (Thompson 1991), that is “hitting” the advertised product.

References


Eleni Tziafa, Olympia Tsaknaki
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
etziafa@lit.auth.gr
Greek Crisis Visualized in Political Cartoons

In this paper we aim to show how debt crisis in Greece is framed or conceptualized in cartoons from the perspective of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff
and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Kövecses 2002; etc.). Conceptual Metaphor Theory as a theoretical framework allows us to establish whether different cultures share the same conceptual background as regards the conceptualisations of abstract concepts. Metaphors in economics are a vital part of media language (McCloskey, 1995) and they can help us understand complicated economic concepts (Charteris-Black, 2000; Charteris-Black and Musolff, 2003; White, 2003; White, 2004). After studying how debt crisis in Greece was framed or conceptualized in English and Greek journalistic discourse, based on a corpus of authentic English and Greek financial articles for the period 2008-2012 (Tsaknaki & Tziafa, 2013), we now focus on visualisation, since metaphors ‘can occur non-verbally and multimodally as well as purely verbally’ (Forceville, 2006: 381).

Our study has been based on a corpus of cartoons pertaining to the Greek Crisis, compiled from Greek and international online financial newspapers, magazines, websites and blogs. The time horizon covers a period of four years (2008-2012) containing a total of around 500 cartoons. Metaphorical patterns such as THE BEFORE CRISIS ERA WAS A FEAST, GREECE IS A PATIENT or GREECE IS DANGEROUS are used. They are very often relied on persons, heroes, gods or semi-gods of Greek mythology. Several stereotypes about Greece and the Greek people recur systematically. Metaphors visualised in cartoons may have a positive or a negative connotation. It must be noted that there are common concepts in Greek and international metaphors; nevertheless, it does not come as a surprise that views and perspectives are not always the same, but they are quite different indeed.

We are particularly interested in the clues which permit us to proceed to the metaphor interpretation, especially in the case where there is no contextual or language support for a cartoon. Facial expressions or gesture expressivity representing various emotions and moods may affect our interpretation. Additionally, the knowledge of socio-cultural references presented in a cartoon can be of great help for the decoding of the visual representation, e.g. “My big fat Greek wedding II” (Fig. 1) makes allusions to the film of the same name. As Bounegru and Forceville (2011) point out: “The ridiculing stance of political cartoonists is strongly enhanced by, or even completely resides in, pictorial elements and exaggerations that
do not bear simple translation into words.” Finally, metonymic links to concepts, widely used in cartoons, are also discussed.

References


Ene Vainik  
Institute of the Estonian Language  
en@eki.ee

Multiplicity of motivation behind the dynamic descriptions of emotions in Estonian

There is a general agreement among the cognitive linguists and some psychologists that the domains of physical motion and emotions are somehow conceptually linked (see e.g. Gibbs 2006). There is, however, less agreement about the nature of the relation of conceptual fields. The theory of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) suggests that emotions as more abstract phenomena are conceptualized metaphorically in terms of several more experience-related phenomena – physical force, heat, pressure, imbalance etc (Kövecses 2000). This kind of argumentation is widespread and has gathered evidence mostly from the synchronic data of quite diverse languages and cultures (e.g. Kövecses, 2000; Maalej, 2004; Yu, 1995). On the other hand, it has been argued, that there is no conceptual leap from one cognitive domain (physical) to another (psychological) (Bloem 2012, Geeraerts 2009). Relying mostly on the diachronic data it has been claimed, instead, that the process of transference of concepts of motion to describe some changes in the psychological states has been gradual, and is motivated by the medieval physiological theory of bodily fluids (Geeraerts & Grondelaers 1995, Geeraerts 2009).

From the viewpoint of this discussion it is interesting to look at the data that comes from a non Indo-European language – Estonian. In the presentation I will tackle the usage of motion verbs in the descriptions of emotions. The purpose is to find out what are the patterns of describing “emotion via motion” (Zlatev et al 2012) in Estonian like and whether the material will support either the “nature” or the “culture” account. The data was gathered from the database of the Estonian Explanatory Dictionary. The results reveal both literal and figurative usage of motion verbs; both bodily motivated conceptualizations as well as possibly some influences of the cultural theories.

The synchronic nature of the data does not reveal, however, how and when exactly the suspected cultural loans must have been adapted into Estonian. What seems to be the case in Estonia, instead, is the apparent multiplicity of motivation – both cultural theories and universal bodily experience seem to play a role. In the presentation I will show also that concurrence of multiple metaphors, or a metonymy and a metaphor is widespread in the dynamic conceptualizations. There seems to be no “the one and only” reason for a particular expressions to occur.
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Evgenia Vassilaki  
Department of Primary Education, University of Thessaly  
evasilaki@pre.uth.gr  
Cognitive motivation in the linguistic realization of requests in Modern Greek: the case of present tense interrogatives

Present tense interrogatives  
e.g. *Μου δίνεις το μολύβι σου?*  
(to-me give [2 sing-present indicative] your pencil?)  
*Are you giving me your pencil?*

comprise a relatively standardized way to express requests in Modern Greek and can be employed in a variety of contexts. In terms of their illocutionary force, such utterances carry a strong obligation over the hearer to perform the action requested by the speaker, although they are judged by Greek native speakers as less imposing than imperatives (Sifianou 1992, Vassilaki 2006). While in classic speech act theory such utterances would be accounted for as a conventionalized indirect means to realize directive speech acts, within the Cognitive Linguistics framework they can be handled as grammatical constructions, i.e. pairings of form and meaning specialized in the expression of requests and perceived by the speakers of language as such (cf. Stefanowitsch 2003 for English, Raptis 1995, Vassilaki 2006 for Greek). In the relevant literature, emphasis has been given to the cognitive mechanisms underlying the emergence and the interpretation of such constructions. Metonymy is considered crucial in motivating the interpretation of indirect directive speech acts in the work of Panther & Thornburg (1997, 1998, 2005, see also Panther & Thornburg 2009). Pérez & Ruiz de Mendoza 2002 further support that the interpretation of directive speech acts involves the interaction of different conceptual constructs such as propositional, image-schematic, metonymic and metaphorical Idealized Cognitive Models.

However, there is less research on the ways specific linguistic devices are employed by languages other than English in order to carry particular aspects of directive speech acts such as the cost-benefit parameter and the degree of imposition on the hearer. To a great extent, such aspects seem to be language specific and culturally bounded (Mauri & Sanso 2011).

In the present paper I argue for the cognitive motivation behind the use of present tense in present tense interrogative constructions in Modern Greek.
Exploiting the notion of grounding (in the sense of Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar) and the epistemic models in terms of which reality is construed (Langacker 1991), I attempt to show how the way the speaker profiles the action under request can carry a strong imposition on the hearer to realize the requested action. In other words, it is the relevant distance of the designated process from speaker’s reality that modulates the degree of imposition or optionality of the request. In this sense the main source of the directivity of the construction can be attributed to the verb grammatical specification rather than the interrogative constructional schema applied (which can be metonymically linked to the optionality component of requests). The widespread use of such constructions in Modern Greek seems to be closely related to social norms prevailing in Greek society, a positive-politeness oriented society with a strong preference for involvement versus detachment (Sifianou 1992).

References


Metaphor, Emotions, and Political Speech

Keywords: Metaphor, political speech, emotional responses

The aim of this research project was to examine metaphoric language as it was employed by politicians during the former pre-election campaign in Greece and the share it had on evoking emotions to the addressees. For this purpose we collected Instances of Metaphorically Used Language (IMUL) from the speeches of the leaders of the three main political parties. Questionnaires were given to students of the School of English of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in order to monitor the emotions these IMULs evoked to them. The emotions they were asked to choose from were hope, pride, anger, fear, and sadness. Metaphoric language use was tested in three ways: (a) IMULs were shown in written form, in contexts that had nothing to do with elections; (b) in written form in contexts relevant to the forthcoming elections, while in (c) the IMULs were presented orally to the participants in the format of video clips taken from the original
Figurative Thought and Language

speeches of the politicians. In order to compare the emotional responses to metaphorical language in the three types mentioned above, two χ² tests were performed. The results showed that from (a) to (c) there was a (highly) significant deviation in terms of IMULs and emotions; for example, IMULs that evoked hope in (a), in (b) and (c) were evaluated as evoking anger. These results are suggestive not only of the significance of context but also of the effect the broader crisis has on the subjects. The crisis seems to have largely affected the subjects’ emotional reactions to the metaphorically used language by politicians. Despite the fact that “politicians use language in ways designated to persuade, and perhaps deceive, and some people would include ‘metaphors’ as examples of political rhetoric” (Chilton, 2006: 63), in the framework of the Greek crisis, the results showed that metaphorical language does not activate emotions to speakers at least not to the extent it is generally expected to be. This may be due to what Sharifian (2011: 21, 35) calls “emergent cultural cognition”. Cultural cognition, therefore, seems to be superimposed on language especially in situations of crisis.

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